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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that are linked by the common topic
of individual labor income dynamics. For most households labor income is the main
source of income. This implies that it matters for many decisions of these households how
their labor incomes change over time: they save to cover the expenditures triggered by
unforeseen events or to bridge periods of unemployment; they invest in education partly
in expectation of higher incomes in the future; even fertility decisions can be affected if
the future income stream is highly risky from the perspective of the households.
More specific, this thesis covers two aspects of labor income. First, it explicitly de-
composes observed income dynamics into components of risk on the one hand and choice
on the other. Second, it analyzes the dynamics of labor incomes over the business cycle
and asks how well households can insure themselves against cyclical fluctuations of the
main earner’s income and how well the government provides additional insurance via the
existing tax and transfer system.
The literature on labor income risk usually treats the wage process as exogenous
to workers, with few exceptions. Those papers study labor income risk by analyzing
data on labor income and treat the income changes as “shocks”, after controlling for
some observable characteristics like age and gender (prominent examples are Moffitt and
Gottschalk, 2002, or Guvenen, 2009). However, observed wage dynamics are the result of
both exogenous factors, such as productivity shocks, and workers’ choices. In Chapter 2,
I analyze the relationship between the decision of workers to switch occupations and the
dynamics of labor income. I focus on the choice to switch occupations for two reasons.
First, the extent of occupational switching upon changing establishments is high, as I
document using data from administrative German social security records: on average 40%
of workers who change establishments also change occupation (in a classification with 30
1
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occupational groups). Second, the decision to change occupations is of major relevance
for realized wages: in terms of the log 90–10 differential, the distribution of wage changes
is about 60% wider for workers that switch occupations than for workers that change
establishments within their occupation (for workers that experience an unemployment
spell, the distribution is 30% wider).
I then develop a structural model in which workers optimally choose occupations in re-
sponse to productivity shocks. This choice then also affects their accumulation of human
capital, which is imperfectly transferable across occupations. The observed productivity
changes of workers in the model economy differ from the underlying productivity shocks.
This distinction allows me to use the model to (i) identify the role of occupational switch-
ing choices for productivity changes and (ii) to quantify the utility gain from the option
of occupational switching. The model is calibrated to be consistent with the occupational
and wage dynamics documented in the data. In the calibrated model, the endogenous
choice of occupations accounts for 26% of the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity
changes after controlling for human capital changes. The utility gain from the availability
of switching occupations corresponds to about 0.78% of per-period consumption for the
average worker. This gain reflects that a worker, looking into the future, knows that some
shocks he receives will be connected to his current occupation and by leaving for another
occupation he can mitigate these negative shocks to some extent. At the same time, some
high positive income changes are related to switching occupations in the context of career
progression.
The focus of the analysis here is on uncovering underlying risk and the role of occu-
pational choice as a device for workers to react in part to this underlying risk. Given this
connection, the model framework now allows to think about the role for wage dynamics
of policies that affect the incentives to switch occupations. This normative analysis is left
for future research.
Chapters 3 and 4 both evolve around the question how labor incomes vary over the
business cycle. Chapter 3 covers a joint paper with Alexander Ludwig. We analyze the
income streams realized by households and ask if and how the distribution of income
shocks across individuals varies systematically over the business cycle, where “shocks”
refers to income changes. In more technical terms, we develop a novel parametric approach
to estimate the relationship between idiosyncratic and aggregate labor income risk. This
connection has been shown in the literature to have potentially important implications
for macroeconomic phenomena, e.g., for asset pricing (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2007) or
the welfare costs of business cycles (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2001a, or Lucas, 2003).
Early evidence by Storesletten et al. (2004) suggests that in a classic decomposition of
3income changes into transitory and permanent shocks (cf., Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002)
the variance of the permanent component is larger in recessions than in booms. More
recently, Guvenen et al. (2014) report that the variance of shocks does not change over the
business cycle, but that instead the distribution becomes more negatively skewed, which
means that the distribution varies asymmetrically and downside risk becomes larger in
recessions. However, their analysis is non-parametric and thus the results are not directly
comparable to Storesletten et al. (2004). The analysis in chapter 3 fills this gap by
providing identification for the cyclicality of the skewness of permanent shocks.
In a nutshell, the idea is that long-lasting income changes accumulate over time. If
the distribution of these changes varies systematically between aggregate contractions and
expansions, then the cross-sectional distribution of incomes of a cohort of workers that
went through more bad times will differ from the cross-sectional distribution of another
cohort at the same age. This idea was brought forward by Storesletten et al. (2004),
who allow the variance of the shocks to take on different values in recessions and booms.
We extend their analysis and show that the general idea carries over to the skewness
of the distribution, a measure of its (a)symmetry. We derive closed form expressions
for the cross-sectional variance and skewness of income, and achieve identification of
the corresponding moments of the shocks in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
framework.
Applying our method to German data from the Socioeconomic Panel Study, we find
that the variance of permanent shocks to gross labor earnings of males increases in reces-
sions. This is in line with the results of Storesletten et al. (2004). However, we find that
this increase of the variance is asymmetric–which is reflected in the estimation by a pro-
cyclical skewness of the permanent shocks. Together, the increase of the variance together
with a more left-skewed distribution in aggregate contractions indicates that negative log
earnings realizations become relatively more likely than positive ones in economic down-
turns. We then estimate the stochastic process for labor incomes at the household level:
for household gross labor earnings we find insurance against transitory but not against
permanent shocks. “Insurance” is meant here in the sense that transitory shocks are less
dispersed and less negatively skewed for households than for individuals. Finally, the
German tax and transfer system provides insurance against both shocks: when consid-
ering taxes and transfers and estimating the process for a measure of post-government
household income the cyclicality of household labor earnings risk is gone.
Chapter 4 covers a joint paper with David Domeij, Fatih Guvenen, and Rocio Madera.1
1In terms of the relative contributions, the whole project was joint work in the sense that the substan-
tial decisions were made jointly in an iterative process. The different contributions then mainly concern
the data preparation and application, in my specific case the SOEP and the SIAB data. Further, the
application in the structural model and the programming of the Simulated Method of Moments estimator
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Relative to the previous chapter, the analysis mainly differs along two dimensions. First,
it zooms out and provides a comparative analysis of the United States, Germany, and
Sweden. Second, it differs from a methodological point of view, because we do not impose
any parametric structure on the distribution of income shocks. Instead, we use non-
parametric methods to analyze the cyclical behavior of labor income changes, the role of
household insurance against this cyclical risk, and the effectiveness of government insur-
ance schemes. We find that across the different labor markets, individual labor income
risk behaves similar and that households are exposed to almost the same risk as individu-
als. Namely, downside risk is higher in recessions. The existing tax and transfer schedules
are successful at reducing the asymmetric risk in all three economies. The chapter finishes
with an evaluation of the welfare gain coming from the insurance provided by the govern-
ment on top of within-household insurance. To this end, we adopt an incomplete markets
model with partial insurance of households against fluctuations developed by Heathcote
et al. (2014). Households in the model face an exogenous income process that we estimate
separately for each economy and for pre- and post-government household income. We
find the gain to be highest in Sweden, followed by the United States and Germany.
Chapter 5 again deals with the question of how labor incomes vary over the business
cycle. Compared to the two preceding chapters, it takes a more structural perspective
and discusses a specific channel through which workers are affected asymmetrically by
aggregate fluctuations. The goal of the chapter is to evaluate the welfare costs of aggre-
gate fluctuations in the presence of imperfect mobility of workers across sectos. To this
end, I set up a real business cycle model with two production sectors and involuntary
unemployment. An important feature of the model is that aggregate fluctuations are en-
dogenously propagated asymmetrically to the two sectors–and as a consequence, workers
want to move across sectors in response to aggregate shocks, which is costly. These costs
can generate costs of aggregate fluctuations, which exceed those in a frictionless economy.
in the last section is collaborative work of Rocio Madera and myself.
Chapter 2
Occupational Switching and Wage
Risk
This chapter is based on Busch (2017).1
2.1 Introduction
Many economic decisions hinge on labor income risk faced by individuals: among others,
savings behavior and portfolio choice (e.g., Carroll, 1997, or Guvenen, 2007), or fertility
decisions. Accordingly, understanding labor income risk is important for a number of
macroeconomic phenomena–ranging from the wealth distribution (Aiyagari, 1994), over
asset prices (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996), to the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk
(Storesletten et al., 2001b).
The traditional approach to evaluate the extent of labor income risk is to analyze labor
income data (prominent examples are Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002, Guvenen, 2009, or
more recently Guvenen et al., 2016). However, income dynamics observed in the data are
always the result of an interplay between risk and decisions made by workers, the latter
partly in reaction to the former. Starting with the analysis of the labor market histories
of young men by Topel and Ward (1992), the literature shows that job-to-job transitions
play a key role for wage dynamics realized by workers during their career.
In this chapter, I zoom in on job-to-job transitions and find that a large share of workers
1I thank Helge Braun, Fatih Guvenen, Alex Ludwig, and Martin Scheffel for detailed comments on
the work in this chapter. Special thanks also go to David Domeij, Michael Krause, Ludo Visschers,
and David Wiczer. I thank participants of the 2016 SED meeting in Toulouse, the XXI Workshop on
Dynamic Macroeconomics in Vigo, the IZA-CMR PhD workshop, the CMR lunch seminar, the BGSE-
CMR Rhineland workshop, the Minnesota Macro Labor workshop, and the University of Edinburgh for
helpful comments. I thank the St. Louis FED, the University of Minnesota, and the University of
Edinburgh for their hospitality.
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switch to different types of jobs: on average, about 40% of workers that change jobs also
change occupations (in a classification with 30 occupational groups). While I document
this observation for the German labor market using a representative administrative data
set from social security records, it appears to be a common feature of labor markets with
very different institutional settings (see Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers, 2014, for the US,
or Carrillo-Tudela et al., 2016, for the UK). With respect to the wage changes realized
upon the job change, staying in the current occupation or moving to another is of large
relevance: both high wage gains and severe wage cuts are realized more frequently by job
changers who also switch occupations.
Thus, the decision to switch occupations is a major way for workers to affect their wage
outcomes: the realized wage dynamics result from an interplay between the underlying
risk and the choice to switch occupations or not. The choice of occupational switching
enables workers to react to shocks and thereby potentially mitigate negative realizations
of shocks–or to realize high wage gains related to a different occupation. In order to
disentangle the two, it is not sufficient to look at income data alone. Instead, I analyze
the evolution of wages together with job-to-job transitions, explicitly taking into account
the occupation at a given job. By its very nature, the switching decision is endogenous.
Hence, I build a structural model of occupational choice that allows to dissect the realized
wage change into its shock and choice components. In other words, the model allows me
to evaluate the magnitude and distribution of underlying productivity shocks necessary
to generate a distribution of realized wage changes in line with the data.
In a calibrated version of the model that is consistent with the documented patterns of
wage changes and occupational switching, I find that the variance of productivity changes
realized by switchers (stayers) is 69% (96%) of the variance of the underlying shocks.
Thus, if one were to equate the observed distribution with the underlying distribution, one
would make an error of 31% (4%) in terms of the dispersion. Considering the distribution
of wage changes for switchers and stayers together, the endogenous choice of switching
generates about 26% of the variance of realized productivity changes. For this calculation,
I compare to the actual dispersion of productivity changes in the model, the dispersion
of a counterfactual distribution, where workers are randomly selected to be switchers or
stayers–keeping the overall level of occupational switching constant.
The counterfactual scenario differs from the actual distribution on two ends: some
workers would decide to switch but are forced to stay; and some workers would decide
to stay but are forced to switch. For the forced stayers, switching would imply a better
outcome, i.e., either a smaller negative change of productivity, or a larger positive change.
Given that the dispersion is larger once workers endogenously choose the occupation, the
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second channel is quantitatively more important; this channel can be interpreted as career
progression. The first channel can be interpreted as an informal insurance character of
occupational switching: the switcher still realizes a negative productivity change, but the
counterfactual would be worse. Thus, workers can react to bad luck that affects them
in their current occupation: think, for example, of a construction worker who after an
accident cannot continue to work as a construction worker, but is able to switch to a
physically less demanding occupation. Given that the switching decision appears to have
large relevance for productivity changes, I use the calibrated model to calculate the utility
gain from the possibility to switch: the gain for the average worker corresponds to 0.78%
of per-period consumption.2
The main data for the calibration of the model comes from a large sample of labor
market histories of workers from administrative German social security records, the SIAB.
In the social security data, I document the extent of occupational switching of workers in
the German labor market and relate it to wage dynamics. Occupational switching refers
to labor market transitions that imply a change of occupation. I document how both
the occurrence of switches and the distribution of wage changes varies with the rank of
a worker in the wage distribution of her origin occupation and with the distance of the
switch. I empirically measure the distance between any pair of occupations using task
measures in survey data from the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training
(BiBB). This is interpreted against the background of occupation-specific human capital
that is only partly transferrable across occupations.3
In terms of empirical patterns, I find that, first, workers switching occupations face
a wider distribution of wage changes than those who change jobs within their current
occupation. Downside movements of wages are much more common and more severe
for workers that transition through unemployment as compared to direct job switchers.
Second, conditional on changing jobs, the probability to switch occupations is about 40%
on average. The individual wage in the old occupation matters: the probability to switch is
the lower, the higher the wage of a worker is relative to all workers in the same occupation
before changing jobs. Third, while the declining pattern of the switching probability by
rank holds for both job changes through unemployment and direct job-to-job transitions,
2In ongoing work, I also analyze the possibility that workers can trade-off short-term wage losses
against long-term gains by moving to a steeper wage profile.
3The first empirical paper that emphasizes the importance of performed tasks in the context of specific
human capital and its partial transferability across occupations is Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010).
Using an earlier version of the administrative data analyzed in this chapter and the same data on task
measures, they construct a measure of ’task-tenure’ and show its significance for explaining wages. While
they estimate the average returns to task-tenure in a Mincer-regression, I explicitly analyze heterogeneity
of occupational mobility and transferability of human capital across the wage distribution.
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switches are more likely after an unemployment period: about 55% of the moves through
unemployment involve an occupation-switch, while this is true for 35% of direct job-to-job
switches. On top of this, I find that the probability to switch occupations upon re-entering
employment increases strictly with the duration of unemployment.
Related Literature
The model builds on the tradition of island economies a la Lucas and Prescott (1974), and
is closely related to Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014). As in their model, idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are the driver of worker movements across occupations.4 Different
to their model, reallocation is not necessarily through unemployment, and workers draw
from two different distributions of productivity shocks (related to staying and switching).
The economy is characterized by occupational islands, each of which is populated by a
continuum of workers. Workers stochastically accumulate human capital and are exposed
to persistent shocks to their idiosyncratic productivity. They can react to shocks by
switching to a different occupation. Switching entails a cost for workers, because human
capital is only imperfectly transferrable, whereby the degree of transferrability depends
on the distance between occupations. The idiosyncratic productivity shock is drawn from
different distributions for workers who stay in the old occupation or workers who switch.
The interplay between shocks, and the resulting switching decision (and the implied moves
along the human capital ladder) allows the model to generate different distributions of
realized wage changes for stayers and switchers. In addition, workers experience taste
shocks, which represent how much they like the non-pecuniary characteristics of each
occupation.5 Workers face an exogenous separation shock, and unemployed workers face
a search friction. When finding a job, workers have all bargaining power such that wages
correspond to marginal productivity.
This chapter is closely related to Low et al. (2010), who also argue that realized
income dynamics result from an interaction of underlying risk and worker decisions. They
focus on the decision of workers to change jobs and differentiate productivity risk from
employment risk, and evaluate the welfare consequences of the different risks using a
life cycle consumption-savings model, which features a rich set of government insurance
policies. Regarding the analysis of wage dynamics, there are two main differences between
this chapter and their analysis. First, they do not address the occupational choice of
workers; I show this to be of major importance for realized wage outcomes. Second, they
4This is one key difference of the model of Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014) and mine to, e.g.,
Alvarez and Shimer (2011), or Wiczer (2015), where reallocation is driven by occupation-specific shocks.
5In an analysis of the effects of occupational switching on outcomes of workers, Longhi and Brynin
(2010) document in survey data of the British Household Panel Survey and the German Socioeconomic
Panel, that a large share of switchers report an improvement in job satisfaction.
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do not explicitly model the job changing decision of workers; instead they estimate a
reduced form income process, in which the selection of workers to change jobs is captured
by a first-stage probit regression.
By emphasizing the importance of analyzing economic choices for the understanding
of labor income risk, this chapter is related to Guvenen and Smith (2014). Using data
on labor earnings and consumption, they estimate a consumption-savings model and in-
fer the amount of risk faced by agents and the degree of insurance against this risk. In
the sense that I am interested in the extent to which occupational switching–or its twin,
occupational attachment–can help us to understand aggregate phenomena, my analysis
is in the spirit of Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), who consider a channel through
which occupational mobility relates to income inequality, as well as Wiczer (2015), and
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014).6 Focusing on the reallocation decision of unem-
ployed, Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014) use data from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) to analyze the role of occupational switching upon finding
employment for aggregate unemployment fluctuations and the distribution of unemploy-
ment duration. They develop a search and matching model that accounts for the observed
patterns. On the empirical side, they document that the likelihood of switching the oc-
cupation upon reentry increases with the unemployment duration. Their framework is
closely related to Wiczer (2015), who builds a model in which unemployed workers are
attached to their recent occupation due to specific human capital.
Empirically, Wiczer (2015) constructs a distance measure between occupations based
on occupational task measures of the O*NET project. In this regard, his analysis is close
to this chapter. However, while his focus is on the role of occupational attachment of
the unemployed for long-term unemployment, I focus on the transferrability of specific
human capital across occupations by rank of workers. This connects this chapter to
Groes et al. (2015), who, using Danish administrative data, analyze how the rank of a
worker within the occupation-specific wage distribution affects the observed occupational
switching behavior. They document that, first, both workers with a relatively low wage
and those with a relatively high wage appear to be more likely to leave the occupation
compared to workers closer to the mean wage. Second, the farther up (down) a switcher
ranks in the wage distribution of her origin occupation, the more likely she switches to an
occupation that pays on average higher (lower) wages than the origin distribution. They
rationalize these two facts with a model of vertical sorting across occupations based on
6In terms of analyzing effects of occupational matching on wages, the chapter is also related to
Guvenen et al. (2015) and Lise and Postel-Vinay (2015), who analyze how (multidimensional) match
quality affects wage growth. However, these papers explicitly focus on a life cycle perspective.
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absolute advantage.7
Huckfeldt (2016) relates occupational switching to the dynamics of earnings and, using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), documents that earnings losses
upon losing a job are concentrated among workers who re-enter employment in lower
lanked occupations. While he focusses on negative implications of moving down the
occupational ladder for the average worker, I relate the whole distribution of wage changes
to occupational switching in either direction.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data
used in the analysis. Section 2.3 analyzes the distribution of wage changes realized by
occupational switchers and the empirical relevance of occupational switching. Section 2.4
introduces a model of occupational switching. Section 2.5 discusses the calibration of the
model, and analyzes, first, the role of switching for wage changes, and, second, the utility
gain from the availability to switch occupations. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Sample Selection
This section provides a description of the data sets used in the empirical analysis, as well
as an overview of the sample selection criteria. The main data set is the SIAB, which has
been used for the analysis of earnings and wage dynamics in, e.g., Busch et al. (2016),
Card et al. (2013), or Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010). The BiBB surveys have been
used to characterize occupations in, e.g., Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010), or recently
by Becker and Muendler (2015).
The SIAB data
The analysis is based on a sample from social security records provided by the Institute
of Employment Research (IAB) of the German federal unemployment agency. The data
set covers 2% of all workers who are employed and subject to social security contributions
from 1976 to 2010, implying that civil servants and students are not covered. Throughout
the analysis, the focus is on males working in West Germany. After applying the usual
selection criteria, the sample comprises on average 55,000 individuals per year, with about
430,000 individuals in total. For a detailed description of the data, see vom Berge et al.
(2013).8
7Their model features learning of workers about their own skills. In my model, there is no ex ante
heterogeneity of workers (in either a one- or a multi-dimensional skill), and thus learning about oneself
does not play role for the analyzed mechanism. A recent overview of papers that model worker learning
about skills or talent can be found in Sanders and Taber (2012).
8Incomes in the SIAB are top-coded: I implement the same imputation procedure as described in
appendix B.1.3.
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The BiBB data
Information on the skill and task content of occupations is taken from a set of surveys
conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BiBB) with
wave-specific cooperation partners. The waves are 1979, 1986, 1992, 1999, 2006, and 2012.
The cross-sectional surveys each cover a representative sample of about 30,000 respondents
and contain information on the tasks performed by workers and on the skills required by
their job. Importantly for the present analysis, respondents report their occupations,
which allows the aggregation of task and skill measures to the level of occupations. I use
data from the first five waves and merge the generated occupation-level information to
the SIAB sample. A comprehensive description of the data can be found in Gathmann
and Schoenberg (2010).
Sample Selection
While East German employment spells since unification are observed in the data, the
analysis focuses on West Germany. East Germany went through a transition period from
a planned economy to a market economy and hence the economic forces governing wages,
and, of prime importance for this chapter, occupational choices, were very different than
those in West Germany. I consider full-time employment spells only and focus on those
employment relationships that have some minimum stability, which I define as a minimum
duration of two months. I drop observations for ages below 25 or above 54. All reported
results are for males.
2.3 Wage Changes and Occupational Switching
2.3.1 The Concept of Occupations in the Data
Definition of Occupations
Occupations are defined by the KldB88 – the 1988 version of the German employment
agency’s classification of occupations, which is consistently available in the data. I use
the classification at the level of occupation segments, which comprises 30 groups of oc-
cupations. At this level, potential problems of misclassification can be expected to be
small. Examples for the groups are “Painter and similar”, “Carpenter, model makers”,
“Organization-, Administration-, Office- related”, or “Physicist, Engineer, Chemist, Math-
ematician”. Table A.1 shows all 30 groups.
Measurement of Tasks and the Distance Between Occupations
At several points in the analysis, I will consider the distance of an occupational switch.
The distance is measured in the dimension of tasks, building on the concept of an occu-
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pation as a combination of tasks (cf. Autor, 2013, or Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). To
the extent that human capital is task-specific, as argued, among others, by Gathmann
and Schoenberg (2010), the economic implications of switching occupations vary with the
distance in the task dimension between old and new occupation.9
Due to the lack of direct information on tasks performed by the workers observed in
the SIAB, the analysis uses external information on task usage at the level of occupations.
Task data comes from representative surveys by the BIBB (see section 2.2). I follow Becker
and Muendler (2015) and define 15 time-consistent task categories and then calculate the
share of workers in each occupation that performs any given task.10
Based on this measure, I calculate the distance between any two occupations o and o′.
Following the literature (cf. Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010)), my preferred measure of
distance is
doo′ ≡ 1−
∑J
j=1 (qjo × qjo′)[(∑J
j=1 q
2
jo
)
×
(∑J
j=1 q
2
jo′
)]1/2 , (2.1)
where qjo denotes the share of workers in occupation o who perform task j. The fraction
on the right-hand side is the angular separation, which is a measure of proximity that
takes only differences in the relative occurence of tasks into account.11 I calculate the
distance measure for all pairs of occupation segments in each cross-section of the BIBB
and then merge the distance measure to the SIAB sample of worker histories.12
The Ranking of Workers
The ranking of a worker i of age a within the occupation-specific wage distribution in a
given month t is based on age adjusted (log) wages, wi,a,t. The age adjustment removes
9An alternative to the task based characterization of occupations is to resort to measures of skills
required to perform the tasks (e.g., Guvenen et al., 2015). Because I do not analyze the matching of
skill requirements to the skills of workers, but rather use the occupation level information to measure the
distance between occupations, the two approaches can be expected to yield similar results if similarity of
occupations in terms of performed tasks correlates strongly with similarity of skill requirements. Given
that some of the task categories used in the analysis are explicitly based on skill requirements, the applied
distance measure reflects differences along the lines of applied skills.
10I thank Sascha Becker for providing details on the task imputation procedure developed in Becker
and Muendler (2015).
11Consider an example with two tasks and two occupations, where both occupations are characterized
by the same overall mix of tasks. In occupation 1, all workers perform both tasks, while in occupation
2, half of the workers performs task 1 exclusively and the other half performs task 2 exclusively. The
distance as measured by (2.1) between the two occupations is zero. The measure is long-established in
the literature on R&D spillovers, where research intensity of firms in different technologies is used to
characterize the proximity of firms (cf. Jaffe, 1986).
12I merge the distance measure from the 1979 BIBB wave to switches in the SIAB which occur between
1980 and 1982, from the 1986 wave to switches in 1983-1988, from the 1992 wave to switches in 1989-1994,
from the 1999 wave to switches in 1995-2001, and from the 2006 wave to switches in 2002-2010.
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the economy-wide average age profile, however, it does not remove potential heterogeneity
of age profiles across occupations. Let w˜i,a,t be the raw (log) wage. I achieve the age
adjustment by subtracting from w˜i,a,t the (adjusted) coefficient on the relevant age dummy,
da, from a regression of raw (log) wages on age and cohort dummies, as well as a constant:
w˜i,a,t = β0 +
A∑
j=2
d˜agej 1 {a = j}+
C∑
k=2
d˜cohortk 1 {c = k} . (2.2)
The coefficients on the age dummies are rescaled to the mean wage at the youngest
age: d1 = β0 and daǫ[2,A] = β0 + d˜
age
a , which then give wi,a,t = w˜i,a,t − da. Based on this
measure, workers are ranked cross-sectionally relative to other workers in their occupation.
The monthly ranking considers all workers who work in a full-time employment spell that
lasts for at least three months, and at least two weeks lie in the given month.
2.3.2 Realized Wage Changes Upon Switching Occupations
Given the definition of occupations, I turn to the distribution of wage changes realized
by occupation switchers and relate them to the wage changes realized by occupation
stayers. I classify a worker as occupation stayer (switcher) if he changes the job and
the occupation at the new job is the same as (different than) the one at the previous
job.13 Further, I differentiate direct job changes, which I refer to as Employer-to-Employer
transitions (E-E), and job changes which go through unemployment (E-U-E). I consider
unemployment spells of up to one year, and treat a transition to be a direct job change
when the unemployment spell is shorter than one month.
A First Look at the Distribution of Wage Changes
Figure 2.1 shows the smoothed log-density function of wage changes upon changing jobs
for four groups: stayers vs. switchers and E-E vs. E-U-E transitions. The individual
wage change is calculated as the difference between the logs of the wage at the new job
and at the old job. From the four groups, the distribution of wage changes for workers
that transition directly and stay within their occupation displays the smallest dispersion.
Occupation switchers realize both more wage losses and more wage gains upon changing
jobs directly. Overall, the distribution is more skewed to the right, with the right arm of
the density shifting farther out than the left arm relative to occupation stayers. This is
compatible with voluntary occupation switches that entail career progression.
Turning to the transitions through unemployment, as would be expected, a big share of
13In the SIAB data, the establishment of a worker during an employment spell and hence a change of
establishment–referred to here as a job change. By focusing on these job changers, I follow the notion of
career changes in Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Wage Changes
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Note: Log-density of wage changes upon changing jobs based on a pooled sample. The non-parametric
estimates are smoothed using a locally weighted regression with span 0.05.
the workers reentering the labor market faces a wage loss relative to the pre-unemployment
job. Comparing the distribution of wage changes of occupation switchers to the one
for stayers that go through unemployment, I find higher losses for switchers. This is
compatible with involuntary occupation switching, where workers first search within their
old occupation and, after not being successful for a while, decide to search in another
occupation. Given the administrative character of the data, which does not provide us
with information regarding the actual search strategy of the unemployed, this is something
I cannot explore in more detail.
Quantile Regression Analysis
While the preceding analysis of wage changes by means of the log density plots can deliver
a good first intuition, it cannot shed light on the role of continuos variables for wage
changes, such as the distance of a switch or the rank before changing jobs. I address this by
fitting a set of quantile regressions, which are a useful tool to analyze how different parts of
the conditional distribution of wage changes differ with a set of observable characteristics
(Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Overall, these regressions confirm and quantify the intuitive
insights from above.
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The regressions take the following form:
quanτ (△ log (wage)) = β0 (τ) + β1 (τ)Rank + β2 (τ)Unemp + ...
Switch× (β3 (τ) + β4 (τ)Ranki,t + β5 (τ)Unemp + β6 (τ)Distance) + . . .
T∑
t=2
γt (τ)1 (year = t) + u, (2.3)
where quanτ (△ log (wage)) is the τ ’s quantile of the distribution of (log) wage changes
conditional on the explanatory variables:14 Unemp is a dummy variable that takes on
value one if the transition is through unemployment and zero otherwise; Switch is a
dummy variable for occupational switching; Rank measures the rank in the last job
in vintiles; Distance measures the distance between the old and the new occupation;
1 (year = t) represents year dummies; and u is an error term.
The coefficients of the quantile regressions are plotted in Figure 2.2 along with 95%
confidence bands.15 The reported coefficients for the constant are normalized by the
average year fixed effect. Consider first the coefficients on the rank in the last job, which
are negative for all quantiles: the higher a worker is ranked relative to other workers
in the same occupation, the more severe (relatively) are the adverse implications for
wage changes of a job change. The point estimates imply that the median worker that
changes the job within the same occupation faces a distribution of wage changes with an
about 0.07 lower 10th percentile and an about 0.15 lower 90th percentile than the worker
from the lowest rank.16 Workers that go through unemployment realize a distribution
of wage changes that is shifted down relative to job changers that do not experience an
unemployment spell: the workers at the 10th percentile of wage changes realize an about18
log points bigger wage cut than those at the 10th percentile among the direct job changers.
At the 90th percentile, the wage cut is larger by about 3 log points.
Turning to the occupation switchers, the positive slope of the coefficients on the switch-
14It might be helpful to think about the quantile regression models relative to a “standard” linear
regression model: coefficients of the quantile regression model for quantile τ predict the τ th quantile
of the conditional distribution, while coefficients of the linear regression model predict the conditional
mean. Estimation is performed by maximum likelihood, where the objective function is (minus) the sum
of weighted absolute deviations from the predicted value, with quantile-specific weights for positive and
negative deviations.
15Confidence bands are based on the standard deviation of the coefficients from 200 bootstrap repe-
titions. Bootstrap samples are clustered at the individual level in order to preserve the auto-correlation
structure of wages.
16The rank is measured in vintiles, so the median worker is in rank 10.
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Figure 2.2: Coefficients of Quantile Regressions
(a) Constant (b) Switching and Distance
(c) Rank in Last Job (d) Unemployment Between Old and New Job
Note: Each plot shows the coefficients from quantile regressions for log wage change for several quantiles;
the regression includes a constant and year fixed effects as specified in (2.3). Rank can take on values
1-20, and the distance is between 0 and 1. 374,139 observations (sample of job changers).
ing dummy by quantile confirm that the distribution of wage changes is wider than for job
changers within the same occupation. Considering the distance of the switch, the coeffi-
cients imply the distribution is the wider, the farther the switch. Regarding job changers
within the same occupation, the wage gains are lower if the worker ranked higher. Last,
relative to a direct job changer, a worker who switches occupations after an unemploy-
ment spell faces a penalty for the unemployment period that is more pronounced than
the unemployment penalty for the workers that stay in their occupation.17
17The anlysis shown here focuses on the distribution of instantaneous wage changes. However, the
occupational switching decision of workers can be assumed to be based on expectations about future
wage implications. In ongoing work, I am evaluating this channel by considering the relationship between
switching and medium-run, i.e., 5-year, wage changes. Also, I am analyzing the impact on wage growth
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2.3.3 The Amount of Occupational Switching
Given that occupation switchers realize a more dispersed distribution of wage changes
upon changing jobs, is it a relevant share of workers that switch occupations? In what fol-
lows, I show that occupational switching is indeed an empirically important phenomenon.
The probabilities of switching occupations across quantiles of the occupation-specific
wage distribution are shown in Figure 2.3. The population used to estimate the monthly
switching probabilities comprises all workers that, after having worked in full-time em-
ployment previously, start a new employment spell in month t. I estimate the probability
of switching occupation o for a worker i ranked in rank r, conditional on starting a new
job, non-parametrically as
Pr
{
Switchi|jobi,new 6= jobi,old ∧ ranki,old = r
}
=∑
j 1 {oi,new 6= oi,old ∧ ranki,old = r}∑
j 1 {jobi,new 6= jobi,old ∧ ranki,old = r}
. (2.4)
Figure 2.3a shows that across wage ranks, the probability of leaving the occupation
upon changing jobs is high. Among the workers coming from the bottom five percent
of the wage distribution in their old occupation, the share of workers leaving their job
for another occupation is highest at about 55%. Up to the 80th percentile, the switching
probability displays a declining pattern, which then flattens out at about 37%. 18
Differentiating direct job changes from those through unemployment, Figure 2.3a re-
veals that, across ranks, it is more likely for workers to switch occupations when they
experience a period of unemployment: on average, about 55% of the job changers that
went through unemployment switch occupations, with a decreasing pattern from about
64% for workers coming from the bottom five percent to around 53% for the highly ranked
workers. Out of all workers who do not go through unemployment, on average, about 35%
switch occupations. Again, the pattern across ranks is declining with about 46% of work-
ers from the bottom and 30% from the higher ranks switching.
In Figure 2.3b, I consider the role of unemployment duration, and find that the share of
workers switching occupations increases with the duration of unemployment. For workers
from the lower half of the occupation-specific wage distribution before entering unemploy-
ment, it stays constant at around 55% for the first five months, after which it increases in a
after the switch. Preliminary results do not suggest that workers do not trade-off short-term losses against
a steeper wage profile.
18Note that Groes et al. (2015) analyze a similar switching pattern for Denmark. However, they
analyze annual earnings data (while I look at monthly wage data) and find a pronounced U-shape of the
switching probability by rank.
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Figure 2.3: Probability of Switching Occupations
(a) Switching by Rank
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Note: Non-parametric probabilities. Smoothed using locally weighted regressions with a 1st degree
polynomial. Only workers with unemployment duration up to one year are considered.
roughly linear fashion up to just below 70% for workers leaving unemployment in the 12th
month. The switiching probability for workers from the upper half of the occupational
wage distribution displays a similar pattern, with a constant probability of about 45% in
the first four months, increasing to about 55%.19
2.4 A Model of Occupational Switching
2.4.1 Overview of the Model Economy
In this section, I build a stationary model of the labor market in which workers discretely
choose their sector of employment. The model allows us to shed light on the relative roles
of occupational choices and of productivity shocks for realized income changes. More pre-
cisely, using the model, I can calibrate aspects of the distribution of shocks consistent with
observed wage changes. This allows me to analyze occupational switching as an insurance
device against income risk that is related to the occupation of current employment.
Time is discrete and the labor market is characterized by a finite number of sectors, or
“islands”, which resemble occupations. This island structure of the labor market is similar
to Pilossoph (2014) and Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014), which are versions of the
Lucas and Prescott (1974) framework. Each island is populated by a continuum of firms,
which use effective labor as an input in a linear production technology. Unemployed
19Controlling for the role of age for switching, I estimate a linear probability model of switching a
switching dummy on a full set of dummies for age, rank, transition type (unemployment dummy), and
year fixed effects. The profile is decreasing in age.
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workers searching for a job face a search friction on each island, which implies that a
worker-job match generates quasi-rents. I assume that workers have all the bargaining
power and thus are paid according to their marginal product. Focussing on a partial
equilibrium analysis, I keep the firm side as simple as possible, and do not endogenize
the job finding probability. Each pair of occupations is characterized by an exogenous
distance, which reflects the concept of an occupation as a certain combination of tasks.
While employed in an occupation, workers move up a ladder of occupation specific
human capital at a stochastic rate. On top of this experience profile, workers receive
persistent stochastic shocks to idiosyncratic productivity, that are orthogonal to human
capital. I refer to the combination of occupation specifc human capital and the persistent
shocks as idiosyncratic productivity. Workers randomly select an alternative occupation,
costlessly search on-the-job for alternative jobs, and receive a job offer with some proba-
bility. Given an offer, workers decide whether to accept or stay with their current job (in
their current occupation). Human capital is perfectly transferrable across jobs within an
occupation island, but imperfectly transferrable across islands.
Workers lose their job with an exogenously given probability and become unemployed.
Unemployed workers decide whether to search for employment in their old occupation or to
switch to another occupation and search for employment there. As for employed workers,
the job finding probability is exogenously given and the same across all islands. While
unemployed, the stochastic component of idiosyncratic productivity does not change, and
each period, an unemployed worker steps down the ladder of occupation specifc human
capital with some probability.
The decision of both employed and unemployed workers whether to stay on their
current island or move to the (randomly selected) alternative island depends on both
wage-related and non-pecuniary aspects. The wage-related aspects are that, when starting
a new job, both components of idiosyncratic productivity (and hence, wages) are affected
by the choice of the worker. First, when switching to another occupation, the worker
enters it at a lower human capital level – the more distant the occupations are, the more
steps on the ladder the worker jumps down. Second, the stochastic skill shock is drawn
from a different distribution for occupation stayers and occupation movers.
The non-pecuniary aspect affecting the decision of where to search for a job is a
worker’s taste for the different occupations: I assume that, each period, each worker draws
a vector of tastes for all islands from distributions that are independent and identical over
workers, islands, and over time.20
20Recent examples of models that use taste shocks in the context of occupational switching are Wiczer
(2015) and Pilossoph (2014). The taste shocks over occupations are a shortcut to achieving worker
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My model is a model of gross flows across occupations and in this respect similar to
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2014). This implies that the occupational employment
share is constant over time. The reason for this choice is that I am interested in the
reallocation across occupations in the individual decision problem and its relation to the
wage process. In order to analyze this decision, I do not need any correlation of shocks
across workers.
2.4.2 The Environment
There is a discrete number of occupational islands. The set of these islands is denoted by
O, and each is populated by firms offering one job each, operating a production technology
that is linear in idiosyncratic worker productivity. Each pair (oi, oj) of occupations is char-
acterized by a distance d (oi, oj). A period is divided into three stages: a pre-production
stage, a production stage, and a post-production stage.
Stochastic Productivity Stochastic idiosyncratic productivity is denoted by xi,t and
follows an AR (1) in logs. A worker enters the pre-production stage with productivity xi,t
and draws two shocks, ηi,t =
{
ηstayi,t , η
move
i,t
}
, where ηstayi,t ∼ F
stay
η,t and η
move
i,t ∼ F
move
η,t . If
the worker works during the production stage, the stochastic productivity component is
given by
log (xi,t+1) = g
e
(
xi,t, oi,t, oi,t+1;ηi,t
)
≡
ρ log (xi,t) + 1 {oi,t+1 = oi,t} η
stay
i,t + 1 {oi,t+1 6= oi,t} η
move
i,t , (2.5)
where 1 {∗} is an indicator function taking the value 1 if ∗ is true and the value 0 otherwise:
only one of the two shocks is relevant for productivity. If the worker is unemployed during
the production stage, xi,t does not change.
Human Capital Human capital of a worker i evolves stochastically and can take on
H discrete values hi,t ∈ {h1, ..., hH}, where h1 < h2 < ... < hH . A worker who enters
period t in the pre-production stage with human capital level hi,t = hj in occupation oi,t
and who ends up working in occupation oi,t+1, has human capital level h˜i,t+1 during the
production stage, where
h˜i,t+1 = hj−k, with k = f (d (oi,t, oi,t+1)), (2.6)
where f (d (oi,t, oi,t+1)) pins down how many steps of the human capital ladder the worker
moves down depending on the distance, where f (0) = 1 and f (1) = κ, where κ <
heterogeneity beyond skill heterogeneity in the cross-section.
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H − 1 denotes the number of steps a worker moves when switching to the most different
occupation. This captures that the degree of transferrability of skills across occupations
depends systematically on the distance between occupations. If a worker is employed in the
production stage with human capital level h˜i,t+1 = hk, then, during the post-production
stage,
hi,t+1 =
hk+1 with probability ψ
hup
k
hk with probability 1− ψ
hup
k
. (2.7)
The probability of stepping up depends on the current position on the ladder, and ψhupk >
ψhupk+1∀k, i.e., the probability of stepping up the ladder decreases with the current position.
This notion of steps that become steeper allows the model to generate a profile of the
switching probability that is decreasing in human capital. Once at the highest level,
hH , a worker stays there with probability 1–unless he switches occupations or becomes
unemployed.
If a worker is unemployed during the production stage and the human capital level is
h˜i,t+1 = hk, then, during the post-production stage, the worker moves down one step with
probability ψhdown:
hi,t+1 =
hk−1 with probability ψhdownhk with probability 1− ψhdown . (2.8)
Separation and Job-Finding In the pre-production stage, a worker is separated ex-
ogenously with probability 1−φ. A separated worker is unemployed during the production
stage and enters the next period as unemployed. Both employed and unemployed workers
receive job offers, with probabilities ψe and ψu, respectively. There is no congestion in
the labor market, and workers have all bargaining power, resulting in marginal product
wages.
Life Span I focus on the stationary equilibrium of the economy and in order to ensure a
realisitc equilibrium distribution over wages and human capital, agents leave the economy
with a constant probability of death, 1− pi < 1. For each worker who dies, a new worker
enters the economy, generating a perpetual youth structure a la Blanchard (1985) and
Yaari (1965), such that the population is of constant size. Newborns enter the economy
as unemployed at the lowest human capital level, with average stochastic productivity,
and randomly attached to one of the occupations.
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2.4.3 The Decision Problem of Workers
EmployedWorkers Workers maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility. When
employed at the beginning of the period t, a worker i is characterized by his occupation
oi,t, his level of human capital hi,t, and his stochastic idiosyncratic productivity xi,t. Also,
workers enter the period with a vector Oi,t of tastes for occupations. If not separated,
the worker randomly chooses in which alternative occupation to search for a job. Then
the worker draws two idiosyncratic productivity shocks, ηi,t =
{
ηstayi,t , η
move
i,t
}
from dis-
tributions F stayη,t and F
move
η,t . Search is costless, and with probability ψ
e an offer arrives
and the worker chooses whether to stay in the current occupation or move to the other.
The human capital level at the production stage depends on this choice according to
(2.6). If no offer is received, the worker stays with his current job (and occupation). The
worker receives wages according to the total productivity and consumes all income, i.e.,
ci,t+1 = xi,t+1 × h˜i,t+1. I assume a linear utility function and hence per-period utility at
the production stage is given by
u˜empl
(
xi,t+1, oi,t+1, h˜i,t+1
)
= xi,t+1 × h˜i,t+1. (2.9)
The recursive problem is given by
V empl (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = φ×
(
ψe × V offer (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) + . . .
(1− ψe)× V stay (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t)
)
+ . . .
(1− φ)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜E
[
V unempl (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t)
])
(2.10)
s.t.
xi,t+1 = xi,t
hi,t+1 acc. to (2.8)
where I express the value function with the adjusted discount factor β˜ = βpi, with β
denoting the pure discount factor and pi the probability of survival. If the worker loses
the job in the pre-production stage, he stays unemployed in period t and enters the
next period unemployed with oi,t indicating the occupation of his last employment, while
idiosyncratic productivity remains constant. If the worker does not lose his job, and
receives no alternative job offer, he stays with the current job; when receiving a job offer,
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he can choose whether to stay with the current job or to move to another occupation.
The sub value functions are given by V stay (•) and V offer (•) as follows.
V stay (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = u˜
empl
(
xi,t+1, oi,t, h˜i,t+1
)
+ . . .
β˜E
[
V empl (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
]
(2.11)
s.t.
xi,t+1 = g
e
(
xi,t, oi,t, oi,t;ηi,t
)
h˜i,t+1 = hi,t
hi,t+1 acc. to (2.7)
and
V offer (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) =
β˜ ×
∑
j 6=oi,t
pij ×max
(
v˜ (j|•) + EOOi,t+1 (j) , v˜ (oi,t|•) + EOOi,t+1 (oi,t)
)
(2.12)
where pij is the probability that the worker randomly chooses occupation j in the pre-
production stage and v˜ (j|•) is given by:21
v˜ (j|•) = v˜ (j|xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) ≡
1
β˜
u˜empl
(
xi,t+1, j, h˜i,t+1
)
+ Eη,ψhupV
empl (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, j) .
s.t.
xi,t+1 = g
e
(
xi,t, oi,t, oi,t+1;ηi,t
)
h˜i,t+1 acc. to (2.6)
hi,t+1 acc. to (2.7).
Unemployed Workers A worker entering the period unemployed is characterized by a
state vector collecting his last occupation, oi,t, his level of human capital, hi,t, his stochastic
idiosyncratic productivity, xi,t, and his preferences over occupations, Oi,t. He randomly
21I make use here of the independence of taste shocks and productivity (and human capital) shocks.
24 CHAPTER 2. OCCUPATIONAL SWITCHING AND WAGE RISK
chooses one alternative occupation oi,t+1 in which to costlessly search for a job, while also
searching in the old occupation. The unemployed worker then draws two idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, ηi,t =
{
ηstayi,t , η
move
i,t
}
from the same distributions F stayη,t and F
move
η,t as
employed workers. With probability ψu the worker receives a job offer and when staying
unemployed at the production stage, the worker receives u˜unempl. The recursive problem
is given by
V unempl (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = ψ
u × V offer (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) + . . .
(1− ψu)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜EV unempl (xi,t,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t)
)
(2.13)
s.t.
hi,t+1 acc. to (2.8)
The Conditional Choice Probabilities
Note that, conditional on receiving an offer, the choice problem of employed and unem-
ployed workers is the same. The introduction of the taste shocks implies that the value
function is smooth in the state space (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t), and that from a group of work-
ers who are at the same position in the state space, every occupation is chosen by some
members of the group, because they differ in their tastes. The policy function is thus a
set of choice probabilities for each occupation.
I assume FO to be a Gumbel distribution, which allows me to exploit results from
discrete choice theory, as also done recently in, e.g., Pilossoph (2014) or Iskhakov et al.
(2015):22 they yield analytical expressions for the conditional choice probabilities, which
for occupation oi,t+1 is given by
P (oi,t+1 = j|xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t, (ψ
e = 1 ∨ ψu = 1)) =
pij ×
1
1 + exp
(
v˜(oi,t|xi,t,ηi,t,hi,t,oi,t)−v˜(j|xi,t,ηi,t,hi,t,oi,t)
σO
) , (2.14)
22Iskhakov et al. (2015) provide a detailed discussion of taste shocks as a smoothing device in the
solution of discrete choice problems. I denote the scale parameter by σO and normalize the location
parameter as −σOγ, where γ is Euler’s constant. The normalization is such that the (unconditional)
expected value of each taste shock is zero.
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where pij is the exogenous sampling probability of occupation j.
2.5 Calibrated Model
In this section, I analyze a calibrated version of the model. The calibration has two goals.
First, it allows me to quantify the relative role of different components of wage changes,
i.e., human capital changes and changes of the stochastic productivity. For direct job
changers that stay in their occupation, productivity shocks account for about 66% of
wage changes, for occupation switchers this number is 49%. Ignoring selection of workers
into switching and staying, one would underestimate the variance of productivity shocks
for occupation movers by 31% and for stayers by 4%. Second, given that workers choose
to switch occupations in response to underlying productivity shocks, I calculate the option
value that workers assign to the availability of the switching channel. To this end, I ask
workers in a counterfactual world without the option of switching, before the realization
of productivity shocks, how much they gain in expectation from the option. As a share
of per-period consumption, the answer to the question is 0.78.
The calibration successfully matches the patterns of wage changes for direct job chang-
ers (targeted), however, it implies too bad outcomes for job changers through unemploy-
ment (non-targeted).
2.5.1 Parameterization and Calibration of the Model
Model Elements Calibrated Exogenously
In the calibrated version of the model, I choose a period to be one month and set the
number of (horizontally differentiated) occupations to six. Given symmetry in terms
of productivity, having six occupations allows me to define the distance doo′ from one
occupation o to any other occupation o′ as either 1/3 (“close”), 2/3 (“medium”), or 1
(“far”).23
Table 2.1 lists the exogenous parameters that are set outside the model. I choose
the survival probability pi such that the expected duration of a career is 40 years. The
monthly probabilities to lose a job when employed and to find a job when unemployed,
respectively, are set in line with the average transition rates as documented by Jung and
Kuhn (2013). Taking the probablity of death into account, I choose the monthly discount
factor to comply with a 4% annual interest rate. Finally, I set the per-period utility
of unemployment, u˜unempl, to 80% of the lowest per-period utility level received by an
23Visualize the occupations to be distributed equidistantly on a circle. The shortest way to get to
another occupation along the circle gives the distance, which I normalize such that the maximum distance
is 1.
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Table 2.1: Pre-Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value Informed by
pi Probability to survive to
next period
.9979
Implied expected duration
of career: 40 years (25-64)
ψe Monthly probability of job
offer when employed
.01 blank
Average monthly E-E,
E-U, and U-E transition
rates
Jung and Kuhn (2013)
(1− φ) Monthly probability to
loose job
.0005
ψu Monthly probability of job
offer when unemployed
.0062
β Monthly discounting factor .9988 4% annual interest rate
Note: Table shows parameters calibrated exogenously. E and U denote Employment and Unemployment,
respectively. β takes the survival probability into account.
employed worker.
Identification of the Remaining Model Elements
Productivity Shocks A key element of the model is its take on the nature of idiosyn-
cratic shocks. In the data, I can only observe the distributions of realized wage changes for
workers that endogenously decide either to stay in their occupation or to switch to a dif-
ferent one. The model’s key identifying assumption for the underlying shock distributions
is that workers make a utility-maximizing choice.
The mechanism can be understood directly in a stripped-down version of the decision
problem. Disregarding the human capiral element of the model, just consider the two
shocks, ηstay and ηmove, and assume that these directly translate into wage changes de-
pending on the choice of the worker to stay or to move. Given any distributions F stayη,t
and Fmoveη,t , the utility maximization of the workers implies that η
stay is observed as a
wage change whenever the draws are such that ηstay > ηmove and vice versa. Thus, the
probability to observe realization n of the move shock, ηmove = n, is a combination of
the probabilities that ηmove = n is actually drawn from Fmoveη,t and that the realization of
the stay-shock is worse, i.e., ηstay ≤ n. In other words, the share of realization n in the
distribution of wage changes realized by occupation switchers is informative about the
lower tail of the distribution of stay-shocks, and vice versa. F stayη,t and F
move
η,t are assumed
to be Normal distributions, with means and standard deviations denoted by µstayη , σ
stay
η ,
µmoveη and σ
move
η .
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Human Capital Ladder In terms of the human capital ladder, the following elements
are not yet fixed: the number of steps, H , the step size of the ladder, ∆h, the probabilities
to step up, ψhupk , or down, ψ
hdown, and the number of steps down depending on the distance
of an occupation switch, f (d (·)).
I set the number of steps on the human capital ladder to H = 11. Consider the im-
plications of an occupational switch. According to Equation (2.6), a worker moves down
the ladder when switching occupations, which implies a wage cut. Above, I defined the
distance between occupations to be 1/3, 2/3, and 1. I set the implied number of steps
down on the human capital ladder to be 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The empirical moti-
vation for workers stepping down the human capital ladder when switching is as follows.
Consider the rank of a worker in the occupation-specific wage distributions before and
after changing jobs. Figures 2.4a and 2.4b show that, for both E-E and E-U-E transitions,
a worker from higher wage ranks tends to rank relatively lower in the occupational wage
distribution when switching occupations. In addition, Figures 2.4c and 2.4d show that,
among the occupation switchers, a worker tends to rank relatively lower in the new occu-
pation when the switch covers a greater distance. This is especially true for transitions
through unemployment. The three categories of switches (“close”, “medium”, and “far”)
are based on grouping workers by distance into three year-specific groups, implying that
each group is of equal size.
I calibrate the probability to step up the ladder, ψhupk , as a piecewise linear function
of the current state k. In the calibration procedure, I set the probability for k = 1, k = 6,
and k = 10, and linearly interpolate between these nodes. Why does the probability to
step up depend on where you are on the ladder? Other things equal, a higher human
capital level implies a higher wage. Now assume that ψhupk = ψ
hup∀k . The higher a
worker is on the ladder, the less relevant is the temporary wage cut from stepping down
the ladder: workers with higher wages are willing to accept the wage cut and switch
occupations more frequently. To see this, consider the inverse of the probability to choose
a given occupation j in Equation (2.14):
P (oi,t+1 = j|•)
−1 =
(
1 + exp
(
v˜ (oi,t|xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t)− v˜ (j|xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t)
σO
))
×
1
pij
The expected value of occupation j relative to the alternative of staying in the current oc-
cupation oi,t, weighted by the scale of the taste shocks, is relevant for the choice. Consider
the situation with two occupations. Now consider a worker i, currently in occupation 1
with human capital level hk. At the production stage, the human capital level of that
worker is h˜i = hk when choosing to stay in occupation 1, and h˜i = hk−1 when choosing
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Figure 2.4: Relative Position of Job Changers
(a) Rank after Changing Jobs: E-E
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(b) Rank after Changing Jobs: E-U-E
Percentile of Wage Distribution in Old Occupation
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(c) Occupation Switchers (E-E) by Distance
Percentile of Wage Distribution in Old Occupation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
in
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
A
ft
er
S
w
it
ch
in
g
F
ir
m
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
45◦
Close (smoothed median)
Medium (smoothed median)
Far (smoothed median)
(d) Occupation Switchers (E-U-E) by Distance
Percentile of Wage Distribution in Old Occupation
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Note: The scatters show the position of the median worker from the respective group, the lines are
smoothed using a locally weighted regression with span 0.5.
to switch to occupation 2. As the worker gets closer to the top of the ladder, keeping the
level of the stochastic component and the productivity shocks constant, v˜ (1|•)− v˜ (2|•)
decreases with the level of human capital hk (the step down is compensated quicker, be-
cause the end of the ladder is reached earlier when choosing to stay). Thus, for the same
stochastic productivity levels and shocks, the probability to stay in occupation 1 decreases
with human capital if the probability to step up the ladder is constant.
However, the empirical analysis in Section 2.3.3 showed that higher ranked workers
are less likely to switch. In order to allow the model to generate this, I let the probability
to step up vary with the step on the ladder. If the ladder becomes steeper as one walks
up (the probabiltiy of stepping up decreases), then this has a positive effect on v˜ (1|•)−
v˜ (2|•) as a function of the level of human capital. The probabilities to step up are
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hence identified by the probability of switching as a function of the rank.24 Unemployed
workers move down the human capital ladder one step each period with probability ψhdown.
I documented above that the probability of switching occuaptions increases with the
duration of unemployment. This is what identifies this parameter.
The step size of the ladder, ∆h, is identified by the right tail of the distribution of
wage changes realized by job changers within an occupation. Consider equation (2.7):
when staying in the occupation, a share of workers moves up the ladder one step, thus
experiencing an increase of human capital by ∆h. Similarly, the lower part of the dis-
tribution of wage changes realized by occupation switchers is informative for ∆h: upon
switching occupations, a worker moves down the ladder by at least ∆h. The other tails
of the respective distributions are governed by the mean parameters of the productivity
shocks.
Taste Shocks The scaling factor of the taste shocks, σO, affects the probability of
workers to switch occupations. A higher σO implies that differences of the expected
value of being in either occupation are less relevant; in the present model, workers are
more willing to accept the human capital loss that comes with switching and switch more
frequently. Along these lines, Wiczer (2015) and Pilossoph (2014) argue that the switching
rate pins down the scale of the taste shocks. In my model, the switching rates are driven
by productivity shocks and taste shocks. The productivity shocks are pinned down by
moments of wage changes, and hence there is scope for the taste shocks.
Less obvious, the scaling factor also affects the elasticity of the switching probability
with respect to changes of the relative payoffs of staying and switching. To see this,
consider again the probability to choose occupation j in Equation (2.14). As discussed
above, the probability of switching occupations varies with the level of human capital. If
the taste shocks are more dispersed, then a (marginal) change of the relative value of j
matters less for the choice (because the difference of expected payoffs is scaled with the
inverse of σO). Thus, the pattern of switching by rank is also informative for the scaling
of taste shocks.
Wage Changes and Switching Probability
Table 2.2 summarizes the targeted moments and their counterparts in the calibrated
model. I calculate the model-implied moments in the stationary distribution of the model
24Note that, in the model, the rank of a worker within the occupation-specific wage distribution is
not the same as his human capital level: wages are a combination of human capital and the stochastic
idiosyncratic component. Given that the ladder gets steeper when walking up, there is a selection process
of workers with lower levels of stochastic productivity: workers with higher levels of human capital are
willing to accept worse stochastic productivity shocks, because they weigh this against a loss of human
capital upon switching from which they (in expectation) recover less quickly.
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Table 2.2: Moments–Data vs. Calibrated Model
Moment Data Model Informs
Distribution of (log) wage changes of E-E transitions
stayers switchers stayers switchers
Productivity shocks;
step size of human
capital ladder
10th percentile -.11 -.19 -.10 -.23
50th percentile .02 .04 .03 .05
90th percentile .22 .34 .17 .26
Probability to switch
Avg. (E-E) .30 .22 Scaling of taste shocks
By rank (E-E) (.43, .27, .24) (.25, .22, .26)
Prob. to step up
human capital ladder
increase over 1
year of unemp.
.29 .22
Prob. to step down
during unemployment
Note: The table shows data moments that are targeted in the calibration and model counterparts with
the calibrated parameters.
economy.25 As empirical counterpart for these moments, I choose long-run averages.
Specifically, for the percentiles of wage changes, I use the fitted percentiles from a set
of quantile regressions, similar to the ones outlined in Equation (2.3) in Section 2.3.2.
I do not use rank and distance of switch as control variables here, because I target the
average percentiles of direct job changers for the current calibration. Given the estimates,
I add the average of the year-dummy coefficients to the constant, and calculate the fitted
percentiles of wage changes for switchers and stayers, respectively.
For the switching probability on average and by rank, I use the predicted probabilities
from a linear probability model. The linear probability model regresses a switching dummy
on a constant, a set of dummies for the rank, a dummy for the type of switch (1 if E-U-E,
0 if E-E), the unemployment duration (interacted with the unemployment dummy), a full
set of year dummies, and dummies for age group; I choose three age groups: 25–34, 35–44,
and 45–54. Given that the model does not feature an age dimension26, I use the predicted
switching profile for the second age group as target. In order to generate long-run average
25A.3 describes the model solution and the calculation of moments in the stationary distribution.
26The model does have a perpetual youth structure, but the probability of death is the same for every
worker. Therefore, the model does not generate an horizon effect, in the sense that younger workers
would switch more often because they can profit from an investment element of the switching decision
longer than older workers. A channel like this can be introduced in the model by having two age groups
living at the same time: a young worker then ages with an exogenous probability, and an old worker dies
with an exogenous probability.
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Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
µstayη -.0075 ψ
hdown 24.23%
µmoveη .0237 ψ
hup
lo 22.57%
σstayη .0934 ψ
hup
med 9.97%
σmoveη .1829 ψ
hup
high 0.52%
∆h .7795 σO .2710
Note: The table shows parameters calibrated using the model.
switching probabilites, I add the average of the year-dummy coefficients. The last target
is the average increase of the switching probability over one year of unemployment. For
this, I use the predicted average switching profile from a linear probability model of
switching on a constant, year dummies, and the unemployment duration (interacted with
the unemployment dummy).
Table 2.3 lists the calibrated parameters. The calibrated model does a good job in
matching the pattern of the targeted percentiles of wage changes – the key focus of the
analysis. Specifically, the median for switchers and stayers, and the 90th percentile for
switchers are fit well (1 log point difference). This is also true for the 10th percentile of
wage changes for stayers. For switchers the 10th percentile is 4 log points worse in the
model than in the data. The 90th percentile of wage changes is five log points too low for
stayers and eight log points for switchers.
The average switching probability in the model is 22% for the direct job changers,
compared to the targeted 30% in the data.27 Turning to the slope of the switching
profile by unemployment duration, the probability to switch increases by about 22% in
the model, compared to 29% in the data. The relationship is generated, because the
switching probability decreases with human capital, as discussed above. The model has
difficulties in matching the switching pattern by rank in the calibration: it exhibits a
u-shape, compared to the monotonically decreasing pattern in the data. The reason for
this is a negative correlation between beginning of period human capital and idiosyncratic
productivity (the correlation coefficient is −.07; see footnote 24).
Figure 2.5 shows the overall distribution of realized wage changes for the four subgroups
defined by direct job change (E-E) vs. job change through unemployment (E-U-E), and
27Given that the model features six occupations, whereas the data moment is based on 30 occupational
groups, this seems a minor issue of the calibration.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Wage Changes in Calibrated Model
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Note: Density functions of observed wage changes in the model.
staying in the occupation vs. switching occupations. Consider direct job changers that
stay at their occupation. Their distribution of wage changes is driven by two elements:
first, their draws of ηstay-shocks, and second, a share of these workers moves up the human
capital ladder by one step, which slightly bends the right tail outwards. Job Changers
that switch occupations realize more negative wage realizations because they move down
the human capital ladder. Similarly, a larger share realizes high wage gains: these workers
find a particularly productive match in a different occupation (they draw from a wider
distribution of productivity shocks), and thus they are willing to move down the human
capital ladder.
Now, consider the distribution of wage changes realized in the model by workers that
spend up to one year in unemployment. We see in Figure 2.5 that these workers move
down the human capital ladder and thus the left arm of the distribution of wage changes
is heavier. Compared to the data, the calibrated model overemphasizes the negative wage
changes for the job changers through unemployment. In the data, the 10th, 50th, and
90th percentiles of wage changes for the stayers and switchers are (−.28,−.00, .25) and
(−.37,−.02, .31), respectively. The model implies wage changes of (−.45,−.12, .09) and
(−.83,−.16, .15), respectively.
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2.5.2 Choice vs. Shock and the Option Value of Switching
Roles of Underlying Productivity Shocks and Occupational Choice
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of stochastic productivity shocks together with the
distribution of the shocks that can be observed; “observed” referring to the stay-shocks
realized by stayers and the move-shocks realized by switchers. Considering stayers, the
distribution of observed realizations from the distribution is more skewed to the right
than the distribution of ηstay-shocks in the population: left-tail (right-tail) events are less
(more) likely to be observed than they are realized. For the distribution of ηmove-shocks
this is even more apparent. Compared to the distribution of draws from the underlying
distribution, in the observed distribution the left tail collapses almost completely: switch-
ers face the (indirect) cost of moving down the human capital ladder and thus only draws
that compensate for the implied wage loss are accepted. The mass points in the left tail
are the result of workers accepting a more severe human capital cut when moving to an
occupation that is more distant.
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Underlying Shocks and of Realized Shocks
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Note: Density functions of ηstay-shocks and ηmove-shocks received by workers that decide to stay or to
switch; solid lines are observable shocks, dashed lines are all shocks.
Changes of stochastic productivity play a bigger role relative to movements along the
human capital ladder for switchers than for stayers: For direct job changers that stay in
their occupation, the overall variance of wage changes in the calibrated model is .0128, out
of which .0044 are generated by changes in human capital; for switchers these numbers
are .0469 and .0284, respectively. Now, what is the role of the occupational choice relative
to underlying shocks? To evaluate this, I disregard changes of human capital for now.
Assume that one can directly observe the realized distributions of productivity shocks for
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switchers and stayers as displayed in figure 2.6. The variances of realized shocks turn out to
be
(
σ˜moveη
)2
= .0231 and
(
σ˜stayη
)2
= .0084, where tilde denotes realized changes. Compare
these to the variance of underlying shocks,
(
σmoveη
)2
= .0335 and
(
σstayη
)2
= .0087. If one
were to ignore selection of workers into switching and staying, and equate the observed
realizations of productivity shocks to the underlying distribution, one would underestimate
the variance of productivity shocks for movers by 31.0% and for stayers by 3.7%.
A second way of pinning down the importance of the selection process for the dis-
tribution of productivity changes is to calculate its role for the distribution of wage
changes for all job changers (E-E). Assume that one knew the true dispersion of the
productivity shocks and the correct share of switchers (implied by the model), pswitch.
If selection into either group was random, one could express the distribution of pro-
ductivity shocks as a mixture of Normal distributions: with probability pswitch a worker
draws from N
(
µmoveeta ,
(
σmoveη
)2)
, and with probability (1− pswitch), a worker draws from
N
(
µstayeta ,
(
σstayη
)2)
. The implied counterfactual distribution of productivity shocks has a
variance of
(
σcounterfactη
)2
= .0137. Compare this to the distribution of productivity shocks
actually realized in the model:
(
σactualη
)2
= .0186. Thus, the counterfactual distribution
understates the dipersion by 26%. Put differently, the endogenous choice accounts for
26% of realized productivity changes.
The Option Value of Occupational Switching
Given that the endogenous switching decision appears to be of major relevance for realized
dispersion of productivity changes, I now evaluate how much workers do prefer a world
in which they can switch occupations to a world where they are exposed to occupation-
related shocks? In other words, what is the utility gain that workers get from the option
of switching in expectation of productivity shocks? I evaluate this by calculating the
Compensating Variation in a counterfactual world without the option to switch occupa-
tions that is necessary to make these workers indifferent to living in the actual (model)
world–while workers are facing the same shock processes for exogenous job separations,
job finding, stochastic productivity, human capital accumulation, and occupational tastes.
Consider a worker who enters the period employed in occupation oi,t, with human
capital level hi,t, and stochastic productivity xi,t. The worker receives two productivity
shocks, ηi,t, and his value function is given in equation (2.10) as V
empl(xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t).
In the counterfactual world, the worker always stays in occupation oi,t. The value func-
tions for employed and unemployed workers are denoted by V count(xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) and
V count−ue (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t), and shown in appendix A.2. The ex ante expected value of
being employed in state (xi,t, hi,t, oi,t), i.e., before the realization of the η-shocks, is given
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Table 2.4: The Option Value of Occupational Switching
λ
Overall 0.78%
Unemployed Workers 1.25%
Employed Workers 0.73%
Note: The table shows the utility gain from switching expressed as a share of per-period Consumption,
λ.
in the two worlds by
V˜ empl (xi,t, hi,t, oi,t) ≡ EηV
empl (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t)
and
V˜ counter (xi,t, hi,t, oi,t) ≡ EηV
counter (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) .
I now calculate the per-period Consumption Compensating Variation (CCV), λ, that
makes the average worker in the world without switching indifferent to the world where he
can switch. Denote the state vector (xi,t, hi,t, oi,t) by si,t. Using the stationary distribution
of workers over states si,t in the model with occupational switching, λ is defined implicitly
by ∑
j
ωjV˜
empl (si,t = j)
!
=
∑
j
ωjV˜
counter (si,t = j;λ) , (2.15)
where V˜ counter (•;λ) reflects the expected present value utility when consumption is ad-
justed by the factor (1 + λ) in every state, and ωj denotes the share of workers in state
si,t = j in the stationary distribution. Given the homotheticity of the per-period utility
function (utility is linear), λ can be calculated in closed form as
λ =
( ∑
j ωjV˜
empl (si,t = j)∑
j ωjV˜
counter (si,t = j)
)
− 1.
Table 2.4 shows the value that workers assign to the option of switching.28 Ex ante,
workers have a utility gain from the option to switch that amounts to about 0.78% of their
expected per-period consumption. Conditioning on employment state, those that enter
28The calculation for unemployed workers follows the same procedure as the one for employed workers
described in the text.
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the period as unemployed, assign a higher value of about 1.25% of per-perid consumption
to the availability of switching–which is to be expected, given that unemployed workers
switch more often. The Compensating Consumption Variation for employed workers is
0.73%.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I take a step in disentangling the role played by productivity shocks
and occupational choices for observed wage dynamics. I first show empirically that the
distribution of realized wage changes varies systematically between occupation switchers
and stayers. I then show that switching occupations is an empirically relevant phenomenon
among job changers, and that the probability of switching, (i), correlates negatively with
relative wage in the old job, and, (ii), increases with the duration of unemployment. I
then set up a structural model of the labor market featuring multiple occupations. The
calibrated model is consistent with the documented patterns of occupational switching
and wage changes and serves two purposes. First, it allows me to evaluate the relative
role of occupational choice for productivity changes. In the model, if one were to mistake
the observed distribution of productivity changes (after controlling for human capital
in the model) realized by switchers (stayers) for the underlying shock distributions, one
would make an error of 31% (4%) in terms of the variance. Overall, the endogenous
choice of occupations accounts for about 26% of realized productivity changes of workers
that change jobs without experiencing an unemployment spell. Second, workers value the
option of switching occupations, because it allows them to react to negative shocks in the
current occupation and to realize good offers related to a different career. The utility gain
from the option to switch occupations corresponds to 0.78% of per-period consumption
for the average worker; given that unemployed workers utilize the option to switch more
often, their utility gain is higher (1.25%) than the gain for employed workers (0.73%).
Chapter 3
Labor Income Risk in Germany Over
the Business Cycle
This chapter is based on Busch and Ludwig (2016).1
3.1 Introduction
Understanding how individual incomes vary over the business cycle is of major importance
for economic policy, e.g., for the design of stabilization policies. Capturing the intuitive
notion that downside labor income risk of workers is increasing in a recession with an
income process featuring a countercyclical variance might, however, be misleading. Such
a process implies that during a recession the probabilities of both, an income drop as well
as a rise of income, are higher. The latter implication seems wrong. In order to allow
for the possibility of higher downside risk along with constant (or lower) upside chances
during a recession, one must take the third moment of the distribution, the skewness, into
account. An income process with countercyclical left-skewness of individual income risk
implies that in a recession the probability of a drop in income is higher—as also implied by
a countercyclical variance—and that the probability of an increase of income is unchanged
(or smaller)—unlike implied by a countercyclical variance.
In this chapter we address this matter by developing a novel parametric approach to
estimate the relationship between idiosyncratic labor income risk over the business cycle.
We analyze the cyclicality of the distribution of idiosyncratic labor income shocks, i.e.,
shocks to income conditional on observable characteristics such as age and education.
We do so by first adopting the standard approach to decompose labor income into a
1We thank Helge Braun for numerous helpful discussions and Kjetil Storesletten for insightful com-
ments.
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deterministic and a stochastic component. The stochastic component in turn is composed
of a fixed effect as well as a persistent and a transitory shock to income. The distributions
of these two components are parameterized by the respective variance and skewness.
In addition, the moments of the persistent shock are assumed to be contingent on the
aggregate state of the economy, i.e., whether the economy is in a recession or in a boom.
Our parametric estimation procedure allows for identification of all these moments of
the shock distribution. Specifically, we derive closed form expressions for the (state con-
tingent) variance and skewness and base identification on a standard Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) approach. To achieve this, we extend the influential method of
Storesletten et al. (2004) (STY) who estimate an income process with a state-contingent
variance of the persistent income shock. They find that the variance is higher in recessions
which has been labelled a counter-cyclical variance effect.2 STY base identification of the
state contingent variance on the observation that persistent shocks accumulate over an in-
dividual’s life-cycle such that the distribution of labor incomes observed for a given cohort
widens as this cohort ages. This implies that cohorts that experienced different macroeco-
nomic histories will feature different cross-sectional age-specific variances of labor incomes
if the variance of income shocks varies over the business cycle.
We extend their framework and analyze how the skewness of the innovation accumu-
lates when a cohort ages, using the same idea for identification (i.e., our identification is
based on the notion that the accumulated skewness differs across cohorts if these cohorts
experienced different macroeconomic histories). As a measure for skewness we use the
third central moment of a distribution. Importantly, we do not base identification on the
standard measure of skewness, which is the third centralized moment normalized by the
variance of the distribution. Since we avoid this normalization, there is no interference
between our estimates of the variance and the skewness of earnings shocks.
We apply our empirical approach to labor incomes from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) which is similar to the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We
base our estimation on gross labor earnings of males aged 25 to 60, that currently live
in West Germany and did not immigrate after age 10, as well as on two measures of
household level labor incomes. The first is based on gross labor income of household head
and spouse, the second on post government net labor income.
Our results establish three important insights on labor income risk in Germany. First,
the variance of log labor earnings shocks of males is countercyclical. Hence, the variance of
log earnings is higher in recessions than it is in booms. The increase in the variance of log
2This terminology has been introduced in the macroeconomic asset pricing literature, see Mankiw
(1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), or Storesletten et al. (2007).
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earnings in recessions is due to an increase of the left skewness: negative log labor earnings
realizations are more likely in recessions than positive ones. Second, there is insurance
against transitory income shocks at the household level, but not against permanent shocks.
Relative to male earnings, the variance of transitory income shocks decreases but the
moments for permanent shocks are (almost) unchanged. Third, the German tax and
transfer system insures against both transitory and permanent earnings shocks. For post
government earnings (after taxes and transfers) the distribtuion of transitory shocks is
further compressed relative to pre government earnings and the cyclicality of earnings
shocks is gone.
Related Literature
On the empirical side, several studies analyze patterns of residual income inequality over
time and over the lifecycle. Examples for the US are Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) and
Heathcote et al. (2010), who document the development of residual inequality over the past
three decades. Trends in income inequality in Germany are studied, e.g., by Dustmann et
al. (2009) using administrative data and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln et al. (2010) using data from the
German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). For Germany, Bayer and Juessen (2012) document
a slightly procyclical variance of wage risk. In contrast to us, they focus on wages.
Recently, Guvenen et al. (2014) stress the importance for estimating higher order
moments of income processes. Using an extensive administrative dataset from US social
security records they challenge the evidence by STY that cyclicality is solely in terms of
the variance. Their findings instead suggest that the left-skewness of individual income
risk increases in a recession, whereas the variance does not change. This motivates our
approach. Methodologically, we differ from Guvenen et al. (2014) in that we superimpose
more parametric structure, as in STY. Hence, our approach is well suited for typically
easily available smaller data sets.
In follow-up work to Guvenen et al. (2014), Guvenen et al. (2016) show that most
individuals experience very small earnings changes and a considerable number of workers
very large ones. Hence, the kurtosis of labor earnings is much higher than the conven-
tional assumption of log normality implies. Given the relatively small sample size of the
SOEP, we do not estimate the kurtosis (and how it varies over the cycle). It is, however,
straightforward to extend our empirical approach by additional moments for the kurtosis.
To achieve independence of the variance, this should again be based on the fourth non-
standardized moment of the distribution. Also, notice that our estimates of the variance
and skewness (and how these moments vary over the cycle) are not affected by omitting
the kurtosis.
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All the aforementioned papers on earnings risk have in common that using the es-
timates in macroeconomic models requires a two-step procedure. As a first step, the
estimation is carried out. In a second step, the estimates are approximated, cf., e.g.,
Guvenen et al. (2016) and McKay (2016). De Nardi et al. (2016) suggest to avoid this by
directly estimating a Markov process on the data.
An important difference between this chapter and these recent papers on higher mo-
ment income risk3 is that we adopt the tradition in the labor/consumption literature to
distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks to income (Deaton, 1992). This
distinction is crucial to understand the disjuncture between consumption and earnings
distribution and to study how households are insured against permanent and transitory
shocks (cf. Blundell et al., 2008b or Kaplan and Violante, 2010). Our application estab-
lishes such insurance within the household and through the government. These findings
share similarities with those of Blundell et al. (2014), who use Norwegian data, without
looking at higher moments though.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents our em-
pirical approach, discusses the moment conditions used to identify the parameters of the
earnings process and provides intuition for identification. Section 3.3 describes the appli-
cation of our approach to German earnings data from the SOEP. We start by describing
the data and by defining business cycles and move on to illustrate how variance and
skewness at different ages depend on histories, i.e., the number of recessions a cohort
has worked through. We then present our main estimation results. Finally, Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Approach
3.2.1 Overview
The individual income process is specified in a way that allows us to separately identify
cyclicality in the variance and skewness of innovations to the persistent component. Our
identification strategy is an extension of the approach proposed by Storesletten et al.
(2004). The basic idea is to exploit how the distribution of persistent idiosyncratic shocks
accumulates over time: if the income process is persistent, then, as a cohort ages, the
cross-sectional income distribution at any age, can be characterized by the sequence of
shocks experienced by the cohort’s members. If the variance of the innovation depends on
3In addition to our focus on how idiosyncratic risk varies over the business cycle, which only some of
the higher moment income risk papers share.
3.2. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 41
the aggregate state of the economy, then the cross-sectional income variance at a certain
age differs between two cohorts if these cohorts went through different macroeconomic
histories. Storesletten et al. (2004) allow for two states of the variance—one in contractions
and one in expansions—and classify each year as either an expansion or a contraction.
We extend their framework by analyzing how the skewness of the innovation accumu-
lates when a cohort ages. As a measure for skewness we use the third central moment
of a distribution. Given our specification of the income process, we derive closed-form
expressions for the variance and skewness of income and develop a Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator to identify all parameters of interest. In addition to variance
and skewness, we consider the covariance and a measure of coskewness in our construction
of moment conditions. These moments allow us to separately identify variance and skew-
ness of transitory and permanent shocks and of the fixed component, as will be discussed
below.
The key advantage of using central moments in the estimation is that we can remain
agnostic about the exact distribution of the stochastic components in the estimated earn-
ings process. However, measurement of central moments could be problematic given the
available sample size, because the measures are sensitive to outliers. Percentile based
measures are more robust. However, were we to use percentile based moments, we would
have to estimate the process using a Method of Simulated Moments approach—and there-
fore take a stand on density functions. In order to evaluate the importance of potential
small sample biases, we compare the age profiles of the applied central moments to the
profiles of the percentile based counterparts to these moments. We find that qualitatively
the age profile is the same, which encourages our choice of central moments.
3.2.2 The Income Process
We impose the following income process, which is commonly used in the literature. The
(log) income of household i of age h in year t is
yith = f (Xith, Yt) + y˜ith, (3.1)
where f (Xith, Yt) is the deterministic part of income, i.e., the part that can be explained
by observable individual and aggregate characteristics, Xith and Yt, respectively, and y˜ith
is the unexplained part of income that is assumed to be orthogonal to f (Xith, Yt). We
consider age, education, and the household size as elements of Xith. More specifically,
the deterministic component f (Xith, Yt) is a linear combination of a cubic in age h and
the log of household size, hhsizeith. The aggregate effects are captured by a time-varying
intercept and the education premium is allowed to vary over time following a quadratic
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function:
f (Xith, Yt) = β0t + fh (h) + Ieit=cfEP (EP ) + β
size log (hhsizeith) (3.2)
where fh (h) = β
age
1 h+ β
age
2 h
2 + βage3 h
3 and fEP (EP ) = β
EP
0 + β
EP
1 t+ β
EP
2 t
2.
Residual income y˜ith is the main object of interest in the analysis. We model y˜ith as
the sum of three components: a fixed effect χi, a persistent component zith, and an iid
transitory shock εith. The persistent component is modeled as an AR(1) process with
innovation ηith.
y˜ith = χi + zith + εith, where εith ∼
iid
Fε (0, m
ε
2, m
ε
3) , χi ∼
iid
Fχ (0, m
χ
2 , m
χ
3 ) (3.3a)
zith = ρzt−1h−1 + ηith, where ηith ∼
iid
Fη (0, m
η
2 (s (t)) , m
η
3 (s (t))) , (3.3b)
where Fχ/ε/η (·) denotes the density functions of χ, εith and ηith, respectively. The fixed
effect and both shocks are mean zero and m
χ/ε/η
2 and m
χ/ε/η
3 are the second and third
moments, respectively. The second and third moments of the persistent shock are allowed
to depend on the aggregate state of the economy in period t, denoted by s (t).
3.2.3 The GMM Approach
The common approach in estimating (3.1) is to perform the estimation in two steps, where
the first step estimation yields residuals and the second step fits the stochastic process
(3.3) to cross-sectional moments of the distribution of residual (log) income. The imposed
process implies the following moments of the distribution of residual income at age h in
year t:
m2 (y˜ith; θ) = m
χ
2 +m
ε
2 +
∑h−1
j=0ρ
2jmη2 (s (t− j) , h− j) (3.4a)
m3 (y˜ith; θ) = m
χ
3 +m
ε
3 +
∑h−1
j=0ρ
3jmη3 (s (t− j) , h− j) (3.4b)
cov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) = m
χ
2 + ρ
∑h−1
j=0ρ
2jmη2 (s (t− j) , h− j) (3.4c)
csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) = m
χ
3 + ρ
∑h−1
j=0ρ
2jmη3 (s (t− j) , h− j) , (3.4d)
where θ =
(
mχ2 , m
χ
3 , m
ε
2, m
ε
3, m
η,E
2 , m
η,C
2 , m
η,E
3 ,m
η,C
3
)
is a vector collecting the 8 second-
stage parameters. m2 (y˜ith; θ) and m3 (y˜ith; θ) denote the second and third central mo-
ment; cov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) and csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) denote the covariance and a measure
of coskewness between y˜ith and y˜it+1h+1 . Coskewness is measured here as the covari-
ance between y˜2ith and y˜it+1h+1, i.e., csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) ≡ cov (y˜
2
ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ). The two
covariance terms allow to separately identify the moments of χ and ε.
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Before implementing the second stage estimator, we impose more structure on the time
dependency of Fη (·). Variance and skewness of the persistent innovation ηit are modelled
as two state processes: mη2 (·) and m
η
3 (·) take on two possible values each, depending on
the aggregate state s (t), which is either an expansion or a contraction. To this end, define
the indicator variable It=expansion to be equal to 1 if year t is an expansion (denoted by E)
and to be equal to 0 if year t is a contraction (denoted by C). We then have:
mη2 (s (t)) = Is(t)=Em
η,E
2 +
(
1− Is(t)=E
)
mη,C2 (3.5a)
mη3 (s (t)) = Is(t)=Em
η,E
3 +
(
1− Is(t)=E
)
mη,C3 (3.5b)
Small sample size can lead to central moments being measured imprecisely. We there-
fore calculate moments for Hg < H age groups. Mean independence of shocks implies for
the theoretical counterparts that:
mk
(
y˜ithg ; θ
)
=
1∑
h∈hg
Nh,t
∑
h∈hg
Nh,tmk (y˜ith; θ) for k = 2, 3
cov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ)h∈hg =
1∑
h∈hg
Nh,t
∑
h∈hg
Nh,tcov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ)
csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ)h∈hg =
1∑
h∈hg
Nh,t
∑
h∈hg
Nh,tcsk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ) .
Given Hg age groups and T years of observations we obtain Hg × T cross-sectional
measures of variance and skewness each, and Hg × (T − 1) estimates of covariance and
coskewness, i.e., 2×Hg×T+2×Hg×(T − 1) empirical moments. The moment conditions
employed in the GMM estimation read as follows:
E
[
m2
(
y˜ithg
)
−m2
(
y˜ithg ; θ
)]
= 0 (3.6a)
E
[
m3
(
y˜ithg
)
−m3
(
y˜ithg ; θ
)]
= 0 (3.6b)
E
[
cov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1)h∈hg − cov (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ)h∈hg
]
= 0 (3.6c)
E
[
csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1)h∈hg − csk (y˜ith, y˜it+1h+1; θ)h∈hg
]
= 0, (3.6d)
where the first term in each line is the empirically calculated moment, e.g., the variance
of residual earnings in year 2000 of workers in age group 2. The second term in each line
is the theoretical counterpart implied by a specific combination of parameters in θ. We
define 7 age groups: 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60. In the estimation
we impose that each worker i enters the labor market at age 25 in some year t, draws
a fixed effect χi from the distribution Fχ (0, m
χ
2 , m
χ
3 ), which does not vary over time,
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and draws the first realizations of transitory and permanent shocks, εit and ηit, from
the distributions Fε (0, m
ε
2, m
ε
3) and Fη (0, m
η
2 (s (t)) , m
η
3 (s (t))). Given a classification of
years as expansions or contractions, we can then use (3.6) together with (3.4) to estimate
the parameters of the income process.
3.2.4 Identification
The use of cross-sectional moments for identification allows to exploit macroeconomic
information that predates the micro panel, thereby incorporating more business cycles in
the analysis than covered by the sample, as pointed out and elaborated on by STY.
In order to understand how identification works, consider the persistent component
of the income process, cf. equation (3.3b): the variances of the innovations accumulate
as a cohort ages, as can be seen from the theoretical moment in equation (3.4a). If the
innovation variance is higher in contractionary years, then a cohort that lived through
more contractions as it reaches a given age will have a higher income variance at that age
than a cohort that lived through fewer contractions has at the same age.
Our extension of STY is based the insight that a similar accumulation holds for the
skewness, as seen in equation (3.4b). If the probability of a large negative/positive income
shock would be higher/lower for the average worker during a macroeconomic contraction,
then the skewness of the shock in a contractionary period would be smaller (more negative)
than in an expansion, i.e., mη,C3 < m
η,E
3 . Comparing again two cohorts when they reach a
certain age, this would imply a more negative cross-sectional skewness for the cohort that
worked through more recessions.
As seen in (3.4a), the sum (mχ2 +m
ε
2) is identified as the intercept of the variance
profile over age. The same holds for (mχ3 +m
ε
3) in (3.4b), which is identified via the
age profile of skewness. Considering the sum in (3.4a), we see that the magnitude of the
increase of the cross-sectional variance over age identifies the variance of persistent shocks.
The difference between mη,C2 and m
η,E
2 is identified by the difference of the cross-sectional
variance of different cohorts of the same age. Likewise, the difference between mη,C3 and
mη,E3 is identified by the difference of the cross-sectional skewness of different cohorts.
The last piece of information for identification comes from considering the expressions
for variance and covariance in equations (3.4c) and (3.4a). It becomes immediately ap-
parent that the difference between the two expressions identifies mχ2 separately from m
ε
2.
Likewise, the difference between the expressions for skewness and coskewness, equations
(3.4b) and (3.4d), identifies mχ3 separately from m
ε
3.
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3.3 Application: Earnings Risk of German House-
holds
3.3.1 Data and Sample Selection
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a survey based panel study covering the years 1984
to 2013. It was initiated with about 10,000 individuals in 5,000 households in 1984 and
covers about 18,000 (10,500) individuals (households) in 2013. We define household level
income variables as follows. Household labor income before taxes is calculated as the sum
of head and spouse annual labor income. Labor income is the sum of income from first
and second jobs, 13th and 14th monthly salaries, Christmas and vacation bonuses, profit
sharing and other bonuses. 50% of income from self-employment is assigned to labor
income.
Post-government income is defined as household labor income plus transfers minus
taxes. Transfers are aggregated over all household members and include pensions (old age;
disability; widows; orphans; or other), maternity benefit, student grants, unemployment
benefits, unemployment assistance (before 2005), subsistence allowance, child allowance,
unemployment benefit II (since 2005). Taxes are provided in the SOEP as estimated from
TAXSIM at the household level. All nominal values are deflated with the CPI.
We exclude SOEP subsamples D and G, which oversample immigrants and high income
households, respectively, and apply the following sample selection criteria. We select
males between 25 and 60 years of age, that currently live in West Germany, and did not
immigrate after age 10. Labor earnings needs to be above a constant threshold, which is
defined as the income from working 520 hours for three year 2000 Euros. A household is
in the household sample if it is comprised of at least 2 adults. The age restriction applies
to the household head and the income threshold needs to be exceeded by the minimum
of male labor earnings and household post-government income.
3.3.2 Defining Business Cycles
In order to implement the estimator we need to classify years as contractions or expansions.
We initiate the classification with peak and trough dates from ECRI4, which is based on
NBER methodology. Given the sluggish synchronization of labor market outcomes with
the macroeconomic indicators that ECRI takes into account, we expand the dating based
on mean earnings of males in the SOEP, as shown in Figure 3.1. For the classification of
4The Economic Cycle Research Institute classifies business cycles based on several macroe-
conomic indicators: https://www.businesscycle.com/ecri-business-cycles/international-business-cycle-
dates-chronologies.
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Figure 3.1: Business Cycle Dating Based on Mean Earnings
Note: Figure shows the cyclical component of HP-filtered (mean) male earnings in the SOEP; smoothing
parameter for the HP-filter is 6.25.
years in the pre-sample period, we use the unemployment rate, which during the sample
time is highly correlated with male earnings.
Given the dating of peaks and troughs, we characterize years as expansions and con-
tractions as follows. A year is classified as a contraction if: (i) it completely is in a
contractionary period which is defined as the time from peak to trough, (ii) if the peak
is in the first half of the year and the contraction continues into the next year, (iii) if a
contraction started earlier and the trough is in the second half of the year. All years that
are not classified as contraction are classified as expansions.
3.3.3 Intuition Behind the Estimator
This section uses information from the data to discuss the intuition behind the estimator,
thereby relating back to our discussion on identification in Subsection 3.2.4. Figure 3.2
shows the variance, m2, of the cross-sectional distribution of male labor earnings for
different age groups as a function of the share of contractionary years a cohort lived
through. For each age group, the higher the share of contractions a cohort went through,
the more dispersed is the cross-sectional earnings distribution. Recall that this is an
implication of the earnings process ifmη,C2 > m
η,E
2 , i.e., if the variance of permanent shocks
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Figure 3.2: Intuition: Cross-sectional Second Moment
Note: The x-axis of each figure shows the share of contractions in all years a cohort went through at a
certain age. The y-axis shows the second central moments for different cohorts at different ages.
is countercyclical, cf. equation (3.4a). The increasing variance in the share of recessions
therefore identifies mη,C2 and m
η,E
2 . Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows the third central moment
of the cross-sectional earnings distribution as a function of the share of contractions. For
each age group, we observe a clear downward-sloping pattern, which is implied by the
earnings process if mη,C3 < m
η,E
3 , i.e., if the skewness is procyclical, cf. equation (3.4b).
The decreasing skewness in the share of recessions therefore identifies mη,C3 and m
η,E
3 .
Fitting a linear regression in each figure suggests a statistically significant difference
between the distribution of permanent shocks in contractions and expansions. Table 3.1
shows the coefficients. This is indeed what we estimate below in Subsection 3.3.4. Finally,
recall from our discussion in Subsection 3.2.4 how the moments of the transitory income
shock, mε2 andm
ε
3 can be identified given the equations in (3.4). To illustrate identification
of these two terms, we compute the difference between variance and covariance in each
cross-section and take the average over all years. This suggests that mε2 ≈ 0.0815, cf.
equations (3.4a) and (3.4c). Similarly, calculating the difference between skewness and
coskewness in each cross-section and taking the average over all years suggests that mε3 ≈
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Figure 3.3: Intuition: Cross-Sectional Third Moment
Note: The x-axis of each figure shows the share of contractions in all years a cohort went through at a
certain age. The y-axis shows the third central moments for different cohorts at different ages.
−0.1083. These values are indeed very close to what the estimation yields in Subsection
3.3.4 to which we turn next.
Table 3.1: Central Moments as Function of Share of Contractions
m2 (y˜) m3 (y˜)
Age 40–44 0.45 –0.74
(3.54) (–3.65)
Age 45–49 0.57 –1.13
(4.27) (–3.50)
Age 50–54 0.90 –1.65
(5.37) (–5.87)
Age 55–60 1.15 –1.48
(5.48) (–5.19)
Note: Each cell shows the slope coefficient of the respective fitted line in figures 3.2 and 3.3. T-statistics
are in parantheses.
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3.3.4 Estimation Results: Cyclical Income Risk
Estimating income processes, we started with a specification where we estimated the
persistence of the persistent income shock process, ρ. It turned out that ρ was not
significantly different from 1. We therefore restrict ρ = 1, hence η is a permanent shock
and z is the permanent income component.
Our main estimates under this parametric restriction are summarized in Table 3.2,
showing the point estimates of all parameters along with the 5th and 95th percentile
of 250 bootstrap draws for three different specifications: male earnings, household pre
government (before taxes and transfers) and household post government (after taxes and
transfers) earnings. In all models, each moment in (3.6a) to (3.6d) is weighted equally,
reflecting insights of Altonji and Segal (1996), who show that the identity weighting
matrix dominates the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix in small samples. We
apply a block bootstrap procedure in which we resample individuals—thereby preserving
the autocorrelation structure of the original sample.
As a first observation, notice that the moments of the fixed effect, mχ2 andm
χ
3 , are very
imprecisely estimated in all models. We therefore put no emphasis on the interpretation of
these estimates. One reason for this imprecision might be that the fixed effect estimates
take up cohort effects that are otherwise missing from our specification of the income
process.
More important is the interpretation of the variance and skewness terms for the tran-
sitory and permanent earnings shocks which yield a number of interesting insights when
moving across the different models. We start with the results for male earnings. Observe
that the central moments estimated for the transitory shock, mε2 and m
ε
3, are at 0.0718
and−0.1, respectively, thereby coming very close to what we estimate in our illustration
in the preceding Subsection 3.3.3. Accordingly, transitory income shocks are left-skewed:
negative shock realizations have more weight than positive ones.
Next, notice that the variance of the permanent income shock features a strong
countercyclicality—mη,C2 = 0.018 and m
η,E
2 = 0.0005 with the difference being highly
significant. Our estimates of the skewness show that this countercyclicality of the vari-
ance is due to a procyclical skewness—mη,C3 = −0.0243 and m
η,E
3 = 0.0037, with both
estimates significantly different from zero and from each other. Accordingly, in contrac-
tions negative log earnings realizations are more likely than positive ones. In expansions,
while our estimates suggest a positive skewness, the point estimate is very small. Hence,
the distribution of permanent shocks is estimated to be almost symmetric in expansions.
Moving from male earnings to household pre government earnings, we notice that there
is insurance against shocks at the household level. Both the variance and the skewness of
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results
mχ2 m
ε
2 m
χ
3 m
ε
3
Male Earnings
.1180 .0718 −.0219 −.1000
(.0661; .1631) (.0651; .0793) (−0.0838; 0.0350) (−.1081;−.0853)
Household Pre-Government Earnings
.0927 .0534 .0199 −.0613
(.0630; .1213) (.0479; .0585) (−.0193; .0672) (−.0700;−.0517)
Household Post-Government Earnings
.0661 .0427 −.0149 −.0471
(.0437; .0865) (.0380; .0461) (−.0540;−.0149) (−.0530;−.0395)
mη,E2 m
η,C
2 m
η,E
3 m
η,C
3
Male Earnings
.0005 .0181 .0037 −.0243
(.0005; .0010) (.0108; .0245) (.0002; .0073) (−.0369;−.0170)
Household Pre-Government Earnings
.0022 .0157 −.0014 −.0189
(.0005; .0044) (.0082; .0176) (−.0043; .0007) (−.0231;−.0107)
Household Post-Government Earnings
.0050 .0024 −.0025 −.0055
(.0036; .0064) (.0005; .0051) (−.0045;−.0004) (−.0070;−.0023)
Note: Table shows estimated moments for the three specifications described in the text. Parantheses
show the 5th and 95th percentile of 250 bootstrap draws.
transitory earnings shocks decrease (in absolute terms) relative to male earnings. How-
ever, the estimates also show that there is no insurance against permanent shocks at the
household level. The estimates of the variance and skewness in both contractions and
expansions are not statistically different from what we find for male earnings. Hence, also
for household pre government earnings, negative log earnings realizations are more likely
than positive ones in contractions and the distribution of permanent shocks is estimated
to be almost symmetrical in expansions.5
5The estimate of the skewness in expansions is now statistically indifferent from zero, but the point
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Finally, when considering household post government earnings, both variance and
skewness of transitory income shocks decrease further.6 Also, the cyclicality of permanent
shocks is gone. The variance in expansions is not statistically different from what we
estimate for pre government earnings, but the variance in contractions decreases strongly
and is no longer statistically different from the variance in expansions. Likewise, the
skewness in contractions of permanent shocks decreases strongly when moving from pre to
post government earnings and is statistically indifferent from the skewness in expansions.
Now, the point estimates of the skewness in both states is small so that the distribution
of permanent shocks is almost symmetric in contractions and expansions.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter develops a new parametric estimator of higher moment income risk. We
show how to use information on pre-data economic booms and recessions to identify how
the variance and the skewness vary over the business cycle. We implement this by a
Generalized Method of Moments estimator.
We apply our method to German earnings data. We show that permanent income
shocks to male earnings exhibit strong countercyclicality, whereby the higher variance of
male earnings in recessions is due to the fact that negative log income realizations are more
likely in recessions than positive ones. We also establish that there is insurance against
transitory earnings shocks at the household level and against transitory and permanent
income shocks through the German tax and transfer system. In addition, according to our
estimates, the cyclicality of earnings risk is gone for household post government earnings.
In this chapter, we focus on the second and third moment of transitory and permanent
shocks to the earnings distribution. Recent work by Guvenen et al. (2016) emphasizes the
importance of the fourth moment, the kurtosis. It is straightforward to extend our method
to including higher moments. For reasons of data limitations (we apply our method to
a relatively small panel data set, the German Socioeconomic Panel, SOEP), we have not
approached this. However, because we employ non-standardized moments, our estimates
of the skewness are independent of our estimates of the variance. Likewise, omitting the
kurtosis does not affect our estimates for variance and skewness of earnings shocks.
estimate for males was also very small.
6The confidence intervals for the skewness of transitory shocks overlap slightly between pre and post
government household earnings.
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Chapter 4
Asymmetric Business Cycles and
Government Insurance
This chapter is based on Busch et al. (2016).1
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies how higher-order income risk varies over the business cycle as well
as the extent to which such risks can be smoothed within households or with government
social insurance policies. By higher-order income risk, we refer to risks that are captured
by not only the variance of income shocks, but also their skewness and kurtosis. These
higher order moments of the data can be a major source of risk for individuals as we show
in this chapter.
To provide a broad perspective on these questions, we study panel data on individuals
and households from the United States, Germany, and Sweden, covering more than three
decades of data for each country. It is useful to begin by putting our analysis in context.
A broad range of empirical evidence indicates that idiosyncratic income risk rises in reces-
sions. Earlier work in the literature was limited by the small sample size and time span on
the available survey-based panel datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), forcing researchers to make parametric assumptions to obtain identification. One
widely used assumptions that is common in the literature is that shocks to earnings are
Gaussian and, therefore, its changes are bound to be symmetric. Restricting attention
to the changes in the mean and variance of income shocks, earlier studies concluded that
1We thank participants of the following conferences and workshops (all in 2015) for helpful comments:
the SED in Warsaw, the ESWC in Montre´al, the NBER SI, the 9th Nordic Summer Symposium in
Macroeconomics in Smo¨gen, the EEA in Mannheim and the CESifo Conference on Macroeconomics and
Survey Data in Munich.
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the variance of income shocks is countercyclical (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2004). In recent
work, Guvenen et al. (2014) used a very large panel dataset on earnings histories of a
representative sample of 10% of all US working-age males from the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA) records. Their large sample size, with millions of observations,
allows for identification of changes in an unrestricted sense—without parametric assump-
tions. They found that the variance of income shocks is very stable over time and is
robustly acyclical, whereas the skewness of shocks varies significantly over time in a pro-
cyclical fashion. This suggests that the changes in labor income risks in recessions and
expansions are rather asymmetric.
Despite important advantages, the SSA data also have three shortcomings: (i) earn-
ings data are available only for individuals, and it is not possible to link household mem-
bers to each other, (ii) no information is available on taxes and transfers (unemploy-
ment insurance, welfare payments, gifts, etc.), and (iii) no information is available on
skills/education. Furthermore, Guvenen et al. (2014) focus on males with no correspond-
ing information on women.
This chapter makes two contributions. First, applying non-parametric techniques
and using robust statistics, we document that the overall dispersion of individual labor
earnings growth is flat and acyclical in all three countries, whereas the left-skewness of
shocks is strongly countercyclical. These findings are robust across gender, skill groups,
private/public sector employment and occupation. Furthermore, we show (using data for
Germany) that these results are primarily driven by changes in wages and not in hours.
Moreover, we show that applying the same method to both survey and administrative
data (the PSID and SSA for the U.S. and SOEP and SIAB for Germany) yields the same
substantive conclusions.
Second we find that insurance provided within households or by the government plays
an important role in reducing downside risk, but that how and to what extent differs
between the countries. Within-household provided insurance reduces the countercyclical-
ity in the skewness of earnings in Sweden, but evidence of within-household insurance is
much weaker in United States and in Germany. Government provided insurance, in the
form of unemployment insurance, welfare benefits, aid to low income households, and the
like, plays a more important role in all three countries; the effectiveness is weakest in the
United States, and strongest in Germany.
Related Literature
This chapter is primarily related to two streams of the literature: the investigation of the
cyclical properties of income risk and the design and analysis of government policy over
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the business cycle.
The question of how idiosyncratic income risk varies over the business cycle is essen-
tially empirical, yet its answers have been dominated by parametric choices as a way to
overcome the data limitations. Storesletten et al. (2004) addressed those difficulties and
proposed an identification strategy that allowed exploiting a longer time span compared
to that available in the micro data. Similar to our results, they find that income risk
increases in recessions. However, as discussed in the introduction, they find this risk to
be driven by countercyclical variance. This chapter is closer to Guvenen et al. (2014),
also briefly discussed above, both in our non-parametric methods and in the findings. We
also find the increase in income risk to be driven by higher-order moments. Moreover,
compared to the latter paper, we extend the empirical analysis to different samples, de-
mographic groups, income measures, and countries. We, together with contemporaneous
research discussed below, confirm that the increase in downside risk in recessions is a
pervasive phenomenon.
Despite the importance of this empirical question for policy analysis in general, there
are few applications to countries other than the US. A notable exception is Bayer and
Juessen (2012), who extend the framework in Storesletten et al. (2004) and apply it to
household data in Germany, the UK, and the US. Limiting their analysis to symmetric
business-cycle risk of wages, they find mixed evidence for the cyclicality of the variance
of shocks; namely that variance is procyclical in Germany, acyclical in the UK, and coun-
tercyclical in the US. They attribute this result to the differences in institutions between
the three economies. In this chapter, we compare three economies with very different in-
stitutions, and after allowing for the possibility of asymmetric changes find that all three
countries exhibit similar cyclical patterns in higher-order labor income risk. Closer to our
work, Busch et al. (2016) analyze the cyclicality of labor income risk in Germany, explic-
itly allowing for time variation of the skewness. Extending the identification approach of
Storesletten et al. (2004) to the third moment, they come to the same substantial conclu-
sion as we do; namely, that variation of income risk over the business cycle is asymmetric.
Finally, concentrating on Italy, Blass-Hoffmann and Malacrino (2016) analyze the dynam-
ics of earnings changes with a focus on a decomposition into its employment time and
wage components.
Our focus on higher-order moments, in addition to the recent empirical evidence, is
motivated by a number of theoretical and quantitative papers that highlight the impor-
tance of these for household consumption behavior to be empirically plausible. In partic-
ular, Constantinides and Ghosh (2017) allow labor income shocks to exhibit procyclical
skewness in an asset-pricing model. Their model is able to match the cross-sectional dis-
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tribution of market returns, resolving several puzzles in the finance literature, including
the equity premium and excess volatility puzzles. These results are in line with earlier
theoretical results shown in Mankiw (1986).
This chapter is also related to the literature on economic stabilizers and cyclical gov-
ernment policy. Similar to our work, McKay and Reis (2014) focus on the stabilization
power of taxes and transfers. Their model allows for different channels through which
fiscal policy can interact with the business cycle. Our exercise is related to their social
insurance channel; that is, how these policies alter the risks households are exposed to and
their subsequent consumption response. In line with our results, they find that transfers
and taxes help reduce the welfare costs of recessions. Bhandari et al. (2015) study the de-
sign of optimal policy—transfers, taxes, and government debt---in response to aggregate
shocks in a model with incomplete markets and redistribution concerns. They calibrate
the model to US data, capturing the asymmetric variation in the tails of the distribution
of earnings shocks. They find that it is optimal for the government to increase all three
instruments as a hedging device against aggregate shocks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
data sources, and Section 4.3 describes the empirical approach. Section 4.4 presents the
results for gross (before-government) individual earnings and examines how the patterns
of cyclicality vary by gender, education, and type of employment. Section 4.5 expands
the analysis to households and includes various types of government social insurance
policies to examine their impact on the cyclicality of higher-order risk. Section 4.6 uses
a structural life-cycle consumption-savings model with partial insurance to quantify the
welfare benefits of governments’ social insurance policies in the three countries under
study. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Data
This section provides an overview of the data sets we use in our empirical analysis, the
sample selection criteria, as well as the variables used in the subsequent empirical anal-
yses. Given the diversity of our data sources, we relegate the details to Appendix B.1.
Briefly, we employ four longitudinal data sets corresponding to three different countries:
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States, covering 1976 to
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2010;2 the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB)3 and the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany, covering 1976 to 2010 and 1984 to 2011,
respectively; and the Longitudinal Individual Data Base (LINDA) for Sweden, covering
1979 to 2010. The PSID and the SOEP are survey-based data sets. The PSID has a yearly
sample of approximately 2000 households in the core sample, which is representative of the
U.S. population; the SOEP started with about 10,000 individuals (or 5,000 households) in
1984 and, after several refreshments, covers about 18,000 individuals (10,500 households)
in 2011.4
The SIAB is based on administrative social security records and our initial sample
covers on average 370,000 individuals per year. It excludes civil servants, students and
self-employed, which make about 20% of the workforce. From the perspective of our
analysis, the SIAB has two caveats: (i) income is top-coded at the limit of income subject
to social security contributions, and (ii) individuals cannot be linked to each other, which
prohibits identification of households. We deal with (i) by fitting a Pareto distribution
to the upper tail of the wage distribution5 and with (ii) by using data from SOEP for
all household-level analyses. Throughout the analysis we focus on West Germany, which
for simplicity we refer to as Germany. LINDA is compiled from administrative sources
(the Income Register) and tracks a representative sample with approximately 300,000
individuals per year.
For each country, we consider three samples: two at the individual level–one for males
and one for females–and one at the household level. The samples are constructed as
revolving panels: for a given statistic computed based on the time difference between
years t and t + k, the panel contains individuals who are aged 25 to 59 in periods t and
t + k (k = 1 or 5) and have yearly labor earnings above a minimum threshold in both
years. This threshold is defined as the earnings level that corresponds to 520 hours of
employment at half the legal minimum wage, which is about $1885 US dollars for the
United States in 2010.6 To avoid possible outliers, we exclude the top 1% of earnings
2The PSID contains information since 1967. We choose our benchmark sample to start in 1976 due
to the poor coverage of income transfers before the 1977 wave. We complement our results using a longer
period whenever possible and pertinent.
3We use the factually anonymous scientific use file SIAB-R7510, which is a 2% draw from the Inte-
grated Employment Biographies data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
4These numbers refer to observations after cleaning but before sample selection. Only the representa-
tive SRC sample is considered in the PSID. The immigrant sample and high income sample of the SOEP
are not used, because they cover only sub-periods.
5The imputation is done separately for each year by subgroups defined by age and gender. For workers
with imputed wages, across years, we preserve the relative ranking within the age specific cross-sectional
wage distribution. The procedure follows Daly et al. (2014): see Appendix B.1.3 for details.
6For the United States, we use the federal minimum wage. There is no official minimum wage in
Sweden or Germany during this period. For Germany, we a take a minimum threshold of 3 Euros (in
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observations in the PSID and SOEP, but not in LINDA (which is from administrative
sources). For each individual, we record age, gender, education, and gross labor earnings.
By gross earnings we mean a worker’s compensation from his/her employer before any
kind of government intervention in the form of taxes or transfers.
The household sample is constructed by imposing the same criteria on the household
head and adding specific requirements at the household level. More specifically, a house-
hold is included in our sample if it has at least two adult members, one of them being the
household head,7 that satisfy the age criterion and household income that satisfies the
income criteria. At the household level, we will analyze pre- and post government earnings
and disposable income. Pre-government earnings defined as the sum of gross labor earn-
ings earned by the adults in the household. Post-government earnings is constructed by
adding taxes and transfers, and disposable income by in addition adding capital income.
Classifying Expansions and Recessions
For the United States, the classification of expansionary and recessionary episodes is based
on the NBER peak and trough dates, with small timing variations. Given the time span
covered by our sample, we classify the following years as recessions: 1980-1983, 1991-92,
2001-2002, and 2008-2010. The main difference compared to the NBER list is that we
treat the 1980-1983 period as a single “double-dip” recession because of the short duration
of the intervening expansion and the lack of recovery in the unemployment rate. Based on
this classification, there are four expansions and four recessions during our sample period.
For both Germany and Sweden, we base the dating of expansions and recessions
on data from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), which applies the NBER
methodology to OECD countries since 1948. The classification is consistent with vari-
ous aggregate measures of the German and Swedish economies, respectively. In the time
period covered by the panel data, recession periods for Germany (peak to trough) are
from January 1980 to October 1982, January 1991 to April 1994, January 2001 to August
2003, and April 2008 to January 2009. Our sample period hence covers four recessions
and four expansions. For Sweden, ECRI recession periods are from February 1980 to June
1983, June 1990 to July 1993, and April 2008 to March 2009. This leaves us with three
recessions and three expansions during our sample period.
year 2000 Euros) for the hourly wage. For Sweden, the effective hourly minimum wage via labor market
agreements was around SEK 75 in 2004 (Skedinger, 2007). For other years, we adjust the minimum wage
by calculating the mean real earnings for each year, estimating a linear time trend for these means and
removing that time trend from the SEK 75 minimum wage.
7In PSID and SOEP the head of a household is defined within the data set. In LINDA, the head of
a household is defined as the sampled male.
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Figure 4.1: Cyclical Component of Quarterly GPD Growth: United States, Germany, and
Sweden
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Note: The shaded areas in the figure indicate U.S. recessions according to our classification described
in the text. The series for Germany corresponds to West Germany up to and including 1990Q4, and to
(Unified) Germany from 1991Q1 on. The cyclical component is obtained by HP-filtering the series for
GDP per capita from 1970Q1 to 2014Q1.
4.3 Empirical Approach
Measuring Income Volatility Over the Business Cycle
For each year, we calculate robust statistics of log s-year changes in income. We consider
different choices of s in order to distinguish between earnings growth over short and long
horizons, and interpret these as corresponding to “transitory” and “persistent” earnings
shocks.
More specifically, we compute moments m [∆syt], where yt ≡ lnYt (natural logarithm)
and ∆syt ≡ yt − yt−s. The moments m we consider are: the log differential between
the 90th and 10th percentiles (L9010), the (Kelley) skewness, and the top (L9050) and
bottom (L5010) tails. For Germany and Sweden, s refers to 1- and 5-year changes. Due
to the biennial structure of the PSID from the 1997 wave, our analyses of earnings for the
United States refer to 2- and 4-year changes instead.8
We do not impose any parametric assumption on the dynamics of income but instead
analyze the behavior of the tails of the distribution of earnings changes. We think this
is important since interpretations when using the variance as a summary statistic of the
8We calculate overlapping s-year differences up to ∆sy1996, and non-overlapping s-year differences
from then and up to ∆sy2010, for s = 2, 4.
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distribution alone can be misleading. To see this point, consider a widening of both the
upper and lower tails of a normally distributed variable. This is, P90 is shifted to the
right and P10 is shifted to the left. This certainly implies an increase in the variance; the
opposite, however, is not necessarily true. Think of the case in which only the lower tail
shifts to the left. Notice how the overall dispersion of the distribution increases here as
well, but if we were to interpret this increase in isolation we would wrongfully conclude
that not only one tail, but both of them expand. Similarly, unchanged overall dispersion
does not imply an unchanged distribution, but can be observed when both tails move
together (i.e., one tail shrinks while the other expands). Both of these last two scenarios
imply a change of the relative size of the tails–a feature summarized by the skewness of
the distribution. In our empirical analysis, these are the two scenarios we observe when
considering cyclicality: either overall dispersion does not change while skewness does, or
dispersion is cyclical, caused by one tail expanding and the other shrinking.
We conclude that, when measuring income volatility, the tails should be explicitly
analyzed. Furthermore, when relying on summary statistics of the distribution, limiting
the analysis to the variance cannot possibly identify the nature of the change, yielding
misleading results. Higher-order moments, like skewness, should be then considered. Note
how any assumption on the distribution of income shocks would drive our results: a (log-)
normal distribution cannot capture changes in skewness, for example. This is why, and in
light of recent evidence on male earnings growth using administrative data for the United
States (Guvenen et al., 2014), we take a skeptical–non parametric–point of view.
Broadening the Definition of Business Cycles
Some of the important macroeconomic variables do not perfectly synchronize with ex-
pansions and recessions, but their fluctuations might have an impact on earnings. For
example, the U.S. stock market experienced a significant drop in 1987, during an ex-
pansion, and we can see in the time series analysis how the third moment falls sharply
in that year. Similarly, the U.S. economy displayed an overall weakness in 1993-1994,
which is evident in a range of economic variables, but these years are technically classi-
fied as part of an expansion by the NBER dating committee. Other examples are easy
to find for Germany and Sweden (e.g., 1996). Therefore, the main focus of our analysis
will be on the co-movement of higher-order moments of earnings changes with a con-
tinuous measure of business cycles. We use the (natural) log growth rate of GDP—i.e.,
∆sGDPt ≡ ln(GDP t) − ln(GDP t−s)—as our measure of aggregate fluctuations. More
specifically, we regress each moment m of the log income change between t− s and t on a
constant, a linear time trend, and the log growth rate of GDP between year t− s and t :
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Table 4.1: Short- and Long-Run GDP Growth Volatility: United States, Germany, and
Sweden
Std. Dev. of GDP Growth
Data period short-run long-run
United States 1976-2010 3.34% 4.44%
Germany 1976-2010 2.01% 3.95%
Sweden 1976-2010 2.36% 5.42%
Note: Short-run is 1-year difference for Germany and Sweden, and 2-year difference for the
United States. Long-run is 5-year difference for Germany and Sweden and 4-year difference
for the United States.
m (∆syt) = α + γt+ β
m ×∆s(GDPt) + ut. (4.1)
For a quantitative interpretation of the results reported in the next sections, Table
4.1 reports the short- and long-run volatility of GDP growth for each country and year
sample considered along the chapter.
4.4 Empirical Results: Gross Individual Earnings
In this section, we address four questions concerning higher-order risk for individual earn-
ings. First, we ask if the countercyclical skewness and the acyclical dispersion is a US-only
phenomenon or a robust feature of business cycles that can be observed in other coun-
tries whose labor markets differ greatly from that in the U.S.. For example, according
to OECD (1993) 15 percent of U.S workers are unionized and 21 percent are covered by
trade union agreements. In Germany the equivalent shares are somewhat higher; 30 and
44 percent respectively, but in Sweden the overwhelming majority are members (84 per-
cent) or are covered (94 percent) by trade union agreements. Second, we ask if business
cycle variation in higher-order income risk differs across observationally distinct groups,
defined by gender, education, private/public sector employment and occupation. Third,
we ask if cyclicality of earnings changes can be attributed mainly to changes in wages or
to changes in hours worked. Fourth, we ask if the countercyclicality of skewness and the
acyclicality of dispersion found in U.S. administrative earnings data is also borne out in
U.S. survey data, e.g., the PSID. This question is important because earlier papers that
used the PSID and adopted parametric methods found strongly countercyclical variance
of shocks. This begs the question: is it the data set or is it the methodology that accounts
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Table 4.2: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
Males –0.11 1.67*** 0.57*** –0.68***
(–0.51) (5.00) (3.71) (–3.96)
Females 0.40*** 0.62* 0.48** –0.08
(1.85) (1.97) (2.61) (–0.52)
Sweden
Males –0.11 3.74*** 0.91*** –1.01***
(–1.22) (4.00) (3.80) (–3.74)
Females 0.43** 1.64*** 0.67*** –0.24**
(2.24) (3.33) (3.09) (–2.67)
Germany (SIAB)
Males 0.15 5.48*** 0.95*** –0.80***
(0.36) (5.80) (3.14) (–4.11)
Females 0.34 2.55** 0.80 –0.46*
(0.48) (2.05) (1.25) (–1.80)
Note: Each cell reports the coefficient on log GDP change of a regression of a moment of the distribution
of changes in a income measure on log GDP change, a constant, and a linear time trend. Newey-West
t-statistics are included in parentheses (maximum lag length considered: 3 for SIAB and LINDA, 2 for
PSID). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗) denote significance at the (10%, 5%, 1%)-level.
for these different conclusions?
Cyclicality of Dispersion
In Table 4.2, we report the cyclicality of four key statistics computed from the distribution
of earnings changes of individual workers. To provide a comparative discussion, we report
the results for all three countries in the same table. For now, we focus on the first row of
each panel, corresponding to the sample of male workers in each country. The first column
reports the cyclicality of the L9010. In the United States, the L9010 for males is acyclical,
as seen from the small (–0.11) and statistically insignificant (t-stat of –0.51) coefficient.
Turning to Sweden and Germany, the L9010 for male earnings are also acyclical.9
Overall, we conclude that in all three countries the dispersion of earnings changes does
not display any robust pattern of cyclicality, judging from these regressions. In addition
to being acyclical, the dispersion of earnings changes is quite flat over time (left panels of
Figure 4.2). These figures should be compared with typical calibrations in the literature
that assume the volatility of earning shocks doubles or triples during recessions. Here the
9All regression results based on SIAB data are robust to various robustness checks that address issues
of top-coding and a structural break in the wage variable. See appendix B.3 for details.
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GROSS INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS 63
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Short-Run Earnings Growth: United States, Sweden, and
Germany (SIAB): Males
(a) United States, SD (left) and KS (right) (b) United States, Upper and Lower Tail
(c) Sweden, SD (left) and KS (right) (d) Sweden, Upper and Lower Tail
(e) Germany, SD (left) and KS (right) (f) Germany, Upper and Lower Tail
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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largest movements are on the order of 10% to 15%, and they show no signs of cyclicality.
Cyclicality of Skewness
We next turn to the cyclical behavior of skewness. Column 2 reports a measure of asym-
metry, called Kelley’s skewness, defined as:
Sk =
(P90− P50)− (P50− P10)
(P90− P10)
.
This measure has several attractive features compared with the third standardized mo-
ment. First, it is much less sensitive to extreme observations, since it does not depend
on observations beyond the 90th and 10th percentiles of the distribution. This deals with
the concern about potential outliers. It is therefore our preferred measure of skewness,
especially when considering the U.S. and Germany (GSOEP) where measurement issues
could be more important.10 Second, the particular value of Kelley’s skewness has a simple
interpretation, in terms of the relative lengths of the top and bottom tails. In particular,
P90− P50
P90− P10
= 0.5 +
Sk
2
, (4.2)
which can be used to compute the fraction of overall dispersion (P90-P10) that is ac-
counted for by the top tail (P90-50) and consequently by the bottom tail (P50-P10).
Armed with these definitions, we turn to the left panels of Figure 4.2. In all three
countries, Kelley’s skewness is procyclical. This pattern is particularly striking in Sweden
and Germany, where movements in Kelley’s skewness are almost perfectly synchronized
with the business cycle as defined by ECRI. The notable exception is the fall in Kelley’s
skewness in 1996, but note that the cyclical component of GDP did indeed fall in 1996 as
displayed in Figure 4.1. Furthermore, Table 4.2 shows that the procyclicality of Kelley’s
skewness is (statistically) significant at the 1% level in all three countries. The coefficient
is 1.67 for the U.S., 3.74 for Sweden, and 5.48 for Germany, showing more cyclicality
when moving from the U.S. to Sweden and most for Germany. Thus, for example, if
a typical recession in Sweden entails a drop in GDP growth of two standard deviations
(from +1 to −1 sigmas, for a swing of 2 × 0.0236 = 0.0472), Kelley’s skewness will fall
by 0.0472 × 3.74 = 0.177. For the sake of discussion, suppose Sexp.k = 0 in an expansion,
then Srec.k = −0.18, which in turn implies from equation (4.2) that the upper tail to lower
tail ratio, (P90 − P50)/(P50 − P10) goes from 50/50 to 41/59 from an expansion to a
recession. This is a large change in the relative size of each tail, especially for a country
like Sweden, which might be thought of as displaying lower business cycle risk (due to the
10We have also analyzed the third standardized moment, and found very similar results.
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high unionization rate, among others).11
Inspecting the Tails
At the expense of some oversimplification, it might be useful to think about a shift to-
wards more negative skewness as arising from either a compression of the right tail or
an expansion of the left tail or both. Thus, a follow-up question is: which one of these
changes is driving the cyclical changes in skewness for each country? Again, the pattern
is particularly striking in Sweden, see the middle right panel of 4.2. It shows that the
top tail is procyclical, whereas the bottom tail is countercyclical. The last two columns
of Table 4.2 shows that this pattern is present and (statistically) significant in all three
countries. This means that, in a recession, the positive half of the shock distribution com-
presses relative to the median, whereas the negative half expands. Thus, the shift towards
negative skewness happens through both tails moving in unison during recessions.
Furthermore, notice that for all three countries it turns out that the magnitude of
movement of each tail is similar to each other. For example, for the U.S., the coefficient
for L9050 is 0.57 and for L5010 is –0.68. The corresponding coefficients are 0.91 and –1.01
for Sweden, and 0.95 and –0.80 for Germany. Therefore, as log GDP growth fluctuates
over the business cycle, the shrinking of one tail is matched closely by the expansion of
the other tail, making the total dispersion, the L9010, move very little over the cycle. As
a result, skewness becomes more negative in recessions without any significant change in
the variance. This analysis shows that the behavior of higher-order risk is best understood
by separately studying the top and bottom tails over the cycle, which can move together
or independently. Focusing simply on a directionless moment, such as the L9010 or the
variance, can miss important asymmetries that can matter for the nature of earnings
risk. As we will see in a moment, whenever we observe cyclical dispersion, it is driven
by asymmetric movements of the tails, and should not be thought of as a pure change in
L9010 or the variance (which would imply an expansion/compression of both tails).
Survey vs. Administrative data
The earlier work on higher order income risk for male earnings (Guvenen et al., 2014),
used administrative data from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) records.
As mentioned in the introduction, it lacks information on income components beyond
earnings and one cannot link household members to each other. Similar restrictions apply
to the administrative data we use for Germany (SIAB). This is why we use survey data
(PSID for the U.S. and SOEP for Germany) to answer questions regarding insurance
provided within households and by the government. These data sets however suffer from
11The corresponding changes in Sk for the U.S. and Germany are: 0.11 and 0.22 respectively.
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having fairly few observations, which may imply that higher moments are imprecisely
estimated. Reassuringly however, the results for individual earnings are very similar in
PSID and SSA data, and in SIAB and SOEP data respectively. Specifically, we have
re-run regression 4.1 using moments from the SSA data, as reported in Guvenen et al.
(2014), and from SOEP data. The resulting coefficients for U.S. males using SSA data
for each of the four moments are –0.07 , 2.31*** , 1.02*** , and –1.09**, respectively.
These numbers are strikingly similar to those in the first row of the top panel in Table
4.2 The equivalent numbers using SOEP data are –1.33**, 1.76***, –0.21, and –1.12***.
While these numbers differ somewhat from those in the first row of the bottom panel in
Table 4.2, they tell the same story. In particular, male earnings changes in both SOEP
and SIAB is characterized by asymmetric movements of the tails rather than uniform
expansions and contractions of both tails.12 The bottom tail is countercyclical in both
data sets while the top tail is procyclical in SIAB but acyclical in SOEP. As a result, the
L9010 is acyclical in SIAB and countercyclical in SOEP, but in both data sets skewness
is procyclical.
4.4.1 Differences by Gender
We now turn to the cyclicality of higher-order risk for female workers and examine how
they compare to the patterns for males. Focusing on the second row of each panel in Table
4.2, we see three main patterns. First, the L9010 of earnings changes is procyclical for U.S.
and Swedish women but acyclical for German women. This is different from men, who
displayed acyclical dispersion in all countries. Second, Kelley’s measure of skewness is
always procyclical–left-skewness is countercyclical–as indicated by the positive coefficient
on log GDP growth, which is highly significant for Sweden (1% level), significant for
Germany (5% level), and only slightly significant for the U.S. (10% level).
Third, inspecting the top and bottom tails separately (last two columns), we observe
the expected pattern of cyclicality, whenever the coefficient is significant. In particular,
L9050 is procyclical and significant for the U.S. and Sweden, whereas the L5010 is coun-
tercyclical and significant for Sweden and Germany.13 Thus, just as for the case of male
workers, the behavior of the variance is driven by an asymmetric movement of the two
tails rather than a uniform expansion of both tails. In our view, this finding reiterates
our earlier point that the L9010 or the variance are not ideal statistics to focus on when it
12We have also run 4.1 using the standard deviation of earnings changes as our measure for overall
dispersion instead, and the coefficients are small (0.07 (SIAB), –0.12 (SOEP)) and insignificant (t-stat of
0.42 (SIAB), –054 (SOEP)) in both data sets.
13It is somewhat surprising that women in the U.S. seem to face less downside risk as measured by
the L5010 differential compared with these two European countries.
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GROSS INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS 67
comes to measuring higher-order earnings risk over the business cycle. Finally, it is worth
noting that the magnitudes of the fluctuations in both Kelley’s skewness and in the upper
and lower tails separately are somewhat attenuated for women compared with men.
4.4.2 Differences Across Groups of Workers
To shed light on the possible sources of cyclicality of higher-order income risk we now
examine if it differs across observationally distinct groups. First we divide male and
female workers into groups by education (college vs non-college graduates), or by private
and public employment. These are two dimensions by which the three countries differ
greatly. In Germany. 12 percent of men and 8 percent of women are college educated. In
Sweden and the U.S. the equivalent numbers are 16 and 25 for males and 17 and 25 for
females respectively. Differences in the size of public sector employment is even larger.
Defining the public employment public administration, health care and education (sectors
which in Germany and Sweden are dominated by public sector jobs or by jobs funded by
the public),14 the share of public sector employment in Sweden is more than twice as
large as in Germany or the U.S.15 Moreover, public sector jobs are often thought of as
less risky, offering generous employment protection and less volatile compensation, so it
is interesting to ask if this is borne out in the data.
For each of these groups we analyze higher order income risk by first computing average
(standardized) moments across years and countries by quartiles of (standardized) log
GDP change as shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4. The standardization of moments and log
GDP change is performed independently for each country before pooling across countries,
which implies that a deviation from zero indicates a standardized deviation from the
country-specific mean of the moment. For each quartile the bars correspond to the average
moment for (ordered from the left) the full sample (blue), college graduates (green), non-
college graduates (red), private employment (cyan) and public employment (magenta),
respectively. Figure 4.3 shows that earnings risk is very similar across all male subgroups;
overall dispersion is acyclical (upper left panel), Kelley’s skewness is procyclical (upper
right panel), the top tail is procyclical and the bottom tail is countercyclical. Turning
to females, Figure 4.4 shows a similar picture and, as noted above, that fluctuations in
earnings risk is somewhat attenuated for women. For both males and females we see a
14Formally we define a worker as working in the public sector, if he/she works in these sectors in both
years t and t+k (where k = 1, 5). Historically most workers in these sectors were employed by the public;
this is less true today.
15In Sweden about 23% of men and 63% of women work in the public sector (these figures have been
relatively stable over the considered time period). In Germany a stable 10% of men work in the public
sector, while the share of women steadily increased from about 23% to about 36% over the considered
time period. In the U.S. 13 percent of males and 18 percent of females are employed in the public sector.
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Figure 4.3: Average Moments by Quartiles of log GDP Change: Males
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Note: For different samples, each bar shows the average moment across years and countries by quartiles
of log GDP change. Both log GDP changes and moments are standardized by country.
strong asymmetric cyclical change of the distribution of earnings changes across groups.
For each group we have also computed correlations between the moments and log
GDP change using equation 4.1 separately by country. These are displayed in Figure 4.5.
Detailed results can be found in Appendix B.2. Each panel in the figure shows, starting
from the left, the regression coefficients (from equation 4.1) with confidence intervals for
males (solid) in the U.S.(blue), Sweden (red) and Germany (green), then followed by
the equivalent regressions coefficients for females (dotted). Within each country-gender
grouping, the regression coefficients are (ordered from the left) those from the full sample,
college graduates, non-college graduates, private and public employment, respectively.
Figure 4.5 confirms the picture that emerged in Figures 4.3 and 4.4; higher order
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Figure 4.4: Average Moments by Quartiles of log GDP Change: Females
(a) P90-10
Quartile of log gdp change (standardized by country)
1 2 3 4
L
90
10
(s
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
b
y
co
u
n
tr
y
)
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
(b) Kelley’s skewness
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Note: See notes to figure 4.3.
earnings risk is similar across groups.16 There are however some noteworthy differences.
The magnitude of cyclicality is stronger for non-college graduates as compared to college
graduates—particularly in the U.S. and Sweden, where it is about three times stronger.
Moreover the magnitude of cyclicality for public sector workers is weaker in all countries.
For example, in Sweden, the procyclicality of Kelley’s measure of earnings is lower for
the public sector (2.10*** for males and 1.10*** for females) compared with the private
sector (3.83*** for males and 1.99*** for females). For males this is due to differences in
the top tail; it compresses strongly for private sector employees, whereas it is acyclical in
the public sector. The L5010 gap on the other hand fluctuates by comparable magnitudes
for both groups. For women, the reduced cyclicality is due to both tails fluctuating less.
16Tables B.3 to B.6 in Appendix B.2 show the coefficients displayed in the figure.
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Figure 4.5: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings and Wages: United States, Sweden, and
Germany (SIAB)
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(b) Kelley’s Skewness
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
for males (-) and females (:)
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(c) P90-50
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
for males (-) and females (:)
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(d) P50-10
Samples 1-5 for US (blue), Sweden (red), Germany (green)
for males (-) and females (:)
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Note: The samples are (1) Earnings: full sample , (2) Earnings: college graduates, (3) Earnings: non-
college graduates, (4) Earnings: private sector, (5) Earnings: public sector. For details of samples see
text. For the regressions, see note to table 4.2. Each • reports reports the coefficient on log GDP change.
Overall, it is somewhat surprising that, even for workers in the public sector in a
country like Sweden with a reputation for high levels of public insurance, there is robust
evidence of higher downside risk in recessions—compression of the top and expansion of
the bottom—even if the magnitudes are somewhat smaller than in the private sector.
This finding further strengthens the conclusion of this section that increasing downside
earnings risk appears to be a robust feature of business cycles in developed countries, even
with very different labor market institutions.
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Differences Across Occupations
We now turn to occupations and explore the heterogeneity of cyclical earnings changes
along this dimension. We are able to conduct this analysis for Germany; the SIAB pro-
vides time-consistent occupational codes based on the KldB-88, the 1988 version of the
classification of occupations by the German Federal Employment Agency. We now run
the cyclicality regressions separately for each occupation, where a worker contributes to
the earnings changes of occupation j from t to t + 1 if in year t he or she works in that
occupation.
We first consider the highest level of disaggregation in the KldB-88, which defines five
broad occupational areas ; (1) farming, gardening, animal breeding, fishing, and similar
occupations, (2) mining and mineral extraction, (3) manufacturing and fabrication, (4)
technical occupations like engineering or laboratory work, and, (5) service occupations.
For each occupation we have computed correlations between moments and log GDP change
using equation 4.1. As seen in Table 4.3, the results are quite similar as compared with
those for the full sample; in particular for male workers in manufacturing occupations,
technical occupations, and service occupations.
We also consider a more disaggregated analysis and re-run the regressions for 30 oc-
cupational segments. While there is then more variation across occupations in terms of
earnings cyclicality, the general pattern seen in the full sample of male and female re-
main; the lower tail is countercyclical for most occupational segments and the upper tail
is mostly procyclical. Tables B.7 and B.8 in Appendix B.2 summarize the coefficients
across the 30 occupational segments.
For both males and females the tail movements translate into the cyclicality procycli-
cality of Kelley’s skewness in the by now familiar way.
Summing up, we find that broad occupational groups experience similar cyclicality
with farming and mining related occupations being less cyclical. Regressions at finer level
of disaggregation point towards interesting heterogeneity of earnings cyclicality across
occupations.
4.4.3 Cyclicality of Earnings vs. Wages
A natural question that is raised by these results is whether the observed cyclicality
of earnings changes can be attributed mainly to changes in wages or to increased risk
of unemployment in economic downturns. The SIAB contains detailed information on
the duration of each employment spell and on whether it is a part-time or full-time
job. Focusing on full-time workers, we analyze the cyclicality of the distribution of wage
changes and compare the results to the ones on earnings changes. We define a worker as
72 CHAPTER 4. BUSINESS CYCLES AND GOVERNMENT INSURANCE
Table 4.3: Cyclicality of Earnings by occupational area; Germany (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Males
Farming and related 4.56 5.64 3.80 0.76
(1.23) (1.51) (1.52) (0.45)
Mining, Mineral Extraction 2.62 3.23 1.32** 1.30
(1.25) (1.39) (2.43) (0.72)
Manufacturing, Fabrication 0.17 11.39*** 2.00*** -1.83***
(0.20) (5.53) (3.21) (-3.99)
Technical Occupations 0.13 12.36*** 1.51** -1.38***
(0.19) (4.04) (2.72) (-3.64)
Service Occupations 0.59 8.89*** 1.76** -1.17***
(0.68) (3.92) (2.41) (-3.09)
Females
Farming and related 2.90 0.96 2.06 0.84
(0.73) (0.31) (0.71) (0.61)
Mining, Mineral Extraction -5.59 12.26 1.61 -7.20**
(-1.02) (1.54) (0.34) (-2.59)
Manufacturing, Fabrication -0.72 10.59*** 2.48* -3.20***
(-0.48) (4.95) (2.00) (-6.01)
Technical Occupations -0.75 8.44** 1.41 -2.16***
(-0.83) (2.70) (1.56) (-2.82)
Service Occupations 0.85 4.09 1.45 -0.60
(0.59) (1.63) (1.13) (-1.15)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2.
full time if his or her full-time spells add up to at least 50 weeks of employment in a given
year. (A less strict definition of full-time workers as 45 weeks of employment does not
change the results.) The wage variable is the average daily wage rate, where the average
is taken over all full-time spells. The same measure has also been used in Dustmann et
al. (2009) or Card et al. (2013).17
In Table 4.4, rows 1 and 4 reproduce the results from Tables 4.2 for completeness.
The first set of new results are in rows 2 and 5: these report the cyclicality regressions
using average daily wages instead of annual earnings. The main finding for both males
and females is that the cyclicality of wages for full-time workers are remarkably similar to
17In Germany, a full-time worker is entitled to an annual vacation time of 4 to 6 weeks, which is
counted as part of the employment spell.
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Table 4.4: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings vs. Wages; Germany (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Males
Earnings 0.15 5.48*** 0.95*** –0.80***
(0.36) (5.80) (3.14) (–4.11)
Full-Time Wages –0.09 4.73*** 0.30*** –0.39***
(–0.54) (6.31) (3.77) (–3.20)
Full-Time Wages –0.12 4.98*** 0.28*** –0.40***
(Firm Stayers) (–0.81) (5.78) (3.29) (–3.20)
Females
Earnings 0.34 2.55** 0.80 –0.46*
(0.48) (2.05) (1.25) (–1.80)
Full-Time Wages 0.03 2.12*** 0.17** –0.14
(0.18) (5.11) (2.61) (–1.58)
Full-Time Wages 0.02 2.28*** 0.16*** –0.14
(Firm Stayers) (0.13) (4.84) (3.17) (–1.61)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2.
the cyclicality of earnings. Specifically, both measures of dispersion of wages are acyclical
as was the case for earnings, and the point estimates for both skewness measures are very
close for wages and earnings.18 Naturally, the dispersion of earnings changes is wider than
the distribution of wage changes, which is reflected by the point estimates on the tails
(last two columns), which are about half as big for wage changes.
A question that remains is what happens to the wages of workers that stay at the
same firm. We therefore further restrict the sample to those workers that work at least
50 weeks for the same employer in both year t and t+1.19 The second set of new results
is in rows 3 and 6: the cyclicality regressions for average daily wages for those workers
who work at the same firm. The remarkable result is that even for those we observe
the same qualitative pattern of cyclicality of wage changes. By and large, these results
strongly indicate that the cyclicality results are driven by changes in wages even for full
18The sample of full-time female workers contains about 73% of women (who make for only 54% of the
observations) that contribute to the measures of earnings change for women. The corresponding figures
were 88% of individuals and 82% of observations for males. This implies that part-time employment plays
a more important role for the female sample.
19The sample of full-time female workers that do not switch firms contains about 61% of women (who
make for about 40% of the observations) that contribute to the measures of earnings change for women.
The corresponding figures were 80% of individuals and 65% of observations for males.
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time workers and not by hours.
4.5 Introducing Insurance
We now turn to various sources of insurance available in modern economies and gauge
the extent to which they are able to mitigate such downside risk over the business cycle.
4.5.1 Within-Family Insurance
In the previous section, we have shown that higher-order moments drive individual earn-
ings risk over the business cycle. While it is important to understand the underlying
nature of labor income risk and the systematic differences across groups, most of our sam-
ples are composed by individuals in cohabitation.20 Assuming pooling of resources within
the household, the relevant income measure for many economic decisions is the joint la-
bor income in the household, not individual income. We therefore shift our attention to
joint labor earnings at the household level in order to shed light on the role of informal
insurance mechanisms within the household. As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to
link individuals in SIAB, so we rely on SOEP data instead.
Mixed Evidence of Within-Family Insurance
The first row of each panel in Table 4.5 displays the cyclicality of each moment of household
earnings changes. In order to get a feeling for the decrease (or increase) of exposure to
business cycle fluctuations, we compare these results to the corresponding measures for
individual earnings from Table 4.2 and in particular male earnings as these on average
constitute 71, 60, and 62 percent of household earnings in the United States, Sweden,
and Germany, respectively. Additional evidence comes from the graphical analysis of
the dispersion, skewness, and the tails, of male earnings changes and household earnings
changes in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, respectively.
Considering cyclicality of dispersion, the patterns and magnitudes for household earn-
ings line up with the ones described for individual male earnings for all countries: house-
hold earnings changes display no cyclicality of dispersion. This is true especially for
Sweden and the United States. The countercyclical measure of dispersion (as measured
by L9010) for Germany is driven by the lower tail and thus the overall pattern here mirrors
the one of male earnings dispersion in SOEP (see Section 4.4).
The analysis of Kelley’s skewness–and the inspection of the tails–yields very interest-
ing results when comparing the three countries. In Sweden, intra-family insurance plays
an important role in reducing downside risk over the business cycle: The estimated co-
20Only 12% of our benchmark individual sample in the United States lives in a singe-person household,
for example.
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Table 4.5: Cyclicality of Household Earnings
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
Earnings 0.23 1.97*** 0.93*** –0.71***
(0.74) (6.17) (4.96) (–3.20)
Post-Gov 0.59** 1.17*** 0.72*** –0.14
(2.44) (3.13) (3.42) (–0.86)
Disposable 0.63* 1.13*** 0.74*** –0.12
(1.90) (4.83) (3.75) (–0.65)
Sweden
Earnings –0.02 2.24*** 0.50*** –0.52*
(–0.08) (3.33) (4.94) (–2.00)
Post-Gov –0.41* 0.94** –0.03 –0.38**
(–2.00) (2.38) (–0.44) (–2.33)
Disposable –0.43 1.50*** 0.06 –0.49**
(–1.64) (3.89) (0.61) (–2.67)
Germany (SOEP)
Earnings –1.31*** 1.88** –0.05 –1.26***
(–3.60) (2.68) (–0.18) (–4.26)
Post Gov –0.18 0.66 0.07 –0.25
(–1.09) (0.85) (0.32) (–1.28)
Disposable –0.16 0.56 0.05 –0.22
(–1.11) (0.67) (0.21) (–1.19)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2.
efficients on household earnings are smaller than those on male earnings and quite close
to those on female earning. For example, the coefficient on Kelley’s skewness is about 2.2
as compared to 3.7 and 1.6 on male and female earnings respectively. The difference is
primarily driven by both tails reacting less than those for male earnings; the lower tail by
about half and the upper tail by almost as much as compared to male earnings. Repeat-
ing the illustrative calculation from above, this would imply a move from an upper tail
to lower tail ratio of 50/50 in a typical expansion to 45/55 in a recession—much smaller
compared to the change to a ratio of 41/59 for male earnings and very similar to a ratio
of 46/54 for females.
Evidence of within-family insurance is weaker for the United States and Germany.
In both economies, the results suggest somewhat higher downside risk in recessions for
household earnings that that for male earnings, and much higher risk than that for female
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earnings. Considering the tails separately for the two countries, the slightly stronger
reaction of Kelley’s skewness is primarily driven by larger movements in the upper tail in
United States, whereas it is the lower tails that widens more in Germany.
In order to shed further light on the insurance within households, we consider the
cyclicality of income for actual households in comparison to income changes for randomly
formed couples. This way we want to see if there is anything special about households
visible in the data, or if the dynamics of household income just represent the dynamics of
male and female income. We therefore randomly pair heads and spouses for each t to t+1
change. For each random couple, we make sure that artificial income is above the lower
income. The first set of results in each country panel of table 4.6 shows the bootstrapped
mean, standard deviation and 10-90 confidence band of the regression coefficients. In
both the US and Germany, we find the random couples to experience lower downside risk
than actual households as measured by the cyclicality of L5010. For Sweden, the random
couples’ L5010 shows the same cyclicality as actual households. The next rows show the
same results when not randomly pooling all heads and spouses, but controlling for some
observables on the side of the head. When we control for age, we group heads into 7 age
groups and in the pool of spouses for each age group are all spouses of heads in the actual
data. Finally, we do the random coupling by age and education groups. As expected, the
cyclicality experienced by random couples is more and more similar to actual households.
Still, for the US and Germany we find actual households experiencing slightly higher
cyclicality of earnings changes than their artificial counterparts. This suggests that the
correlation between head’s and spouse’s labor market income is higher than for a random
counterpart and uncontrolled characteristics play some role - like, e.g., most heads and
spouses working in the same local labor markets.
We conclude that the responses of gross household earnings are heterogeneous across
countries, with Sweden being the only economy where the family plays a clear insurance
role against aggregate fluctuations. However, it is hard to extract further conclusions in
disconnection to taxes and transfers payed and received by the household. In order to
shed light on this issue, we move on to considering the role of social insurance policy over
the business cycle.
4.5.2 Government and Social Insurance Policy
Focusing on the household as the relevant unit, we analyze the effectiveness of social
policy in mitigating business cycle risk in addition to any insurance arrangements made
within households. We evaluate the total insurance effect of the tax and transfer system
by analyzing the cyclicality of post-government earnings as compared to household gross
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Table 4.6: Cyclicality of Earnings for Random Couples
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
Actual Households 0.23 1.97*** 0.93*** -0.71***
Random couples 0.21 1.27 0.63 -0.42
(0.22) (0.31) (0.15) (0.19)
[-0.07 - 0.49] [0.84 - 1.69] [0.42 - 0.82] [-0.66 - -0.19]
Random by age 0.03 1.51 0.65 -0.62
(0.30) (0.35) (0.18) (0.24)
[-0.35 - 0.45] [1.05 - 1.94] [0.42 - 0.89] [-0.92 - -0.33]
Random by age & educ. 0.01 1.49 0.63 -0.62
(0.29) (0.34) (0.18) (0.23)
[-0.40 - 0.34] [1.06 - 1.92] [0.37 - 0.87] [-0.92 - -0.32]
Sweden
Actual Households -0.02 2.24*** 0.50*** -0.52*
Random couples -0.21 1.72 0.31 -0.52
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
[-0.25 - -0.16] [1.66 - 1.79] [0.28 - 0.33] [-0.55 - -0.49]
Random by age -0.20 1.76 0.32 -0.,53
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
[-0.25 - -0.16] [1.68 - 1.85] [0.30 - 0.35] [-0.56 - -0.50]
Random by age & educ. 0.02 1.82 0.46 -0.43
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
[-0.02 - 0.06] [1.72 - 1.89] [0.43 - 0.48] [-0.47 - -0.40]
Germany (SOEP)
Actual Households -1.31*** 1.88** -0.05 -1.26***
Random couples -0.99 1.28 -0.12 -0.87
(0.29) (0.48) (0.18) (0.22)
[-1.35 - -0.62] [0.64 - 1.88] [-0.35 - 0.11] [-1.14 - -0.58]
Random by age -1.15 1.02 -0.25 -0.89
(0.32) (0.57) (0.21) (0.25)
[-1.57 - -0.73] [0.29 - 1.78] [-0.53 - 0.01] [-1.23 - -0.58]
Random by age & educ. -1.19 1.01 -0.28 -0.91
(0.33) (0.56) (0.21) (0.25)
[-1.65 - -0.80] [0.25 - 1.70] [-0.54 - -0.01] [-1.24 - -0.60]
Note: See notes for Table 4.2. The parameter for the random couples is the mean over 250
bootstrap repetitions. In parentheses is the standard deviation, in brackets are the 10th
and 90th percentiles. The regression for Sweden with education starts in 1991.
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Figure 4.6: Standard Deviation and Skewness of Short-Run Earnings Growth: United
States, Germany (SOEP), and Sweden
(a) United States, Std. Dev. (b) United States, Kelley’s Skewness
(c) Sweden, Std. Dev. (d) Sweden, Kelley’s Skewness
(e) Germany, Std. Dev. (f) Germany, Kelley’s Skewness
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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Figure 4.7: Tails of Short-Run Earnings Growth: United States, Germany (SOEP), and
Sweden
(a) United States, P90-50 (b) United States, P50-10
(c) Sweden, P90-50 (d) Sweden, P50-10
(e) Germany, P90-50 (f) Germany, P50-10
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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Table 4.7: Components of Social Policy
LINDA SOEP PSID
1. Labor Market Transfers: Unemployment
benefits;
Labor market programs
Unemployment benefits Unemployment
benefits;
Workers’ compensation
2. Aid to Low-Income Families: Family support;
Housing support;
Cash transfers from the
public;
(no private transfers)
Subsistence allowance;
Unemployment
assistance
(up to 2004);
Unemployment benefits
II (since 2005)
Supplemental Security
Income;
Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
(AFDC);
Food Stamps;
Other Welfare
3. Social Security and Pensions: (Old Age) Pensions Combined old-age,
disability, civil service,
and company pensions
Combined (Old Age)
Social Security and
Disability (OASI)
Note: Table lists the measures used in the three data sets to construct subcomponents of
transfers.
earnings. In order to gain insights on the effectiveness of different policies, we then evaluate
the relative importance of several subcomponents of transfers using the empirical tools
employed in the previous analysis on income measures that in turn add certain transfers
to household gross earnings.
For the analysis of subcomponents, we consider three main groups of transfers that
are comparable across countries and for each country are consistently measured over
time. The groups are (1) labor-market-related policies, (2) aid to low-income families,
and (3) “pensions,” and are listed in Table 4.7. Labor-market-related policies mainly
consist of unemployment benefit payments—this component of social insurance policy is
of particular importance for the mitigation of increased downside household earnings risk
in recessions, if the nature of downside risk is (temporary) job loss of household head or
spouse.
The second component considered, “aid to low-income families,” consists of several
measures of social insurance policies specifically aimed at at-risk households. The rele-
vance of this type of transfer can therefore be expected to matter most for low-income
households who have a higher likelihood of falling down to fulfilling ’at-risk’ criteria in the
course of a recession. The third component, pension payments, is not directly connected
to business cycle considerations. It can still play a relevant role for household members
near or at retirement age, who may take up pension payments instead of unemployment
payments if they decide to leave the labor market upon job loss.
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The Overall Effect of the Tax and Transfer System
We begin with a brief discussion on the overall effect of the government, comparing the
cyclicality of pre- and post-government measures of household earnings listed in rows
1 and 2 of Table 4.5. Again, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 visualize the findings. We find that
social policy is an important source of insurance against aggregate fluctuations in all
three economies, with very similar overall effects. Motivated by the considerations from
above sections, we directly consider the reactions of the upper and lower tails of income
changes. In all three economies, downside risk is mitigated successfully by the tax and
transfer system. In both the United States and Germany, the lower tail of post-government
earnings changes is unresponsive to the business cycle–while significantly countercyclical
for pre-government earnings. In Sweden, lower tail counter-cyclicality is dampened but
still statistically significant (from a point estimate of –0.52 to –0.38).
Considering the cyclicality of the upper tail reveals differences between the countries.
In Germany, it is unresponsive to the cycle for both pre-and post-government earnings.
While both the U.S. and Sweden reveal procyclicality of L9050 of pre-government earn-
ings changes, the L9050 of post-government earnings changes is acyclical in Sweden, but
still procyclical in the United States. The different reactions of the tails translates into
procyclical overall dispersion of post-government earnings changes in the U.S., and coun-
tercyclical dispersion in Sweden. Summarizing the reaction of overall dispersion and tails
results in procyclicality of Kelley’s skewness measure for both countries; though the pro-
cyclicality is much smaller for post- than for pre-government earnings.
To sum up, the analysis suggests that downside risk in recessions is mitigated by taxes
and transfers. In Sweden, an additional effect are lowered upside chances in expansions.
This lines up with considerations of Sweden as a country with a high degree of redistri-
bution.
The Role of Subcomponents of Social Policy
The measure of post-government earnings used so far lumps a lot of very different transfers
received and taxes paid by households. While this measure is appropriate for assessing
the overall effect of the tax and transfers system, it is not as well suited for understanding
the success of different social policies that specifically aim at mitigating downside risk or
that aims at aiding low-income families, who can be expected to be especially vulnerable
in recessionary periods. Therefore, we now consider different types of transfers separately.
The results of the cyclicality analysis are listed in Table 4.8. As for for the estimates
of total taxes and transfers, we compare the coefficients to the ones from the household
gross earnings analysis in row 1 of Table 4.5. Recall that in order to be in the year t
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base sample for the analysis, the lowest considered income measure of a household needs
to be above the income threshold for that year. This way, we ensure that the sample
is stable at the lower end of the distribution and results are not driven by low-income
households entering the sample for a certain type of transfer but are not in the sample
when considering another.
Table 4.8: Cyclicality of Household Earnings - Transfers Added Separately
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
+ Labor transfers 0.60 1.59*** 0.92*** –0.33
(1.54) (5.20) (4.20) (–1.34)
+ Aid to low-income 0.21 1.90*** 0.89*** –0.69***
(0.77) (6.13) (5.16) (–3.33)
+ Pensions 0.22 1.82*** 0.86*** –0.64***
(0.80) (5.61) (4.79) (–3.06)
Sweden
+ Labor transfers –0.22 1.14*** 0.13* –0.35**
(–1.23) (4.23) (2.04) (–2.58)
+ Aid to low-income –0.07 2.11*** 0.42*** –0.49**
(–0.38) (3.72) (4.51) (–2.47)
+ Pensions –0.07 2.34*** 0.48*** –0.55**
(–0.43) (3.55) (4.50) (–2.68)
Germany (SOEP)
+ Labor transfers –1.09*** 1.34** –0.13 –0.96***
(–2.96) (2.50) (–0.60) (–3.65)
+ Aid to low-income –1.32*** 1.66** –0.11 –1.21***
(–3.82) (2.40) (–0.47) (–4.08)
+ Pensions –1.21*** 1.80*** –0.04 –1.17***
(–3.30) (3.10) (–0.18) (–4.58)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2.
The results in Table 4.8 show that out of the three transfer components, labor market
related transfers (which have unemployment benefits as the main component) accounts
for most of the reduction in downside. The other two components of transfers do not
have any impact on cyclicality as measured by our cyclicality regressions. For all three
economies, the point estimates when adding aid to low-income families or pensions are
almost identical to the ones for gross earnings.
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A closer look at the estimated coefficients reveal some interesting differences between
the countries. In Sweden, labor market transfers account for almost the whole difference
between pre- and post-government earnings cyclicality in the tails (compare rows 1 and
2 in Table 4.7 with row 1 in Table 4.8). Thus only a tiny amount is accounted for by the
Swedish tax system or other transfers.
In the U.S., labor market transfers similarly accounts for the entire reduction in lower
tail cyclicality. But the upper tail is unaffected by labor market transfer, and it is barely
affected by aid to low-income families or pensions. This suggest that the lower procycli-
cality of the upper tail of U.S. post-government earnings changes is accounted for by U.S.
tax system (or some interaction between taxes and transfers).
Finally, in Germany labor market transfers also mitigates downside risk, but it does so
to a lesser extent than in Sweden and the United States. Rows 1 and 2 in Table 4.7 and
row 1 in Table 4.8, shows that households earnings plus labor market transfers display
significant down-side risk, (smaller but quite similar coefficients that those on household
earnings), whereas post-government earnings changes are acyclical. The former finding is
corroborated on individual earnings changes using our larger sample based on the SIAB
data base. Besides individual earnings SIAB also contains information on unemployment
benefits at the individual level. Table 4.9 shows results for individual level regressions
for male and female earnings separately, when unemployment benefits are excluded (rows
1 and 3) and included (2 and 4). These individual level results line up well with the
household level analysis conducted using SOEP data; labor market transfers mitigate
the cyclicality of the tails but there is still significant higher order income risk even when
unemployment benefits are included in the income measure. This suggest that the German
tax system (or interaction terms between taxes and transfers) is the primary reason for
post-government earnings being acyclical.
4.5.3 Sensitivity of Results to Choice of Lag Length
All results reported in the text refer to the distribution of what we label transitory, i.e.,
one-year changes of several income measures.21 Given the focus of Storesletten et al.
(2004) or Guvenen et al. (2014), to which we relate our results, on persistent income
changes this choice needs to be discussed. The main reason for us to focus on one-year
changes is that we choose a regression framework as our main tool of analysis. We make
this choice, because we compare the cyclicality of income risk across countries. While for
the US it is widely accepted to base the dating of business cycles on NBER recession dates,
21Recall that for the US we define two-year changes as transitory in order to account for the biannual
nature of the PSID since 1997.
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Table 4.9: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings Including Unemployment Benefits in Ger-
many (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Male Earnings 0.11 5.71*** 0.97*** –0.86***
(0.26) (5.32) (2.93) (–4.40)
+Unempl. benefits 0.15 5.12*** 0.84** –0.70***
(0.34) (5.24) (2.61) (–4.01)
Female Earnings 0.46 2.69* 0.89 –0.44*
(0.60) (1.92) (1.26) (–1.74)
+ Unempl. benefits 0.50 2.43* 0.82 –0.32
(0.67) (1.82) (1.22) (–1.43)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2. Difference to estimates in 4.2 are due to the fact that
regressions start in 1981 instead of 1976.
this dating is less clear cut for both Germany and Sweden. More generally, it is not clear
that in a cross-country comparison the dating of business cycles is of the same quality in
terms of capturing actual economic conditions. Our regression framework allows a very
clear interpretation and comparison of cyclicality of income changes.
Moving to five-year changes—which are closer to capturing persistent changes—would
imply problems with the regression analysis for two reasons. One option would be to use
non-overlapping five-year changes of income and GDP, another would be to use overlap-
ping changes. The first option would give too few data points for a regression analysis,
while the second would open the door to usual problems of overlapping data.
The time-series of five-year changes is shown in figures B.1 to B.3 in Appendix B.4.
Comparison to the one-year changes suggest the same qualitative patterns.
4.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we quantitatively address the question of how successful government policy
is in insuring households against business cycle fluctuations of earnings risk. For that
purpose, we estimate income processes for pre-government household labor income and,
separately, for post-government household income. The process is specified flexibly as
a mixture of normals with time-varying moments to allow for cyclical higher-order risk.
Given estimated processes, we quantify the welfare gain of the existing tax and transfer
system for the average household as the consumption equivalent variation (CEV) that
is necessary to make households facing the pre-government income stream indifferent to
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facing the post-government income stream.
Our estimation is based on earnings data, so we use a model to simulate consumption
profiles of households facing either pre- or post- government income streams. It is well
documented that households are able to partially insure against income changes via various
mechanisms (see, e.g., Blundell et al., 2008a). Reflecting this, we use a variant of the
partial insurance model by Heathcote et al. (2014) to quantify the welfare gains. We
do this exercise for all three countries. Before going to the results of the model-based
welfare analysis in section 4.6.2, the next subsection discusses the estimation of the income
process.
4.6.1 Estimation of Pre- and Post-Government Income
Let Yt denote household earnings in period t, and define yt ≡ log Yt. We assume yt evolves
according to the following process:
yt = zt + θt (4.3)
zt = zt−1 + ζt
where εt is an iid transitory shock with distribution N (µθ, σθ),22 and ζt denotes a perma-
nent shock with time-varying and business-cycle dependent distribution, modeled as in
McKay (2016).
In particular, ζt follows a mixture of three normalsN (µ¯t+µi−φixt, σi), with respective
probability pi, i = 1, 2, 3, where
∑3
i=1 pi = 1 and xt ≡ GDP growth. µ¯t is simply a
normalization such that E(eζ) = 1. We use GDP growth as the empirical measure of
aggregate fluctuations in order to make the quantitative results easily interpretable in
relation to the empirical estimates shown in section 4.4. The parameter φ determines how
much of aggregate risk is transmitted to idiosyncratic earnings risk and will be estimated
alongside the other parameters that drive the distributions of the shocks.
We estimate θ = (σθ, p1, µ2, µ3, σ1, σ2, φ)
23 by Method of Simulated Moments (MSM).
We target the time series of the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the 1, 3, and 5-year
earnings changes distribution,24 as well as the age profile of the cross-sectional variance
from age 25 to 60. Tables B.13a and B.13b show the parameter estimates for the three
economies under both scenarios. Appendix B.5 includes the comparison between the
simulated moments at these parameters and the empirical moments, as well as further
22µθ is chosen such that E
(
eθ
)
= 1.
23For identification purposes, we impose µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≤ 0, and φ1 = 0. With this assumption, the time-
varying means of the three mixtures will control the center, right tail, and left tail of the distribution of
ζ, respectively. For practical purposes, we further assume p2 = p3, σ2 = σ3.
24In the case of the United States, we target the 2, 4, and 6-year changes.
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details on the simulation and estimation implementation.
4.6.2 Quantitative Model
The earnings changes we estimated reflect both actual ”shocks” in the sense of unforeseen
income changes, as well as expected changes (Guvenen and Smith, 2014). Further, shocks
differ in their nature, and some shocks are insurable, while others are not. Heathcote et
al. (2014), HSV hereafter, set up a model populated by a continuum of islands, each of
which in turn is populated by a continuum of agents. Two types of shocks exist in their
economy, one common to all members of an island and the other individual specific. Island
refers to a group of workers that are described by the same history of uninsurable shocks.
Islands can be thought of as a network of family members, who perfectly share the risks
faced by each individual. If, e.g., all family members work in the same industry and live in
the same region, there will be shocks that hit every member equally and hence cannot be
insured within the family network. Importantly for the model estimation, there is no need
to define empirical counterparts to the model islands, and all parameters can be identified
solely with aggregate moments. Given some assumptions on the market structure, outlined
below, HSV show the existence of a non-trade equilibrium in the spirit of Constantinides
and Duffie (1996). In this equilibrium, there is no asset trade across islands while agents
within an island insure themselves perfectly against the individual-specific shocks. This
reflects insurable (within island) and uninsurable (island level) shocks.
Model Structure
We employ a version of the HSV model, in which we abstract from endogenous labor
supply. We also stay agnostic about the specific functional form of the tax and trans-
fer system. Instead, we confront the model agents with the estimated pre-government
earnings process and derive the implied consumption profile faced by expected utility
maximizers, whose only choice (on top of engaging in asset trade) is consumption. We
then consider the alternative world in which agents face the estimated post-government
earnings process and derive their consumption profiles.
Specifically, household income is assumed to follow
yt = αt + εt,
where αt is the ”island-specific” component, that is common to a continuum of agents,
which are additionally characterized by ”individual” component εt. This individual com-
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ponent in turn has a permanent part κt and a transitory part θt.
αt = αt−1 + ωt
εt = κt + θt
κt = κt−1 + ηt (4.4)
θt ∼ Fθ,t
ηt ∼ Fη,t
ωt ∼ Fω,t
Workers live finite lives. Each period a mass (1− δ) of newborns enters the economy
with age 0. The probability of survival from age a to age a+1 is constant at δ. New-born
agents maximize discounted life-time utility. For the per period utility function we use
log utility: u (ct) = log (ct).
Age 0 agents entering in year b hold zero financial wealth and are allocated to an island
of agents that then share the same sequence of uninsurable shocks {ωt}
∞
t=b. There exists a
full set of state-contingent claims for individual-specific shocks. Across islands, individuals
can trade contracts contingent on their individual level shocks, while inter-island contracts
are non-existent.
In equilibrium, log consumption and consumption change is given by:25
log ct (xt, εt) = αt + log
ˆ
exp (εt) dF
a
ε,t, (4.5)
∆ log ct+1 = ωt+1 +
(
log
´
exp (ηt+1) dFη,t+1
´
exp (θt+1) dFθ,t+1´
exp (θt) dFθ,t
)
(4.6)
Note that the uninsurable shock ωt+1 that realizes for an individual translates one for
one to consumption. The individual realizations of the two insurable shocks, however, do
not at all affect consumption: given perfect risk sharing, all members of an island consume
the mean realization of these shocks.
Distribution of Shocks
In order to use the model, we need to translate the estimated earnings process (4.3) into
the process specified in (4.4). In the estimation the transitory component is assumed
to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution, which directly translates into the distribution
θt from (4.4). Permanent earnings changes are drawn from a mixture of three normal
25The derivation of consumption outlined in HSV carries over 1:1 to our simplified version of their
model, which abstracts from the tax function and endogenous labor supply
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distributions. In specification (4.4), the overall permanent earnings change is given by
(ωt + ηt) , the insurable (individual-level) and the uninsurable (island-level) part. We
now assume that both types of permanent shocks are drawn from time-varying mixture
distributions. We scale the estimated parameters of the permanent shocks such that the
variance of ηt (ωt) is equal to the fraction λ (1-λ) of the overall variance of the permanent
shock ζ :
ηt ∼

N (λ1/2µ1,t, λσ
2
1) with probability p1
N (λ1/2µ2,t, λσ22) with probability p2
N (λ1/2µ3,t, λσ23) with probability p3
(4.7)
ωt ∼

N ((1− λ)1/2 µ1,t, (1− λ)σ21) with probability p1
N ((1− λ)1/2 µ2,t, (1− λ)
2
2) with probability p2
N ((1− λ)1/2 µ3,t, (1− λ)σ23) with probability p3
(4.8)
This scaling implies that the first three moments of ηt and ωt are given by E [ηt] =
λ1/2E [ζt], var [ηt] = λvar [ζt], and skew [ηt] = skew [ζt] (for ω replace λ with 1 − λ); see
Appendix B.6.26
In this setup, λ is the measure of the degree of partial insurance against permanent
shocks: it simply measures the share of the total permanent variance that is accounted
for by the insurable component. In line with the estimation we draw changes to xt from a
Standard Normal distribution and for each t calculate the parameters of the transitory and
permanent shock components. In order to break the permanent shocks into an insurable
and an uninsurable component we exogenously pick a value for λ and then simulate income
and consumption profiles for a number of model agents.
Household i’s lifetime utility when facing the pre- or post-government income streams
is given by:
U ji
({
cjia
}
a
)
=
∑
a
(βδ)a−1 u
(
cji,a
)
,
for j = pre, post, and cji,a is consumption of household i at age a when facing income
stream j.
Utilitarian welfare in the world of the pre-government income stream when agents
receive per-period consumption equivalent variation CEV is given by W pre (CEV ) ≡∑
i U
pre
i
({
(1 + CEV ) cprei,a
}
a
)
, similarly utilitarian welfare in the post-government world
is W post ≡
∑
i U
post
i
({
cposti,a
}
a
)
. We search for the CEV that ensures W pre (CEV ) =
W post, which with homogeneity of the per-period utility function can be calculated in
26We then shift the η and ω shocks by dη and dωsuch that E [exp (η + dη)] = E [exp (ω + dω)] = 1.
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closed-form and for log utility is
CEV = exp
(
W post −W pre
N
1− βδ
1− (βδ)A
)
− 1, (4.9)
where N is the number of individuals and A is the maximum age.
We evaluate the welfare gains for several values of the degree of partial insuranceλ. For
the remaining model parameters we follow HSV, i.e., we set the annual survival probability
to δ = 0.996, the preference discount factor to β = 0.95. We simulate the model economy
for 10 cohorts, each consisting of 10,000 individuals that live for a maximum of 100 years
and calculate their expected present value utility at model age 1. Each cohort lives through
a different macroeconomic history of log GDP changes, which we draw independently from
a Normal distribution. The initial distribution of earnings at model age 1 is drawn from a
lognormal distribution that resembles the overall dispersion at age 25 from the data. To
be precise, we assume that earnings at age 25 are composed by the sum of a transitory
component and two permanent components. We draw the transitory component from a
lognormal distribution with variance of transitory shocks and then draw the uninsurable
and insurable parts of the permanent shocks from lognormal distributions with λ and
(1− λ) times the remaining variance. Thus, total variance at model age 1 corresponds to
data variance at age 25. Then, agents accumulate shocks as described above. Using (4.9),
we calculate the CEV for each cohort and then take the average over cohorts to calculate
the welfare gains which are shown in table 4.10.
The degree of partial insurance λ is set to be the same in the two alternative worlds,
i.e., pre- or post-government income. This reflects that we explicitly do not want to
capture any partial insurance by the tax and transfer system. As expected, a higher
value of partial insurance implies a lower gain from introducing the tax and transfer
system: households are insured better against shocks and so the individual realization
of earnings changes is less relevant for actual consumption. If the channels of partial
insurance available to households beyond taxes and transfers reduce earnings volatility
by 50 percent, the introduction of the tax and transfer system amounts to a welfare
gain of about 7.4% of annual consumption for the average American household facing
the pre-government income stream. These numbers are 9.8% and 6.2% for Sweden and
Germany, respectively. A higher degree of partial insurance implies less scope for the tax
and transfer system to insure households against income fluctuations.
Summarizing, in all three economies, the welfare gains resulting from the tax and
transfer system are large and of similar magnitude. The Swedish tax and transfer system
is estimated to yield a higher welfare gain than its German and American counterparts.
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However, comparing the US to Germany, it is surprising that our results point towards
slightly higher gains in the United States.
Table 4.10: Welfare Gains of the Tax and Transfer System
λ = 0.75 λ = 0.5
United States 3.6 7.4
Sweden 4.7 9.8
Germany 3.1 6.2
Note: λ denotes the degree of partial insurance against permanent shocks; the per-period
utility function is log (c). The table entries show the consumption equivalent variation in
percentages that is necessary to make households indifferent between the (compensated)
pre-government income stream and the post-government income stream.
Digging deeper into the structure of the model economy, table 4.11 summarizes mo-
ments of the distributions of (log) income changes and of (log) consumption changes in
expansions and contractions. The clear pattern that emerges across countries in the sim-
ulations is that the consumption stream is less volatile, and that the distribution of both
income and consumption changes changes asymmetrically with aggregate conditions, in
the sense that the distribution is more skewed to the right in expansions. Zooming in on
the simulated income and consumption profiles, figure 4.8 shows the variances over the
life cycle. The variance of the pre-government income stream is higher and rises faster
that for the post-government income stream, which translates to similar behavior of the
consumption inequality over the life cycle.
The described welfare analysis is based on an imposed structure with strong assump-
tions. We complement these results with a more reduced form estimate of the welfare
gains. Consider Table 4.12: it shows moments of the distribution of income changes com-
ing from pooled samples for each country for the income measures considered throughout
the analysis in the preceding sections. Let us focus on the moments of pre- and post-
government household income. In all three countries, the tax and transfer system overall
closes the distribution of earnings changes: both upper and lower tails are smaller. Also
a finding common to all economies is that the lower tail is affected more than the upper
tail, which is reflected by a less negatively skewed distribution. For example, in Sweden
the distribution of post-government earnings changes is even symmetric on average. For
the United States, the described pattern is very weak: Kelley’s skewness is only slightly
affected and the measure based on central moments is unchanged to the second digit.
Not only is the overall dispersion smaller, and the distribution more symmetric, when
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Figure 4.8: Variance of the Simulated Life Cycle Profiles of Income and Consumption:
United States, Germany, and Sweden
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(b) United States, λ = 0.5
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(c) Sweden, λ = 0.75
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(d) Sweden, λ = 0.5
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(e) Germany, λ = 0.75
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(f) Germany, λ = 0.5
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Note: Figures show life cycle variance profiles in the simulated model. For details see text.
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Table 4.11: Moments of Income and Consumption Changes in the Model Economy
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
HH Earnings 0.84 0.02 0.43 0.41
0.83 –0.01 0.41 0.42
HH Post Gov 0.75 0.01 0.38 0.37
0.74 –0.00 0.37 0.37
Consumption w/o GOV 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.07
0.14 –0.02 0.07 0.07
Consumption w/ GOV 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.06
0.12 –0.01 0.06 0.06
Sweden
HH Earnings 0.48 0.06 0.26 0.23
0.47 –0.04 0.23 0.24
HH Post Gov 0.38 0.07 0.21 0.17
0.36 –0.04 0.17 0.18
Consumption w/o GOV 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.06
0.12 –0.04 0.06 0.06
Consumption w/ GOV 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03
0.06 –0.06 0.03 0.03
Germany
HH Earnings 0.61 0.02 0.31 0.30
0.65 –0.07 0.30 0.35
HH Post Gov 0.55 0.02 0.28 0.26
0.56 –0.04 0.27 0.29
Consumption w/o GOV 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.05
0.11 –0.08 0.05 0.06
Consumption w/ GOV 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04
0.08 –0.11 0.03 0.04
Note: The degree of partial insurance against permanent shocks, λ, is set to 0.75. The first
line of each case denotes the average value of the moment in expansions; the second line
denotes the average value of the moment in contractions.
comparing post-government household income to household gross earnings, also the share
of households for which the annual income movements are very small is higher. This is
what the higher kurtosis of post-government income suggests. Again, the effect is weakest
for the United States and most pronounced for Sweden. Note that, in all three countries,
the distribution of both pre- and post-government income changes is far away from a
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Table 4.12: Moments of Income Changes
Std.Dev L9010 Skew Kelley Kurt L9050 L5010 Nobs
United States (PSID)
Male Earnings 0.44 0.75 –0.42 0.03 13.69 0.39 0.36 42,698
HH Earnings 0.45 0.83 –0.24 –0.04 10.86 0.40 0.43 38,314
HH Post Gov 0.41 0.76 –0.24 –0.03 12.26 0.37 0.39 38,602
HH Disposable 0.39 0.79 –0.19 –0.02 10.50 0.39 0.40 38,632
+ Labor transfers 0.44 0.81 –0.24 –0.04 11.33 0.39 0.42 38,327
+ Aid to low–income 0.45 0.83 –0.25 –0.04 10.98 0.40 0.43 38,326
+ Pensions 0.45 0.83 –0.22 –0.04 10.85 0.40 0.43 38,354
Sweden (LINDA)
Male Earnings 0.36 0.45 –0.27 0.04 13.57 0.23 0.22 1,907,421
HH Earnings 0.26 0.45 –0.47 –0.04 14.22 0.21 0.23 1,113,760
HH Post Gov 0.21 0.35 –0.04 0.00 23.03 0.17 0.17 1,113,759
HH Disposable 0.20 0.35 0.03 0.01 17.64 0.18 0.17 1,113,759
+ Labor transfers 0.23 0.40 –0.44 –0.04 16.37 0.19 0.21 1,077,255
+ Aid to low–income 0.28 0.45 –0.34 –0.04 17.54 0.22 0.24 1,077,255
+ Pensions 0.25 0.44 –0.21 –0.01 15.00 0.21 0.22 1,077,255
Germany (SOEP)
Male Earnings 0.35 0.52 –0.23 0.00 15.89 0.26 0.26 64,572
HH Earnings 0.33 0.58 –0.78 –0.08 13.32 0.27 0.31 59,161
HH Post Gov 0.28 0.50 –0.11 –0.04 16.09 0.24 0.26 58,725
HH Disposable 0.27 0.50 –0.11 –0.03 14.99 0.24 0.26 58,853
+ Labor transfers 0.32 0.57 –0.70 –0.07 13.93 0.26 0.30 59,173
+ Aid to low–income 0.33 0.58 –0.83 –0.08 13.29 0.27 0.31 59,199
+ Pensions 0.32 0.57 –0.66 –0.06 13.55 0.27 0.30 59,166
Note: For Germany and Sweden, all moments refer to 1-year income differences, i.e. s = 1.
For the United States, the reference sample is 1976-2010, with s = 2. Moments for s = 1
are reported in the appendix for the sample 1969-1996.
lognormal distribution (which has a kurtosis of 3).
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies how higher-order income risk varies over the business cycle, as well
as the extent to which such risks can be smoothed within households or with government
social insurance policies. To provide a broad perspective on these questions, we study
panel data on individuals and households from the United States, Germany, and Sweden,
covering more than three decades of data for each country. We find that the underlying
variation in higher-order risk is remarkably similar across these countries that differ in
many details of their labor markets. In particular, in all three countries, the variance of
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earnings shocks is almost entirely constant over the business cycle, whereas the skewness of
these shocks becomes much more negative in recessions. Government provided insurance,
in the form of unemployment insurance, welfare benefits, aid to low income households,
and the like, plays an important role for reducing downside risk in all three countries;
the effectiveness is weakest in the United States, and most pronounced in Germany. For
Sweden we find that insurance provided within households plays a similar role.
Chapter 5
Labor Market Transitions in a
Sectoral Business Cycle Model
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present a structural real business cycle model with two sectors and
involuntary unemployment. The goal of the model is to quantify the welfare costs of
aggregate fluctuations in the presence of imperfect labor mobility across sectors. A specific
feature of the model is that aggregate shocks have asymmetric implications across sectors.
This incentivizes workers to switch sectors–which is costly. These costs can generate costs
of aggregate fluctuations, which exceed those in a frictionless economy.1
Firms in the two sectors produce consumption goods with the same aggregate tech-
nology, in which labor is the only production factor. Workers have preferences that are
non-homothetic in the two consumption goods, which implies that a shock wich affects in-
come changes the optimal demand shares of the two goods. As a consequence, an aggregate
productivity shock is propagated asymmetrically to the two sectors via the consumption
response, which in turn changes the relative labor demand. Because workers cannot freely
move to the sector with the higher labor demand, wages respond asymmetrically.
The structure of the model economy is in the spirit of Lucas and Prescott (1974) in
the sense that it features separate sectors, or “islands”, in which production takes place.
More recent examples of Lucas and Prescott (1974) inspired models in the context of
worker movements across sectors are Rogerson (2005) or Pilossoph (2014). Those and
related studies have in common that mobility across sectors is induced by asymmetric
sector-specific productivity shocks.
1The model evolved after many conversations with Peter Funk. I also thank Helge Braun for many
helpful discussions.
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Whether reallocation of workers across sectors is driven by sector-specific shocks, how-
ever, is an open debate. Lilien (1982) provides an argument in favor of sector-specific
shocks that rests on the observation that the observed dispersion in employment growth
rates correlates positively with aggregate unemployment. Abraham and Katz (1986) ques-
tioned this conclusion and discuss that also aggregate shocks can lead to the same corre-
lation if the sectors differ in their long-term employment trends or the cyclical reaction
of employment. In a recent paper along those lines, Garin et al. (2011) develop a frame-
work with both aggregate and sector-specific shocks and discuss that over time aggregate
shocks became less important relative to sectoral shocks.2
The novelty of the model in this chapter is that it generates asymmetric changes across
sectors from an aggregate shock. The model therefore lends itself naturally to an analysis
of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations. In an influential study, Lucas (1987) argues
that the costs of aggregate fluctuations are small–and thus the potential gain of any stabi-
lizing policy is small. He draws this conclusion from a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
the fraction of per-period consumption individuals need to get in order to be indifferent to
a world without any fluctuations. The calculation is based on several strong assumptions,
one very important being full insurance against idiosyncratic risk. Motivated by the fact
that this conclusion strongly contradicts general perceptions of economic fluctuations, a
literature challenging Lucas’ analysis evolved (comprehensive surveys can be found in
Barlevy, 2005, or Lucas, 2003). A general conclusion of the literature is that workers’
incomes vary over the business cycle in an asymmetric fashion and thus, some groups of
workers do suffer more from fluctuations: the Poor (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2001b) the
Unemployed (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1999 or Krebs, 2007).
A challenge for the analysis of the costs of business cycles is that an assumption needs
to be made with respect to the counterfactual income, i.e., the income after removing
aggregate fluctuations. The model presented here provides a natural reference point,
namely the non-stochastic steady state of the economy. In order to elicit the role that
mobility costs play for the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations, I discuss an alternative
version of the model which features full insurance against asymmetric income fluctuations
via pooling cross-sectionally all incomes in a family structure.3 The income streams
2In a parallel line of research, several papers developed multisectoral real business cycle models that
feature both aggregate shocks and sectoral shocks and the goal is to identify the role of each of the two
(e.g., Horvath, 1998, 2000; or more recently Foerster et al., 2011) . A main feature of those models is
that the production technologies of the several sectors are interrelated via input-output linkages and thus
some of the shocks observed as aggregate shocks through the naive lense of a one-sector model might
in fact reflect sector-specific shocks that did not cancel out across sectors. Further, labor is completely
mobile in those models.
3The general idea that the family chooses on behalf of its members is in the spirit of the employment
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generated in this economy can then serve as an additional reference point.
It must be noted that the focus of the chapter is on the description of the model
economy and the illustration of how it can be used in the context of analyzing the welfare
costs of business cycles. An actual calculation of the latter is only reasonable in a properly
calibrated version of the model, which is left for future research.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses a version of the model
without unemployment and Section 5.3 introduces unemployment into the model. Section
5.4 briefly illustrates the model numerically, before Section 5.5 discusses how the model
can be used in the context of analyzing the welfare costs of business cycles. Section 5.6
concludes.
5.2 Model Economy Without Unemployment
5.2.1 Intraperiod Equilibrium
Firms
Firms in sector i produce with a Cobb-Douglas technology function
fi
(
nfi , z
)
= znαi , z > 0, αi ∈ (0, 1]
where nfi is the labor input to production in sector i. In equilibrium this will be the
number of workers in sector i, Ni, times the individual labor supply - workers in one
sector are homogenous and hence supply the same amount of labor. The elasticity of
labor in production, αi, is assumed to be identical in the two submarkerts.
4 Productivity
z follows an AR(1) process with mean one. Firms are price-takers and thus in each sector
the firm’s optimum is characterized by
f ′i
(
nfi , z
)
= wi (5.1)
Profits in units of the good produced in the sector are given by pii = fi
(
nfi , z
)
−
f ′i
(
nfi , z
)
nfi .
lotteries of Rogerson (1988).
4Different curvatures of the production technologies lead to asymmetric propagation of the aggre-
gate technology shock via the supply-side of the economy similar to non-homothetic preferences. The
two alternatives will have different implications for the reaction of relative prices to an aggregate shock.
Throughout the chapter, we focus on the demand-side channel, i.e., the case with non-homothetic pref-
erences as discussed below.
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Workers
Workers enjoy utility from consumption of the two consumption goods and from leisure.
Effort exerted to switch sectors implies a direct utility cost k (ei). Overall, per-period
utility is given by
ui = u
(
ci1, c
i
2
)
+ v
(
1− ni
)
− k (ei) , (5.2)
where ci1 and c
i
2 is the demand of a worker in sector i for good 1 and 2, respectively,
ni denotes labor supply (the time endowment of a household is normalized to 1) and ei
is excerted switching effort. The utility function u (c1, c2) is increasing with decreasing
marginal utility in ci1 and c
i
2, and is non-homothetic in the two goods. The assumption of
additive separable effort costs implies that the intertemporal optimization (via choice of
the switching effort) does not affect the intraperiod decision problem (labor supply and
consumption) and thus the intraperios problem can be separated.
The budget set of the two groups of workers in a given period is
c11 + p2c
1
2 ≤ w1n
1 +
pi1
N1
(5.3a)
c21 + p2c
2
2 ≤ p2
(
w2n
2 +
pi2
N2
)
, (5.3b)
where p2 is the relative price of good 2 and wi is the real wage in sector i measured in
units of the good produced. pii is the sector’s profit per head: it is assumed that in each
period profits in a sector are distributed amongst the population of that sector.5
The following set of first order conditions with respect to consumption and labor
supply characterize the workers’ intraperiod optimum.
u1
(
c11, c
1
2
)
− λ1 = 0 (5.4a)
u2
(
c11, c
1
2
)
− λ1p2 = 0 (5.4b)
−v′
(
1− n1
)
− λ1w1 = 0 (5.4c)
w1n
1 +
pi1
N1
− c11 − p2c
1
2 = 0 (5.4d)
u1
(
c21, c
2
2
)
− λ2 = 0 (5.4e)
u2
(
c21, c
2
2
)
− λ2p2 = 0 (5.4f)
−v′
(
1− n2
)
− λ2w2p2 = 0 (5.4g)
p2
(
w2n2 +
pi2
N2
)
− c21 − p2c
2
2 = 0 (5.4h)
5This is equivalent to a constant nonlabor input to production which is owned by the workers of a
sector and rented by the firms.
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where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the constraints. For a given
relative price p2 the excess demands for the two goods are
ex1 (p2) = N1c
1
1 (p2) +N2c
2
1 (p2)− f1
(
N1n
1 (p2) , z
)
(5.5a)
ex2 (p2) = N1c
1
2 (p2) +N2c
2
2 (p2)− f2
(
N2n
2 (p2) , z
)
(5.5b)
Definition 5.1 Intraperiod Equilibrium: The intraperiod equilibrium for given state
of the economy (N1, N2, z) is a list of prices and wages (p2, w1, w2) such that for the
corresponding optimal plans of firms and households, markets clear. One can obtain
the equilibrium values of (c1∗1 , c
1∗
2 , c
2∗
1 , c
2∗
2 , n
1∗, n2∗, p∗2) as functions of (N1, N2, z) by first
solving the FOCs (5.4) and (5.1) for a given relative price p2 for (c
1
1 (p2) , c
1
2 (p2) , c
2
1 (p2) ,
c22 (p2) , n
1 (p2) , n
2 (p2)). The equilibrium relative price p
∗
2 solves ex1 (p
∗
2) = ex2 (p
∗
2) = 0.
5.2.2 Intertemporal Problem
Given a mass of workers N¯ , there is one aggregate endogenous state variable N1 and one
exogenous state variable z. The firms’ planning horizon is one period and they simply
solve their intratemporal problem in each period. The household decision is intertempo-
ral: expectations such that being in the other sector has a higher expected lifetime utility
motivate an household to exert switching effort, which translates into a switching prob-
ability. The timing assumption is that in a given period the household is in one sector
and solves the intraperiod decision problem. At the end of the period, that is after profit
shares are distributed, he or she can exert effort e at cost k (e) and with the resulting
probability ψ (e) immediately switch the sector.
I assume convex effort costs: k′ (e) > 0, k′′ (e) > 0 and k′ (0) = 0. The probability
function maps from R+ into [0, 1) and is increasing: ψ
′ (e) > 0. We further assume that
lime→0 ψ
′ (e) ∈ R+. Households base their decision on an assumption about the aggregate
law of motion G (N1, z), which gives tomorrow’s expected number of workers in sector 1
as a function of todays number of workers N1 and todays aggregate productivity z.
The recursive household problem is given by
V 1 (N1, z) = max
e1≥0
[
u
(
c1∗1 , c
1∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n1∗
)
− k
(
e1
)
+
ψ
(
e1
)
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1, z) , z
′) +
(
1− ψ
(
e1
))
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, z) , z
′)
]
(5.6a)
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V 2 (N1, z) = max
e2≥0
[
u
(
c2∗1 , c
2∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n2∗
)
− k
(
e2
)
+
ψ
(
e2
)
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, z) , z
′) +
(
1− ψ
(
e2
))
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1, z) , z
′)
]
(5.6b)
where (c1∗1 , c
1∗
2 , c
2∗
1 , c
2∗
2 , n
1∗, n2∗) are the intraperiod equilibrium values as defined above for
the state (N1, z). The first order conditions for an interior solution with respect to effort
are
k′ (e1)
ψ′ (e1)
= βEz′|z
(
V 2 (G (N1, z) , z
′)− V 1 (G (N1, z) , z
′)
)
(5.7a)
k′ (e2)
ψ′ (e2)
= βEz′|z
(
V 1 (G (N1, z) , z
′)− V 2 (G (N1, z) , z
′)
)
(5.7b)
The corner solution ei = 0 is chosen whenever the expected value difference from
moving into the other sector is less or equal to zero. The assumptions on the cost function
k (e) and the switching technology ψ (e) are such that a unique solution exists and that
zero effort is chosen only when the expected value difference is zero or negative. There
never is positive switching effort in both sectors at the same time and it always holds
that either e1 is zero, or e2 is zero, or both: in every period labor market movements are
one-directional.
Definition 5.2 Recursive Equilibrium: A recursive equilibrium of the economy con-
sists of the value functions V 1 (N1, z) and V
2 (N1, z), the policy functions e
1 (N1, z) and
e2 (N1, z) and an aggregate law of motion G (N1, z) such that
1. Given G (N1, z), V
1 (N1, z) and V
2 (N1, z) solve the Bellman equations of the house-
holds and e1 (N1, z) and e
2 (N1, z) are the corresponding optimal policies.
2. The law of motion G (N1, z) satisfies
G (N1, z) = (1− ψ (e1 (N1, z)))N1 + ψ (e2 (N1, z))
(
N¯ −N1
)
5.3 Introducing Unemployment Into the Model
Building on the depicted model, I now introduce unemployment, which adds a state
variable to the model. During unemployment, workers enjoy home production. A worker
in the unemployment pool excerts effort in order to leave unemployment, which translates
into a probability of transitioning to employment. An unemployed worker’s search is
directed towards the sector which he or she prefers; hence, there is no random matching
to sectors. This describes the flow out of the unemployment pool.6
6The search technology that translates an unemployed worker’s search effort into a job finding prob-
ability determines the average unemployment duration.
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Inflow into unemployment consists of those workers that in a period lose employment
in either sector, which occours with an exogenous probability that depends on the state of
the aggregate productivity. Unemployed workers draw utility from home production. In
contrast to benefits dependening on former wages this assumption implies homogeneity
of the unemployed.7
With regard to timing, we assume that switching occurs after production, but before
the arrival of the unemployment shock. This implies that the intertemporal (effort) deci-
sion of a currently employed worker is unaffected by the presence of the separation shock
- in the sense that for a given expected value difference the effort decision is the same.
Denoting the separation shock in sector i by si (z), the value functions of workers are as
follows.
V 1 (N1, U, z) = max
e1≥0
[
u
(
c1∗1 , c
1∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n1∗
)
+ s1 (z) βEz′|zV
U (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) +
(1− s1 (z))
(
− k
(
e1
)
+ ψe
(
e1
)
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) +
(
1− ψe
(
e1
))
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
)]
(5.8a)
V 2 (N1, U, z) = max
e2≥0
[
u
(
c2∗1 , c
2∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n2∗
)
+ s2 (z) βEz′|zV
U (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) +
(1− s2 (z))
(
− k
(
e2
)
+ ψe
(
e2
)
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) +
(
1− ψe
(
e2
))
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
)]
(5.8b)
Notation is modified slightly compared to the case without unemployment. The switch-
ing technology of an employed worker is now denoted by ψe (·) and the expected aggregate
law of motion G (·) describes the expected transition of the population as a function that
maps from the state of the world into a vector (N ′1, U
′) (G (N1, U, z) : [0, 1]× [0, 1]×R→
[0, 1] × [0, 1]). The decision problem of the workers is symmetric to the case without
7If benefits depend on the last wage, symmetric linear technology in the two sectors implies homo-
geneity w.r.t. benefits of workers becoming unemployed in a period. Heterogeneity in the unemployment
pool stems from unemployment beginning in different periods.
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unemployment. V u denotes the value function of an unemployed worker:
V u (N1, U, z) = max
eu≥0
[
u
(
cu1 , c
u
2
)
− k (eu)+
ψu (e
u) βEz′|zmax
{
V 1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) , V 2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
}
+
(1− ψu (e
u)) βEz′|zV
u (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
]
(5.8c)
The period utility u
(
cu1 , c
u
2
)
corresponds to the value of home production. In each period
an unemployed decides how much effort to spend in order to leave unemployment. This
decision is based on expectations about the value of being in either sector next period.
Effort eu translates into a probability ψu (e
u) of leaving unemployment towards the sector
which in expectation gives a higher value to a worker next period. An expected value
difference of zero by assumption implies a random distribution of newly employed to the
two sectors in equal shares.
In the context of this specification, in each period one sector is the receiver of worker
flows, both from unemployment and from the other sector. The first-order conditions are
k′ (e1)
ψ′e (e
1)
= βEz′|z
(
V 2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)− V 1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
)
(5.9a)
k′ (e2)
ψ′e (e
2)
= βEz′|z
(
V 1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)− V 2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
)
(5.9b)
k′ (eu)
ψ′u (e
u)
= βEz′|z
(
max
{
V 1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′) , V 2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
}
− V u (G (N1, U, z) , z
′)
)
(5.9c)
5.4 Numerical Illustration of the Model
This section serves to illustrate the main mechanism of the model economy. The elements
of the per-period utility function (5.2) are specified as follows. Utility from consumption
is the sum of two CRRA utility functions:
u
(
ci1, c
i
2
)
=
(ci1)
1−γ1
1− γ1
+ φ2
(ci2)
1−γ2
1− γ2
, (5.10)
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Table 5.1: Illustrative Parametrization
utility technology
β 0.99 ρz 0.95
γ1 1 σz 0.015 ; 0.03
γ2 2 α1, α2 1
γn 1 εeff 5
φ2 1 φeff , φ
u
eff 10000, 1000
φn 1
Note: Table shows the parameter values picked for the illustration of the model.
the utility from leisure is
v
(
1− ni
)
= φn
(1− ni)
1−γn
1− γn
, (5.11)
with φ2, φn, γ1, γ2, γn > 0, where φ2 and φn are weighting parameters of utility from
consumption good 2 and leisure, respectively. The felicity function is non-homothetic in
the two consumption goods when γ1 6= γ2. The cost of switching effort measured in units
of period-utility and the switching technology are specified as
k (e) =
φeff
1 + εeff
e1+εeff , εeff > 0, φeff > 0 (5.12a)
ψ (e) = 1− exp (−e) (5.12b)
I solve the model for an illustrative parameterization (see Table 5.1). Figure 5.1
plots the search effort policy functions e1(N1, U, z) and e
2(N1, U, z). Effort is excerted by
workers in one market only. The asymmetric propagation of the aggregate fluctuations
to the two sectors via the non-homothetic demand structure is apparent by the way the
policy functions vary with aggregate productivity: Workers in sector 1 excert more search
effort when aggregate productivity is low, for workers in sector 2 it is the other way
around.
5.5 Welfare Costs of Aggregate Risk
In the context of the model economiy one can evaluate the welfare costs of business
cycles in a framework that explicitly generates asymmetric wage responses from aggregate
fluctuations. In the vein of Lucas, the welfare costs of business cycles can be calculated by
asking how consumers in a risky world have to be compensated in order to be indifferent
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Figure 5.1: Search Effort Excerted by Workers in Each Sector
(a) Workers in sector 1
1
N1
0.5
00
0.5
U
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1
(b) Workers in sector 2
1
N1
0.5
00
0.5
U
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1
Note: Each panel shows the search effort policy function for 3 different values of the aggregate produc-
tivity: low (red), medium (black), high (blue).
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to a risk-free world. Studies of the welfare costs of business cycles usually assume that
eliminating business cycles does not change the average level of income. Taking this
assumption to our model, we leave the exogenous technology shock z, the driver of business
cycles, at its unconditional expectation and solve for the non-stochastic steady state of
our model, which then serves as reference point for welfare evaluation.
5.5.1 The Non-Stochastic Steady State
In the steady state for a given value of productivity z, the value of being employed in
either sector has to be the same to ensure that there are no transitions between the two
markets: there cannot be a steady state with labor market transitions between the two
sectors, because the loss of workers in one sector would not be compensated by newly
employed, who move to the more attractive sector. The following equations have to hold
(for brevity dependency on z is surpressed).
s1N1 = pψe (e
u)U (5.13a)
s2N2 = (1− p)ψe (e
u)U (5.13b)
N1 +N2 + U = N¯ , (5.13c)
where p denotes the share of newly employed moving to sector one. Switching between
the two sectors must not be profitable and hence the following equality has to hold:
u
(
c1∗1 (N1, U) , c
1∗
2 (N1, U)
)
+ v
(
1− n1∗ (N1, U)
)
+ s1βV
U (N1, U) =
u
(
c2∗1 (N1, U) , c
2∗
2 (N1, U)
)
+ v
(
1− n2∗ (N1, U)
)
+ s2βV
U (N1, U) (5.14)
Notice the appearence of V u (·) in equation (5.14): if the risk of becoming unemployed
differs by sector (s1 6= s2), this risk difference needs to be compensated by per-period
utility. When unemployment risk is the same, the condition states that felicities in the
two sectors have to be the same - as would be the case without unemployment.
Denoting the deterministic steady state values by superscript d, the present-value
lifetime utility of a households in the two sectors is denoted by Ud1 and U
d
2 .
5.5.2 Costs of Business Cycles
In order to achieve the most straightforward comparability to the calculation in Lucas
(1987), I focus on a consumption equivalent variation as the relevant measure of welfare
comparison. Since there are several goods, I interpret the non-homothetic utility function
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as a consumption aggregate and compensate the household in units of this aggregate.8
In order to evaluate how workers in different sectors are hit in the presence of mobility
costs, I distinguish workers by their initial sector affiliation. Applying an ex ante perspec-
tive, the welfare measure is calculated by equating the expected value of being in either
sector to the present-value utility of a worker in the risk-free economy. The respective
consumption equivalent variations are implicitly given by:
Ez,N1V
1 (N1, U, z, λ1) = U
d
1 (5.15a)
Ez,N1V
2 (N1, U, z, λ2) = U
d
2 , (5.15b)
where V 1 (N1, U, z, λ1) and V
2 (N1, U, z, λ2) are the value functions of being in sector
1 and 2, respectively, that add the proportional compensation to each periods utility:
a household that now is in sector i gets proportional compensation λi on the lifetime
path of consumption. Ez,N1 is the expectation operator that gives the unconditional
expectaion over the joint distribution of the exogenous technology and the endogenous
labor allocation.
V 1 (N1, U, z, λ1) and V
2 (N1, U, z, λ2) are given by
V 1 (N1, U, z, λ1) =
[
(1 + λ1) u
(
c1∗1 , c
1∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n1∗
)
− k
(
e1∗
)
+
ψ
(
e1∗
)
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1U, z) , z
′, λ1) +(
1− ψ
(
e1∗
))
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′, λ1)
]
(5.16a)
V 2 (N1, U, z, λ2) =
[
(1 + λ1) u
(
c2∗1 , c
2∗
2
)
+ v
(
1− n2∗
)
− k
(
e2∗
)
+
ψ
(
e2∗
)
βEz′|zV
1 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′, λ2) +(
1− ψ
(
e2∗
))
βEz′|zV
2 (G (N1, U, z) , z
′, λ2)
]
. (5.16b)
5.5.3 Reference Point: Perfect Insurance
The model does not feature assets. This implies that the above measures of the welfare
costs of aggregate fluctuations overstate the actual costs, because workers cannot insure
8A second possibility is a compensation in income that the households can spend optimally, equilib-
rium prices given, which is straighforward to implement here.
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themselves against income fluctuations. Further, the goal is to extract the specific role
for welfare played by the mobility costs that inhibit workers to immediately respond to
asymmetric wage changes. To this end, I now consider another extreme: perfect insurace
of households against asymmetric wage changes and unemployment. The overall structure
of the economy is the same, with the one difference that all workers are part of a family
that consists of a mass of workers–and the economy is populated by a mass of families. The
focus here is on the characterization of the solution of the family’s problem. The utility
derived from the consumption stream of the family is then a natural point of comparison
for the evaluation of the role of mobility costs for the welfare implications of aggregate
fluctuations: the family faces the same mobility costs for its workers as workers in the
economy without risk-sharing.
A family is described by two endogenous state variables: its allocation of workers to
sectors and unemployment, N1 and U , as well as two aggregate state variables: aggregate
productivity z and the aggregate distribution of families, denoted by φ. φ is a distribution
of families over their allocation of workers, which is an equilibrium object. A family pins
down the labor supply and the switching effort exerted by its members. Within a family,
all incomes are pooled.
Intraperiod Equilibrium
Family i’s intraperiod problem is
max
c1i,c2i,
n1i,n2i
u (c1i, c2i) +N1iv (1− n1i) + (1−N1i − Ui) v (1− n2i) (5.17)
+Uiv (1)
s.t. c1i + p2c2i ≤ w1N1in1i + p2w2 (1−N1i − Ui)n2i
The aggregate labor supply in sectors 1 and 2 is
´
N1in1idΦ and
´
N2in2idΦ, respec-
tively. Equilibrium supplies solve the representative firms’ first order conditions for an
interior solution:
∂f1
(´
N1in
∗
1idΦ, z
)
∂n
= w∗1
∂f2
(´
N2in
∗
2idΦ, z
)
∂n
= w∗2
Intertemporal Problem
The value function of family i is given by
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Vi (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) = max
e1i,e2i,eui
[
r (N1i, Ui, z,Φ)−N1i (1− s1 (z)) ke (e1i)−
(1−N1i − Ui) (1− s2 (z)) ke (e2i)− Uiku (eui) +
βEVi (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ)) (5.18)
Vi (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) = max
e1i,e2i,eui
[
r (N1i, Ui, z,Φ)−N1i (1− s1 (z)) ke (e1i)−
(1−N1i − Ui) (1− s2 (z)) ke (e2i)− Uiku (eui) +
βEVi (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ))
s.t.
N ′1i = (1− s1 (z)) (1− ψe (e1i))N1i + (1− s2 (z))ψe (e2i) (1−N1i − Ui)
+1EVi1i ψu (eui)Ui
U ′i = (1− ψu (eui))Ui + s1 (z)N1i + s2 (z) (1−N1i − Ui)
where
r (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) = u (c
∗
1i, c
∗
2i) +N1iv (1− n
∗
1i) + (1−N1i − Ui) v (1− n
∗
2i) + Uiv (1) (5.19)
and (c∗1i, c
∗
2i, n
∗
1i, n
∗
2i) solve the family’s intraperiod maximization problem in the intrape-
riod equilibrium in state (N1i, Ui, z,Φ). The indicator variable 1
EVi1
i takes on the value
1 if EVi1 (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ)) > 0 and 0 otherwise. The first order condtions for the above
Bellman equation (5.18) are
k′e (e1i) = ψ
′
e (e1i)×
(
− βEVi1 (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ))
)
(5.20a)
k′e (e2i) = ψ
′
e (e2i)×
(
βEVi1 (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ))
)
(5.20b)
k′u (eui) = ψ
′
u (eui)× βE
(
1
EVi1
i Vi1 (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ)) (5.20c)
−Vi2 (N
′
1i, U
′
i , z
′, G (Φ))
)
where Vij (·) denotes the derivative of the value function Vi (·) with respect to the j’th
argument. As in the case of no insurance, there is a corner solution for e1i or e2i. Using
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the envelope theorem one can write these derivatives as
Vi1 (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) = v (1− n
∗
1i)− v (1− n
∗
2i)− (ke (e
∗
1i)− ke (e
∗
2i)) (5.21a)
+ µ∗i (w
∗
1n
∗
1i − w
∗
2p
∗
2n
∗
2i)
+ λ∗i1 [(1− s1 (z)) (1− ψe (e
∗
1i))− (1− s2 (z))ψe (e
∗
2i)]
+ λ∗i2 [s1 (z)− s2 (z)]
Vi2 (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) = v (1)− v (1− n
∗
2i)− (ke (e
∗
ui)− ke (e
∗
2i)) (5.21b)
+ µ∗i (−w
∗
2p
∗
2n
∗
2i) + λ
∗
i1
[
1
EVi1
i ψu (e
∗
ui)− (1− s2 (z))ψe (e
∗
2i)
]
+ λ∗2i [(1− ψu (e
∗
u))− s2 (z)]
with µ∗i denoting the value of the Lagrange multiplier on family i’s budget constraint in
the intraperiod equilibrium in state (N1i, Ui, z,Φ) and λ
∗
i1 and λ
∗
i2 denoting the equilibrium
values of the multipliers on the laws of motion.
If in the initial period, the allocation of workers is the same for every family, i.e.
there is no heterogeneity of families, the distribution Φt=0 is degenerate and the following
holds in the initial period: N1i = N1j and Ui = Uj ∀i, j. It follows that the choices
(c1i, c2i, n1i, n2i, e1i, e2i, eui) = (c1j, c2j , n1j , n2j, e1j , e2j , euj) ∀i, j. This implies that the law
of motion for the labor allocation is the same for all families and hence next period’s
distribution Φt=1 is degenerate. As the same argument holds for each period, there is no
heterogeneity of families in the recursive equilibrium when adding the initial condition
that Φt=0 is degenerate. The household side of the economy can hence be desribed by a
representative family with the following recursive optimization problem:
V (N1, U, z) = max
e1,e2,eu
[
r (N1, U, z)−N1 (1− s1 (z)) ke (e1)− (5.22)
(1−N1 − U) (1− s2 (z)) ke (e2)−
Uku (eu) + βEV (N
′
1, U
′, z′)
]
s.t.
N ′1 = (1− s1 (z)) (1− ψe (e1))N1 + (1− s2 (z))ψe (e2) (1−N1 − U)
+1EVi1i ψu (eu)U
U ′ = (1− ψu (eu))U + s1 (z)N1 + s2 (z) (1−N1 − U)
where
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r (N1, U, z) = u (c
∗
1, c
∗
2) +N1v (1− n
∗
1) + (5.23)
(1−N1 − U) v (1− n
∗
2) + Uv (1)
and (c∗1, c
∗
2, n
∗
1, n
∗
2) solve the family’s intraperiod maximization problem in the intraperiod
equilibrium in state (N1, U, z). The intraperiod solution simplifies accordingly.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a multisectoral real business cycle model. The focus lies on the
illustration of a mechanism that propagates an aggregate shock asymmetrically across
groups of workers. The specific channel analyzed is that the relative demand for the
goods produced in different sectors changes with aggregate income due to preferences
that are non-homothetic with respect to the goods produced in the different sectors.
Worker mobility between sectors is imperfect and thus wages respond asymmetrically to
the aggregate shock. I then discussed how the model framework can be used in principle
to analyze the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations.
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A.1 Simplifying the Value Functions
An implication of the taste shocks is that it simplifies the value functions–relative to a
version of the model without these shocks. Technically speaking, I get rid of kinks in
the value functions V stay, V offer, and V unempl that are induced by the discrete choices
and am left with continuous value functions. I impose FO to be a Gumbel distribution
with scale parameter σO and location parameter −σOγ, where γ is Euler’s constant. The
location parameter is a normalization such that the unconditional expected value of each
taste shock is zero. Using Gumbel iid taste shocks allows me to exploit results from
discrete choice theory, as also done in, e.g., Pilossoph (2014) or Iskhakov et al. (2015).
Gumbel distributed taste shocks yield analytical expressions for the continuation values
conditional on the state vector (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t).
First, consider the (expected) continuation values in equations (2.10) and (2.11): the
worker does not control oi,t, which is a state. The expected value of the taste shock is thus
the unconditional expected value of FO, which is normalized to zero. By independence of
the productivity and taste shocks, this gives
V empl (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = φ×
(
ψe × V offer (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) + . . .
(1− ψe)× V stay (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t)
)
+ . . .
(1− φ)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜EV unempl (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t)
)
(A.1)
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and
V stay (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = u˜
empl
(
xi,t+1, oi,t, h˜i,t+1
)
+ . . . (A.2)
β˜EV empl (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) .
In the following, I only explicitly state the state variables η and o for readability. The
expected continuation value of entering next period as an employed worker is
EV empl (ηi,t+1, oi,t) = φ×
(
ψe × EηV
offer (ηi,t+1, oi,t+1) + . . .
(1− ψe)×EηV
stay (ηi,t+1, oi,t+1)
)
+ . . .
(1− φ)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜EηV
unempl (ηi,t+1, oi,t+1)
)
(A.3)
Next, consider the sub value function V offer (•), which in the two value functions
(2.10) and (2.13) represents situations in which the worker chooses a target occupation
oi,t+1. Conditional on sampling occupation j as alternative occupation, the worker chooses
to either stay in occupation oi,t or to take the offer from j, maximizing
max
(
v˜ (j|•) + EOOi,t+1 (j) , v˜ (oi,t|•) + EOOi,t+1 (oi,t)
)
. (A.4)
The expectation over taste shocks O is the expected value of the maximum of the expres-
sion. The taste shock can be integrated out to get
EO
[
max
(
v˜ (j|•) +Oi,t+1 (j) , v˜ (oi,t|•) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
)]
.
McFadden (1978) shows that the integral over O can be analytically solved; using his
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derivation, I write the above expected value as
EO
[
max
(
v˜ (j|•) +Oi,t+1 (j) , v˜ (oi,t|•) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
)]
= σO log
(
exp
[
v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
]
+ exp
[
v˜ (j|•)
σO
]
+
−σOγ
σO
+ γ
)
= σO log
(
exp
[
v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
]
+ exp
[
v˜ (j|•)
σO
])
= σO
(
v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
+ log
(
1 + exp
[
v˜ (j|•)− v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
]))
where γ is Euler’s constant. This gives the simplified sub value funciton V offer (•) as:
V offer (•) = β˜×
∑
j 6=oi,t
pij×σO
(
v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
+ log
(
1 + exp
[
v˜ (j|•)− v˜ (oi,t|•)
σO
]))
, (A.5)
in which the taste shocks are integrated out and the conditional expectation over the taste
shocks has an analytical solution, leaving us with smooth value functions in which only
the expectation operator over productivity shocks remains.
A.2 Value Functions for Counterfactual
Consider the welfare experiment in section 2.5.2. Along the lines of equations (2.10) (2.11),
and (2.13), the value functions of employed and unemployed workers in the counterfactual
world are given by
V count (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = φ×
(
u˜empl (xi,t+1, oi,t, hi,t) + . . .
β˜E
[
V count (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
]
+ . . .
(1− φ)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜E
[
V count−ue (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
])
(A.6)
s.t.
xi,t+1 = g
e
(
xi,t, oi,t, oi,t;ηi,t
)
hi,t+1 acc. to (2.7)
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V count−ue (xi,t,ηi,t, hi,t, oi,t) = ψ
u×
(
u˜empl
(
xi,t+1, oi,t, h˜i,t+1
)
+ . . .
β˜E
[
V count (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
])
+ . . .
(1− ψu)×
(
u˜unempl + β˜E
[
V count−ue (xi,t+1,ηi,t+1, hi,t+1, oi,t) +Oi,t+1 (oi,t)
])
(A.7)
s.t.
xi,t+1 =
ge
(
xi,t, oi,t, oi,t;ηi,t
)
if empl. in prod. stage of t
xi,t else
hi,t+1 acc. to
(2.7) if empl. in prod. stage(2.8) else
A.3 Numerical Solution and Simulation
I solve the model on a discretized state space using global methods. Given a vector of
parameters, I use Gaussian quadrature to pick the nodes and weights of the grid for the
Normal productivity shocks. For the grid of stochastic productivity, I select the lower
(upper) bound to receiving the worst (best) productivity shock five times in a row. I then
distribute the grid points with a higher mass of points around the mid-point between
lower and upper bound. The grid for human capital is normalized to start at zero and
has equidistant grid points; the step size is a parameter.
At every point in the state space, each choice of oi,t+1 implies a value of human
capital, and a value of idiosyncratic productivity. I locate the point on the grid for
idiosyncratic productivity and calculate the linear interpolation weights corresponding to
the two surrounding grid points. Together with the exogenous transition probabilities,
these weights give an oi,t+1–choice specific transition matrix on the whole state space.
Given a guess for the value functions, I use the simplified Bellman equations from A.1
to update the value functions. During the calibration stage I iterate until convergence of
the policy functions (i.e., the probability to choose any occupation, which is calculated
analytically for a given guess of the value functions).
Given the converged policy functions, I combine the policy function with the exogenous
transition matrix, which gives a transition matrix over the whole state space as a solution
to the model. To get the stationary distribution, I extract (and normalize) the eigenvector
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with eigenvalue 1 from this transition matrix. To calculate the moments implied by
the model in the long run, I directly use the policy functions, which I weight with the
stationary distribution over the discrete state space, to calculate the average switching
probability and the switching probability as a function of the unemployment duration.
The discretization of the state space implies that I cannot directly use the wage changes
implied by the moves on the grid to calculate percentiles of the distribution of wage
changes: the calculation of central moments is unproblematic, but there are too few re-
alizations to meaningfully calculate percentiles. I thus distribute N individuals over the
discrete state space according to stationary distribution and draw continuous shocks for
this sample of workers. One implication of the taste shocks is that the choice proba-
bilities become a smooth function over the state space (net the taste shocks). Thus, I
can interpolate the choice probabilities using the policy functions on the discrete grid.
Then, I can calculate the wage change for each worker as implied by the choice. Similarly
for EUE-transitions, where in addition I take into account that workers transition over
the state space during unemployment. I choose a number of N=30,000 individuals for
the simulation, repeat the simulation M=3 times, and take the average of the implied
moments over the M simulations.
For the calibration, I solve the model at 1,000 parameter combinations, which I choose
from a Sobol sequence over the ten-dimensional parameter space. I then calculate the dis-
tance as the sum of squared deviations between the model implied moments and the data
moments for the selected targets. I choose an identity weighting matrix (reflecting insights
in Altonji and Segal (1996), on small sample performance of GMM estimators). I then
use the best ten parameter vectors as initial guesses for a simplex downhill minimization
algorithm a la Nelder and Mead (1965) to find a minimum. (A more elaborate global
minimization procedure is work in progress.)
A.4 Classification of Occupations
The empirical measures of occupational switching are based on occupational segments as
defined in the KldB88. The 30 groups are outlined below.
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Table A.1: Classification of Occupations
Segment SIAB
group
Description
100 1 Farmers until animal keepers and related occupations
2 Gardeners, garden workers until forest workers, forest cultivators
200 3 Miners until shaped brick/concrete block makers
301 4 Ceramics workers until glass processors, glass finishers
302 5 Chemical plant operatives
6 Chemical laboratory workers until vulcanisers
7 Plastics processors
303 8 Paper, cellulose makers until other paper products makers
9 Type setters, compositors until printers (flat, gravure)
10 Special printers, screeners until printer assistants
304 11 Wood preparers until basket and wicker products makers
305 12
Iron, metal producers, melters until semi-finished product fettlers
and other mould casting occupations
13
Sheet metal pressers, drawers, stampers until other metal
moulders (non-cutting deformation)
14 Turners
15 Drillers until borers
16 Metal grinders until other metal-cutting occupations
17 Metal polishers until metal bonders and other metal connectors
18 Welders, oxy-acetylene cutters
306 19 Steel smiths until pipe, tubing fitters
20 Sheet metal workers
21 Plumbers
22 Locksmiths, not specified until sheet metal, plas-tics fitters
23 Engine fitters
24
Plant fitters, maintenance fitters until steel struc-ture fitters,
metal shipbuilders
25 Motor vehicle repairers
26 Agricultural machinery repairers until precision mechanics
27 Other mechanics until watch-, clockmakers
28 Toolmakers until precious metal smiths
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29 Dental technicians until doll makers, model mak-ers, taxidermists
307 30 Electrical fitters, mechanics
31
Telecommunications mechanics, craftsmen until radio, sound
equipment mechanics
32 Electrical appliance fitters
308 33 Electrical appliance, electrical parts assemblers
34 Other assemblers
35 Metal workers (no further specification)
309 36 Spinners, fibre preparers until skin processing operatives
37 Cutters until textile finishers
310 38 Bakery goods makers until confectioners (pastry)
39 Butchers until fish processing operatives
40
Cooks until ready-to-serve meals, fruit, vegetable preservers,
preparers
41 Wine coopers until sugar, sweets, ice-cream makers
311 42 Bricklayers until concrete workers
43 Carpenters until scaffolders
44 Roofers
45 Paviors until road makers
46 Tracklayers until other civil engineering workers
47
Building labourer, general until other building labourers, building
assistants, n.e.c.
312 48 Stucco workers, plasterers, rough casters until insulators, proofers
49 Tile setters until screed, terrazzo layers
50 Room equippers until other wood and sports equipment makers
313 51 Carpenters
314 52 Painters, lacquerers (construction)
53 Goods painters, lacquerers until ceramics/glass painters
315 54 Goods examiners, sorters, n.e.c.
55 Packagers, goods receivers, despatchers
316 56 Assistants (no further specification)
317 57 Generator machinists until construction machine attendants
58
Machine attendants, machinists helpers until ma-chine setters (no
further specification)
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401 59 Mechanical, motor engineers
60 Electrical engineers
61 Architects, civil engineers
62 Survey engineers until other engineers
63
Chemists, chemical engineers until physicists, physics engineers,
mathematicians
402 64 Mechanical engineering technicians
65 Electrical engineering technicians until building technicians
66
Measurement technicians until remaining manu-facturing
technicians
67 Other technicians
68 Foremen, master mechanics
69 Biological specialists until physical and mathemat-ical specialists
70 Chemical laboratory assistants until photo labora-tory assistants
71 Technical draughtspersons
501 72 Wholesale and retail trade buyers, buyers
73 Salespersons
74
Publishing house dealers, booksellers until ser-vice-station
attendants
75 Commercial agents, travellers until mobile traders
502 76 Bank specialists until building society specialists
77
Health insurance specialists (not social security) until life,
property insurance specialists
78 Forwarding business dealers
79
Tourism specialists until cash collectors, cashiers, ticket sellers,
inspectors
503 80 Railway engine drivers until street attendants
81 Motor vehicle drivers
82 Navigating ships officers until air transport occupations
83 Post masters until telephonists
84 Warehouse managers, warehousemen
85 Transportation equipment drivers
86 Stowers, furniture packers until stores/transport workers
504 87 Entrepreneurs, managing directors, divisional managers
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88
Management consultants, organisors until char-tered accountants,
tax advisers
89
Members of Parliament, Ministers, elected offi-cials until
association leaders, officials
90 Cost accountants, valuers until accountants
91 Cashiers
92 Data processing specialists
93 Office specialists
94 Stenographers, shorthand-typists, typists until data typists
95 Office auxiliary workers
505 96 Factory guards, detectives until watchmen, custo-dians
97 Doormen, caretakers until domestic and non-domestic servants
98 Soldiers, border guards, police officers until judi-cial enforcers
506 99 Journalists until librarians, archivists, museum specialists
100 Musicians until scenery/sign painters
101
Artistic and assisting occupations (stage, video and audio) until
performers, professional sports-men, auxiliary artistic occupations
507 102 Physicians until Pharmacists
103
Non-medical practitioners until masseurs, physio-therapists and
related occupations
104 Nurses, midwives
105 Nursing assistants
106
Dietary assistants, pharmaceutical assistants until medical
laboratory assistants
107 Medical receptionists
508 108 Social workers, care workers until religious care helpers
109 Home wardens, social work teachers
110 Nursery teachers, child nurses
111
University teachers, lecturers at higher technical schools and
academies until technical, vocational, factory instructors
112 Music teachers, n.e.c. until other teachers
113 Economic and social scientists, statisticians until scientists n.e.c.
509 114 Hairdressers until other body care occupations
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115
Restaurant, inn, bar keepers, hotel proprietors, catering trade
dealers until waiters, stewards
116 Others attending on guests
117
Housekeeping managers until employees by household cheque
procedure
118
Laundry workers, pressers until textile cleaners, dyers and dry
cleaners
119 Household cleaners until glass, buildings cleaners
120
Street cleaners, refuse disposers until machinery, container
cleaners and related occupations
Note: Table shows the occupation groups. The 120 “SIAB groups” are provided in the
data set. The First column denotes the 30 aggregated occupational segments
(Berufsgruppen) used in the analysis.
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B.1 Data Appendix
This appendix briefly describes the variables used for each of the data sets and lists the
numbers of observations after the sample selection steps.
B.1.1 PSID
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. We identify current heads and spouses as those
individuals within the family unite with Sequence Number equal to 1 and 2, respectively.
In the PSID, the man is labelled as the household head and the woman as his spouse.
Only when the household is headed by a woman alone, she is considered the head. If the
family is a split-off family from a sampled family, then a new head is selected.
Age. The age variable recorded in the PSID survey does not necessarily increase by 1
from one year to the next. This may be perfectly correct, since the survey date changes
every year. For example, an individual can report being 20 years old in 1990, 20 in 1991,
and 22 in 1992. We thus create a consistent age variable by taking the age reported in
the first year that the individual appears in the survey and add 1 to this variable in each
subsequent year.
Education Level. In the PSID, the education variable is not reported every year and it
is sometimes inconsistent. To deal with this problem, we use the highest education level
that an individual ever reports as the education variable for each year. Since our sample
contains only individuals that are at least 25 years old, this procedure does not affect our
education variable in a major way.
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Income
Individual Male Wages and Salaries. This is the variable used for individual income
in the benchmark case. It is the answer to: How much did (Head) earn altogether from
wages or salaries in year t-1, that is, before anything was deducted for taxes or other
things? This is the most consistent earnings variable over time reported in the PSID, as
it has not suffered any redefinitions or change in subcomponents1.
Individual Male Labor Earnings. Annual Total Labor Income includes all income
from wages and salaries, commissions, bonuses, overtime and the labor part of self-
employment (farm and business income). Self-employment in PSID is split into asset
and labor parts using a 50-50 rule in most cases. Because this last component has been
inconsistent over time2, we subtract the labor part of business and farm income before
1993.
Individual Female Labor Earnings. There is no corresponding Wages and Salaries
variable for spouses. We use Wife Total Labor Income and follow a similar procedure
as in the case of heads.
Annual Hours. For heads and wives, it is defined as the sum of annual hours worked
on main job, extra jobs and overtime. It is computed using usual hours of work per week
times the number of actual weeks worked in the last year.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Head and wife labor earnings.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Pre-government household earnings
minus taxes plus public transfers, as defined below.
Taxes. The PSID reports own estimates for total taxes until 1991. For the remaining
years, we estimate taxes using TAXSIM.
Public Transfers. Transfers are considered at the family unit level, when possible. We
group social and welfare programs in three broad categories. Due to changes in the PSID
design, the specific definition of each program is different every year. We give an overview
below and leave the specific replication details for the online Data Appendix.
Household Disposable Income. We construct this variable from Household Tax-
able Income (Head’s and wife’s income from assets, earnings, and net profit from self-
employment) minus taxes plus public transfers.
1See Shin and Solon (2011) for a comparison of PSID male earnings variables in inequality analyses.
2In particular, total labor earnings included the labor parts of farm and business income up to the
1993 survey but not in subsequent waves.
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Transfers
We refer to Table 4.7 in the main text for a description of the three groups of programs
considered, as well as their subcomponents. In the PSID, obtaining an annual amount
of each type of benefits is almost wave-specific. Every few survey years, the level of
aggregation within the family unit and across welfare programs is different for at least
one of our groups. To impose some common structure, we establish the following rules.
For survey years 1970-19933 and 2005-2011, the total annual amount of each program
is reported for the head, spouse and others in the family unit. In occasions, the amount
appears combined for several or all members.4 Because in those cases it is impossible
to identify separate recipiency of each member, we consider the benefit amount of the
whole family. This is, we add up all available information for all family members, whether
combined or separately reported.
In survey years 1994-2003, most benefits (except Food Stamps and OASDI) are re-
ported separately for the head and the spouse only. The way amounts are reported changes
as well. First, the reported amount ($X) received is asked. Second, the frequency of that
amount ($X per year, per month, per week, etc) is specified. We convert all amounts to a
common frequency by constructing a monthly amount $x using these time values. Finally,
the head and spouse are asked during which months the benefit was received. The final
annual recipiency of transfers is then obtained multiplying $x by the number of months
this benefit was received. For Food Stamps and OASDI, we follow the rules described for
the other waves.
Detailed Sample Selection
We start with an initial sample of 584,392 SRC individuals interviewed between 1976 and
2011. We then impose the next criteria every year. The number of individuals kept at
each stage in the sample selection is listed in Table I. Previous to this selection process,
we have cleaned the raw data and corrected duplicates and inconsistencies (for example,
zero working hours with positive labor income). We also require that the individuals have
non top-coded observations in income.
1. The individual must be from the original main PSID sample (not from the Survey
of Economic Opportunities or Latino subsamples).
2. In the benchmark individual sample, we select male heads of family. In the reference
3Our main sample refers to survey years 1977-2011, but complementary results are provided for the
annual subsample of the PSID. This is, for 1970-1997. We drop the first two waves in all cases, since
benefits such as OASDI, UI and WC are only reported for the family head; and benefits such as SSI are
not reported at all.
4This is always the case for Food Stamps.
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household sample, we require at least two adult members in the unit and that
individuals had no significant changes in family composition. More specifically, we
require that they responded either “no change” or “change in family members other
than the head or wife” to the question about family composition changes.
3. The household must not have missing variables for the head or wife labor income,
or for education of the head. The individuals must not have missing income or
education themselves.
4. The individual must not have income observations that are outliers. An outlier is
defined as being in the top 1% of the corresponding year.
5. We require the income variable of analysis to be positive.
6. Household heads must be between 25 and 65 years old.
Table B.1: Number of Observations Kept in Each Step: PSID
Male Heads Households All Females
SRC 586,187 586,187 586,187
Family Composition 90,106 75,202 110,711
Non-Missing y or College 83,039 69,443 97,990
Positive Income 63,875 58,551 54,214
Outliers 63,065 57,262 53,257
Age Selection 54,593 50,102 45,330
Final #Obs for transitory changes 42,623 38,171 33,687
Final #Obs for persistent changes 34,985 30,985 27,269
Note: Table lists number of person-year, or household-year, observations in the three panels for the
sample from PSID.
B.1.2 LINDA
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. LINDA is compiled from the Income Register based
on filed tax reports and other registers. Statistics Sweden samples individuals and then
adds information for all family members, where family is defined for tax purposes. This
implies that there is no information about ’head of households’. We therefore define the
head of a household as the sampled male.
Age. As defined by Statistics Sweden
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Education Level. LINDA contains information about eduction from 1991 and onwards.
An individual is assigned “college” education if it has at least 3 years of university educa-
tion.
Private / Public employment An individual is defined as as working in the public
sector, if he/she works in public administration, health care or education. Linda contains
consistent comparable information for the years 1991 and onwards. For the years 1991-
92 the public sector employment is defined as those we use SNI90 codes 72000-72003,
90000-93999 and >=96000. For 1993-2006 we use SNI92 codes 64110-64202, 73000-74110,
75000-92000, 92500-92530 and >=96000. For 2007 we use SNI2007 codes 64110-64202,
73000-74110, 75000-92000, 92500-92530 and >=96000.
Income
For the years 1985-2010 we use the measures suggested by Statistics Sweden to be compa-
rable between years in LINDA. We construct comparable measure for the years 1979-1984.
Individual labor earnings. Labor earnings consist of wages and salaries, the part of
business income reported as labor income, and taxable compensation for sick leave and
parental leave.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Defined as the sum of individual
labor income within the family.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Post-government earnings is calcu-
lated as pre-government earnings minus taxes plus public transfers.
Household Disposable Income. Disposable income consists of the sum of factor in-
come and minus taxes and plus public transfers.
Taxes. LINDA provides observations of total taxes paid by the individual. Since taxed
paid on capital income constitute a small part of total tax payments, and since we cannot
separate taxes on capital income from those on labor income, we assume that all taxes
are labor income taxes.
Public Transfers. LINDA provides observations of total public transfers at the indi-
vidual level (Statistics Sweden has individualized transfers given to families) and at the
household level. We also consider three subcategories of transfer as listed below.
Transfers
Transfers in subcategory 1 and 3 are individual level transfers. Transfers in subcategory
2 are family level transfers but have been individualized by Statistics Sweden. For each
subcategory, we take all transfers received by all members of the households.
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 HH-level transfers subcategory 1 (labor market transfers): sum of unemployment
benefits received by all members of household.
 HH-level transfers subcategory 2 (family aid): sum of transfers to support families
received by all members of household.
 HH-level transfers subcategory 3 (pensions): sum of old-age pensions received by all
members of household.
Detailed Sample Selection
To be included in the individual sample the individual has to be sampled and between 25
and 60 years old. A family is included in the household sample if the sampled individual
is a man between 25 and 60 years old and there are at least two members aged 25-60 in
the family.
B.1.3 SIAB
We use the scientific use file SIAB-R7510 provided by the Institute for Employment Re-
search (IAB). The SIAB data from which the scientific use file is constructed is a 2%
random sample of all individuals covered by a dataset called IEB. This data set is from
four different sources, which can be identified in the data. For construction of our sam-
ple we use earnings data stemming from BeH (employee history) and transfer data from
LeH (benefit recipient history). Records in BeH are based on mandatory social security
notifications from employers and hence cover individuals working in employment subject
to social security, which excludes civil servants, students and self-employed. A new spell
starts whenever there is a new notification, which happens when either a new employ-
ment relationship changes, an ongoing contract is changed, or with the start of a calendar
year. BeH covers all workers subject to social security contributions, which excludes civil
servants, self-employed and students. For details on the data set see vom Berge et al.
(2013).
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. SIAB does not contain information on households.
We use only individual level data.
Age. Birth year is reported consistently in SIAB data.
Education Level. Each individual spell in SIAB contains information on the highest
degree of formal education as reported by the employer. In order to construct a consistent
measure of education we apply imputation rules proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
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Private / Public employment An individual is defined as as working in the public
sector, if he/she works in public administration, health care or education. SIAB contains
consistent comparable information for all years of the sample. We use the classification
WZ93 as provided in the data, which aggregates 3 digit codes of the original WZ93
classification into 14 categories. The industry of an employer is registered once a year and
assigned to the worker spells of that year. This implies that for some individual spells
there is no information on the industry. For each year a worker is assigned the industry
from the longest spell in that year. We classify as public employment those in sectors
13 (3-digit WZ93 801-804, 851-853: Education, social and health-care facilities) and 14
(751-753, 990: public administration, social security).
Income
Individual labor earnings. We calculate annual earnings as the sum of total earning
from all valid spells for each individual. As marginal employment spells were not reported
before 1999, we drop marginal employment in the years where they are reported to obtain
a time consistent measure. For the same reason we drop spells with reported average daily
wage rate below the highest marginal employment threshold in the sample period, which
is 14.15 Euros (in 2003 Euros). There are two drawbacks in the available data: structural
break of the wage measure in 1984 and top-coding.
Structural break in wage measure Since 1984 the reported average daily wage rate
from an employment spell includes one-time payments. We correct for this structural
break following a procedure based on Dustmann et al. (2009): we rank individuals from
1976 to 1983 into 50 quintiles of the annual full-time wage distributions. Then we fit
locally weighted regressions of the wage growth rate from 1982-1983 on the quintiles in
1983 and the same for 1983-1984. We then define as the correction factor the difference
between the quintile-specific smoothed value of wage growth between 1984 and 1983. The
underlying assumption is that wage growth should be higher from 1983-1984 because the
wage measure includes one-time payments. In order to control for overall wage growth
differences we subtract the average of the correction factor of the second to 20th quintiles.
The resulting percentile-specific correction factor is then applied to wages in 1976-1983.
Imputation of top-coded wages Before aggregating earnings from all spells we correct
full-time wage spells for the top-coding. We therefore follow Daly et al. (2014) and fit a
Pareto tail to the cross-sectional wage distribution. The Pareto distribution is estimated
separately for each year by age-group and sex. We define seven age groups: 25-29,30-
34,...,55-60. As starting point for the Pareto we choose the 60th percentile of the subgroup-
specific distribution. As in Daly et al. (2014), we draw one random number by individual
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which we then apply to the annual specific distributions when assigning a wage to the
top-coded workers. We apply the imputation method to the annual distribution of average
full-time wages and hence an individual can be below the cutoff limit if, e.g., from two
full-time spells in a year only one is top-coded. We therefore define as top-coding limit
the annual specific limit minus 3 DM (1995 DM) as in Dustmann et al. (2009).
Transfers
In SIAB we observe consistently over time unemployment benefits at the individual level.
Detailed Sample Selection
To be included in the sample the individual has to be between 25 and 60 years old and
earn a gross income above 520*0.5*minimum wage. We drop all workers which have at
least one spell reported in East Germany.
B.1.4 SOEP
Variables
Demographic and Socioeconomic
Head and Relationship to Head. For each individual in the sample, SOEP reports
the relationship to the head of household in any given wave. Whenever there is a non-
couple household, i.e., no spouse is reported, the reported head is classified as head.
Whenever we observe a couple household and the reported head is a male we keep this;
when the reported head is a female and the reported spouse is a male, we reclassify the
male to be head and the female to be spouse.
Age. The age is measured by subtracting year of birth from the current year.
Education Level. The education variable used categorizes the obtained maximum edu-
cation level by ISCED 1997. An individual with category 6 is assigned “college”education,
an individual with categories 1-5 is assigned “non-college”. Category 6 includes a degree
obtained from university, from technical college, from a university abroad, and a PhD.
An individual still in school (category 0) is assigned a missing. For a small number of
individuals the described procedure yields inconsistencies in the sense that for some year
t the assignment is “college” and some later year t+s the assignment is “non-college”; in
these cases we assign “college” to the later year.
Income and Hours
Individual labor income. Labor earnings are calculated from individual labor income
components and includes income from first job, secondary job, 13th and 14th salary,
christmas bonus, holiday bonus, profit sharing. For consistency with the PSID measure
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we assign 50% of income from self-employment to labor income.
Household level labor income. Defined as the sum of individual labor income of head
and spouse.
Annual Hours. SOEP measures the average actual weekly hours worked and the num-
bers of months an individual worked. From these measures SOEP provides a constructed
measure of annual hours worked of an individual.
Pre-Government Household Labor Earnings. Head and spouse labor earnings.
Post-Government Household Labor Earnings. Pre-government household earnings
minus taxes plus public transfers, as defined below.
Taxes. SOEP provides estimates of total taxes at the household level.
Public Transfers. Transfers are considered at the family unit level and at the individual
level. We group social and welfare programs in three broad categories as listed below.
Household Disposable Income. We construct this variable from Household Tax-
able Income (Head’s and wife’s income from assets, earnings, and net profit from self-
employment) minus taxes plus public transfers. SOEP provides a measure of household
asset flows, which is calculated as income from renting minus operating costs, plus divi-
dend income.
Transfers
Transfers are partly observed at the individual level and partly at the household level.
For each subcategory, we take all transfers received by all members of the households.
 HH-level transfers : we use transfers received by all individual household members
in order to calculate measures that are consistent over time. For each individual,
total transfers are the sum of the following components: old-age pensions, widow’s
pensions, maternity benefit, student grants, unemployment benefits, subsistence al-
lowance, unemployment assistance (up to 2004); at the hh-level we measure received
child allowances and the total unemployment benefits II received by all household
members (since 2005 replacing unemployment assistance).
 HH-level transfers subcategory 1 (labor market transfers): sum of unemployment
benefits received by all members of household.
 HH-level transfers subcategory 2 (family aid): sum of subsistence allowance of all
members, + sum of unemployment assistance received by all members (up to 2004),
+ hh-level measure of unemployment benefits II (since 2005).
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 HH-level transfers subcategory 3 (pensions): sum of old-age pensions received by all
members of household.
Sample Selection
In order to be in the initial sample for a year, the individual or household head must be
between ages 25 and 60 and live in West Germany. In order to have a consistent sample,
we drop the immigrant subsample and the high income subsample. This gives initial sam-
ple sizes of 87,582 individual-year observations for the male sample, 76,249 individual-year
observations for the female sample, and 76,051 household-year observations for the house-
hold sample. The sample selection then follows the steps listed below for each sample.
All cross-sectional statistics are calculated using appropriate cross-sectional individual or
household weights, respectively.
1. drop if no info on education or if no degree obtained yet
2. drop if currently working in military
3. drop if no info on income
4. drop if no info on hours worked
5. keep if income > 0 and hours > 520
6. drop if in highest percentile (sample outliers)
7. drop if below 520*0.5*minimum wage, where minimum wage is set to be 6¿ in year
2000 Euros
8. for transitory change measure: keep if in sample in t and t-1
9. for permanent change measure: keep if in sample in t and t-5
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Table B.2: Number of Observations Kept in Each Step: SOEP
selection step Male Heads Households All Females
initial 87,582 76,051 76,249
drop if no coll. info 86,737 75,310 75,270
drop if in military 86,712 75,293 75,268
drop if no obs on ymin 79,547 75,070 50,374
drop if no obs on hours 79,547 75,070 50,374
keep if >=520 hrs and ymin>0 77,265 71,389 42,245
drop top 1% of ymin per year 76,404 70,627 41,830
drop if ymin<.5*520*min wage 76,268 70,097 41,434
Final #Obs for transitory changes 64,572 59,209 31,612
Final #Obs for persistent changes 38,399 34,792 16,792
Note: Table lists number of person-year, or household-year, observations in the three panels for the
sample from SOEP.
B.2 Cyclicality of Individual Earnings by Groups
Tables B.3 to B.8 show results of the individual level earnings regressions discussed in
Chapter 4.4 by subgroups.
Table B.3: Cyclicality of Male Earnings, by Education Groups
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
College Graduates 0.25 0.58* 0.35* –0.10
(0.90) (1.97) (1.98) (–0.64)
Non-College –0.38 1.84*** 0.52* –0.90***
(–0.84) (4.17) (1.83) (–3.19)
Sweden
College Graduates –0.00 1.80*** 0.42 –0.42***
(–0.01) (4.93) (1.58) (–5.72)
Non-College –0.17 4.03*** 0.99*** –1.26***
(–1.52) (3.86) (3.39) (–3.53)
Germany (SIAB)
College Graduates 0.62 4.70*** 1.24** –0.61**
(1.01) (3.10) (2.17) (–2.29)
Non-College 0.10 5.26*** 0.89*** –0.79***
(0.25) (5.41) (3.07) (–3.78)
Note: See Table 4.2 for explanations.
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Table B.4: Cyclicality of Female Earnings, by Education Groups
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
United States
College graduates –0.60 1.08* 0.18 –0.78**
(–1.70) (1.77) (0.57) (–2.50)
Non-college 0.79*** 0.59 0.67*** 0.12
(3.59) (1.46) (3.14) (0.53)
Sweden
College graduates 0.13 1.15*** 0.64 –0.25
(0.31) (4.03) (1.22) (–1.74)
Non-college 0.50* 1.81*** 0.75*** –0.25**
(1.96) (3.40) (2.78) (–2.71)
Germany (SIAB)
College graduates 0.01 2.03 1.01 –1.00
(0.01) (1.65) (1.12) (–1.39)
Non-college 0.32 2.58** 0.77 –0.45*
(0.47) (2.08) (1.27) (–1.88)
Note: See Table 4.2 for explanations.
Table B.5: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings, by Sector of Employment, Males
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Sweden
Private 0.10 3.83*** 0.93*** –0.83***
(0.93) (4.02) (3.81) (–4.08)
Public –0.45*** 2.10*** 0.17 –0.62***
(–3.93) (6.55) (1.64) (–9.11)
Germany
Private 0.03 5.55*** 0.88*** -0.85***
(0.08) (6.44) (3.55) (–5.64)
Public 2.50 0.30 1.45 1.06
(1.16) (0.17) (1.08) (1.01)
Note: See Table 4.2 for explanations.
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Table B.6: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings, by Sector of Employment, Females
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Sweden
Private 0.50* 1.99*** 0.78** –0.29**
(1.87) (3.02) (2.81) (–2.43)
Public 0.18 1.10*** 0.34** –0.16**
(1.19) (3.29) (2.43) (–2.61)
Germany
Private 0.01 3.13** 0.73 –0.72***
(0.01) (2.44) (1.50) (–3.15)
Public 1.17 0.95 0.85 0.32
(0.84) (0.68) (0.85) (0.59)
Note: See Table 4.2 for explanations.
Table B.7: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings, by Occupational Segments, Males; Germany
(SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Distribution of Beta Coefficients
Mean 0.71 8.78 2.06 -1.35
P10 -0.83 3.68 0.90 -2.91
Median 0.46 8.35 1.75 -1.29
P90 2.62 13.09 3.29 -0.18
Standard Deviation 1.30 3.52 1.37 1.47
Min -1.55 2.36 0.66 -7.09
Max 4.56 17.87 7.89 1.30
Distribution of t-Statistics
Mean 0.34 4.11 2.59 -2.21
P10 -0.90 1.39 1.43 -4.93
Median 0.46 3.23 2.46 -2.22
P90 1.19 7.73 3.73 -0.18
Standard Deviation 0.87 2.71 1.07 1.79
Min -2.30 1.01 0.99 -6.62
Max 2.01 11.46 6.36 0.72
Note: The table displays moments of the distribution of beta-coefficients (upper panel) and
t-statistics (lower panel) from separate regressions for each of the 30 occupational segments.
See notes for Table 4.2.
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Table B.8: Cyclicality of Individual Earnings by Occupational Segments, Females; Ger-
many (SIAB)
L9010 Kelley L9050 L5010
Distribution of Beta Coefficients
Mean -0.10 6.87 1.98 -2.08
P10 -3.33 0.96 0.89 -4.45
Median 0.12 6.30 2.06 -2.00
P90 1.97 12.26 3.10 0.69
Standard Deviation 2.25 3.94 1.37 1.96
Min -6.40 -0.56 -4.13 -7.20
Max 3.61 13.50 3.80 0.84
Distribution of t-Statistics
Mean -0.11 2.35 1.43 -1.84
P10 -1.53 0.31 0.53 -4.28
Median 0.05 1.81 1.38 -1.35
P90 0.71 5.41 2.27 0.52
Standard Deviation 0.80 1.81 0.89 1.73
Min -2.06 -0.07 -0.72 -6.30
Max 0.95 6.15 4.04 0.61
Note: The table displays moments of the distribution of beta-coefficients (upper panel)
and t-statistics (lower panel) from separate regressions for each of the 30 occupational
segments. See notes for Table 4.2.
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B.3 Robustness of the Empirical Results
We perform a number of robustness checks for the analyses based on SIAB data, which
deal with (i) top-coding of incomes and (ii) a structural break in the income measure in
1984. In addition to Kelley’s skewness we consider two alternatives-2 versions of Hinkley’s
measure of skewness. Instead of L9050 and L5010, these measures relate L8550 and L5015
or L8050 and L5020, respectively.
The first four rows of table B.9 show the results of the regressions for male and female
earnings wages, respectively. The results are the ones from the main text and serve
for comparison to the robustness analyses. Columns 7-12 show the results for the two
versions of Hinkley’s skewness measures and the corresponding tails. Compared to Kelley’s
skewness and L9050 and L5010, the estimates show that the substantive conclusion is
robust also for these smaller log percentile differentials. Rows 5 and 6 show the results for
the wage regressions when applying a less strict criterion of working full-time for only 45
weeks in two consecutive years. Again, the results are as the reported ones for 50 weeks.
In order to ensure that top-coding does not drive our results, we redo the analysis
using reduced samples in which an individual is considered in the distribution of income
changes from t to t+1 only if income is below the top-coding thresholds in both t and t+1.
About 11% and 2% of all observations are top-coded in the male and female base samples,
respectively. Table B.10 shows the results of the respective regressions for earnings, wages,
and wages of firm stayers for both males and females. Second, we rerun the regressions
completely ignoring top-coding, i.e., all individuals from the base sample are in the sample
- but with their reported incomes again for earnings, wages, and wages of stayers. Results
are table B.11.
A rerun of the regression analysis using only observations after 1983, thereby dropping
all years for which the reported income measure does not include one-time payments such
as bonuses, does not change the results (lower panel of table B.11).
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TableB.9:SensitivityofRegressionResults-SIABI
StdDevL9010SkewKelleyL9050L5010Hinkley1Hinkley2L8550L8050L5015L5020
MaleEarnings0.070.1514.42***5.48***0.95***-0.80***5.84***5.85***0.51***0.32***-0.54***-0.36***
(0.42)(0.36)(4.28)(5.80)(3.14)(-4.11)(9.85)(7.51)(4.10)(3.57)(-4.77)(-3.43)
FemaleEarnings0.100.344.34*2.55**0.80-0.46*2.75**2.71***0.430.25-0.24**-0.14*
(0.47)(0.48)(1.77)(2.05)(1.25)(-1.80)(2.62)(3.85)(1.40)(1.65)(-2.56)(-1.87)
MaleWages0.01-0.0914.55***4.73***0.30***-0.39***4.94***4.88***0.22**0.18**-0.28**-0.20**
(0.23)(-0.54)(4.58)(6.31)(3.77)(-3.20)(4.35)(3.37)(2.59)(2.66)(-2.55)(-2.07)
FemaleWages0.040.038.98*2.12***0.17**-0.142.20***2.09***0.14**0.11**-0.09-0.04
(0.66)(0.18)(2.02)(5.11)(2.61)(-1.58)(4.79)(4.67)(2.68)(2.65)(-1.24)(-0.83)
MaleWages0.01-0.0813.20***4.65***0.31***-0.39***4.88***4.85***0.23**0.18***-0.29**-0.20**
(45weeks)(0.27)(-0.54)(4.55)(6.60)(3.90)(-3.30)(4.50)(3.48)(2.70)(2.78)(-2.61)(-2.09)
FemaleWages0.040.048.80*2.07***0.17**-0.142.20***2.10***0.14**0.12**-0.09-0.05
(45weeks)(0.72)(0.25)(2.02)(5.21)(2.72)(-1.57)(4.85)(4.72)(2.73)(2.66)(-1.23)(-0.84)
Note:SeenotesforTable4.2.
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Table B.10: Sensitivity of Regression Results - SIAB II
Std Dev L9010 Skew Kelley L9050 L5010 Hinkley 1 Hinkley 2 L8550 L8050 L5015 L5020
Not top-coded workers only:
Male Earnings 0.08 0.26 14.49*** 4.98*** 0.96** -0.70*** 4.83*** 4.65*** 0.48*** 0.31*** -0.44*** -0.28***
(0.41) (0.53) (4.26) (4.28) (2.53) (-3.07) (6.66) (8.86) (3.13) (3.40) (-4.06) (-3.08)
Male Wages -0.01 -0.05 8.76*** 3.39*** 0.23*** -0.28*** 3.49*** 3.36*** 0.19*** 0.14*** -0.20** -0.14*
(-0.14) (-0.29) (6.07) (10.76) (3.52) (-2.91) (8.43) (8.09) (3.74) (3.49) (-2.34) (-2.00)
Male Wages -0.03 -0.08 11.41*** 3.66*** 0.22*** -0.30*** 3.67*** 3.48*** 0.17*** 0.13*** -0.21** -0.14**
(stayers) (-0.75) (-0.52) (5.77) (9.09) (4.12) (-2.96) (7.52) (7.65) (4.14) (3.63) (-2.42) (-2.10)
Female Earnings 0.09 0.33 4.67* 2.54* 0.80 -0.46* 2.72** 2.67*** 0.43 0.25 -0.23** -0.13*
(0.45) (0.47) (1.90) (2.03) (1.24) (-1.83) (2.57) (3.76) (1.40) (1.67) (-2.46) (-1.71)
Female Wages 0.04 0.05 2.04 2.05*** 0.17** -0.12 2.11*** 2.12*** 0.13*** 0.11** -0.08 -0.05
(0.71) (0.31) (0.66) (4.42) (2.64) (-1.34) (4.10) (4.56) (2.77) (2.74) (-1.08) (-0.92)
Female Wages 0.02 0.03 3.87 2.17*** 0.16*** -0.12 2.25*** 2.18*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.08 -0.05
(stayers) (0.56) (0.25) (0.78) (4.11) (3.16) (-1.38) (4.04) (4.46) (3.24) (2.99) (-1.15) (-0.98)
Note: See notes for Table 4.2.
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TableB.11:SensitivityofRegressionResults-SIABIII
StdDevL9010SkewKelleyL9050L5010Hinkley1Hinkley2L8550L8050L5015L5020
IgnoreTop-Coding:
MaleEarnings0.070.1514.72***5.68***0.91***-0.76***5.97***6.17***0.48***0.30***-0.52***-0.37***
(0.40)(0.40)(4.30)(5.70)(3.14)(-4.68)(10.66)(8.02)(4.27)(3.46)(-5.60)(-4.51)
MaleWages-0.01-0.0913.36***4.93***0.29***-0.38***5.40***5.38***0.21**0.15*-0.30***-0.22***
(-0.27)(-0.69)(4.24)(7.59)(4.59)(-3.86)(5.11)(3.76)(2.57)(1.95)(-3.59)(-3.22)
MaleWages-0.04-0.1316.06***5.19***0.27***-0.39***5.55***5.36***0.19**0.14*-0.31***-0.22***
(stayers)(-1.15)(-1.06)(3.47)(6.67)(4.03)(-3.85)(4.63)(3.51)(2.11)(1.85)(-3.58)(-3.17)
FemaleEarnings0.100.344.36*2.51*0.79-0.45*2.70**2.63***0.410.24-0.23**-0.13*
(0.48)(0.48)(1.76)(2.02)(1.24)(-1.78)(2.61)(3.98)(1.39)(1.65)(-2.55)(-1.84)
FemaleWages0.030.021.912.03***0.15**-0.132.16***2.17***0.13**0.11**-0.09-0.05
(0.65)(0.16)(0.60)(4.79)(2.64)(-1.51)(4.68)(5.10)(2.74)(2.68)(-1.29)(-1.11)
FemaleWages0.020.013.522.20***0.14***-0.132.35***2.27***0.12***0.10***-0.09-0.05
(stayers)(0.48)(0.09)(0.75)(4.45)(3.31)(-1.58)(4.70)(4.90)(3.30)(3.01)(-1.40)(-1.18)
1984-2010:
MaleEarnings-0.04-0.0713.25***5.10***0.81***-0.88***5.82***6.22***0.46***0.31***-0.61***-0.42***
(-0.26)(-0.18)(3.84)(5.85)(2.96)(-3.99)(11.04)(9.21)(3.83)(3.12)(-5.48)(-4.33)
FemaleEarnings0.040.303.862.46*0.75-0.462.79**2.88***0.420.26-0.26**-0.16*
(0.21)(0.39)(1.51)(1.84)(1.10)(-1.65)(2.46)(3.65)(1.24)(1.49)(-2.29)(-1.87)
Note:SeenotesforTable4.2.
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B.4 Long-Run Earnings Growth
Figures B.1 to B.3 characterize the distribution of long-run earnings growth, i.e., five-year
changes for Germany and Sweden, and four-year changes for the United States
Figure B.1: Standard Deviation of Long-Run Earnings Growth: United States, Germany,
and Sweden
(a) United States (b) Sweden
(c) Germany
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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Figure B.2: Kelley Skewness of Long-Run Earnings Growth: United States, Germany,
and Sweden
(a) United States (b) Sweden
(c) Germany
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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Figure B.3: Standard Deviation, Skewness, and Tails of Long-Run Earnings Growth:
Germany, IAB Sample
(a) Standard Deviation: Males (b) Kelley Skewness: Males
(c) Upper and Lower Tails: Males
Note: Linear trend removed, centered at sample average.
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B.5 Details on the Estimation and Simulation
Parametric Specification
Let Yt denote household earnings in period t, and define yt ≡ log Yt. We assume yt evolves
according to the following process:
yt = zt + θt (B.1)
zt = zt−1 + ζt
where εt is an iid transitory shock with distribution N (µθ, σθ),5 and ζt denotes a perma-
nent shock with time-varying and business-cycle dependent distribution. In particular, ζt
follows a mixture of three normals:
ζt ∼

N (µ1t,, σ1) with probability p1
N (µ2t, σ2) with probability p2
N (µ3t, σ3) with probability p3
(B.2)
where
∑3
j=1 pj = 1.
We follow McKay (2016) and incorporate the dynamics of aggregate risk in the stochas-
tic component of household earnings, as opposed to imposing discrete events for recessions
and expansions. Namely, the time-varying means are specified as:
µ1t = µ¯t
µ2t = µ¯t + µ2 − φxt (B.3)
µ3t = µ¯t + µ3 − φxt
where µ¯t is a normalization such that E(e
ζt) = 1 for all t, and xt ≡ −(log
GDPt+1
GDPt
)
captures the business cycle.6 We use GDP growth as the empirical measure of aggregate
fluctuations in order to make the quantitative results easily interpretable in relation to
the empirical estimates shown in section 4.4. The parameter φ determines how much of
aggregate risk is transmitted to idiosyncratic earnings risk and will be estimated alongside
the other parameters that drive the distributions of the shocks.
Notice that business-cycle risk is transmitted to household earnings only through the
permanent shock. Blundell et al. (2016), among others, concluded that transitory shocks
are almost entirely insurable by the household. That is, transitory shocks barely affect
5µθ is chosen such that E
(
eθ
)
= 1.
6To be precise, in the estimation we standardize log GDP changes.
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consumption decisions or welfare. Therefore, we refrain from unnecessarily complicating
our model and leave the transitory shock as in the standard case.
The vector of parameters left to be estimated is:
θ = (σθ, p1, µ2, µ3, σ1, σ2, φ)
Estimation
We estimate θ by Method of Simulated Moments (MSM). We target the time series of
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the 1, 3, and 5-year earnings changes distribution,
as well as the age profile of the cross-sectional variance from age 25 to 60. In the case
of the United States, we target the 2, 4, and 6-year changes. For ease of notation, we
will describe our methodology taking Sweden and Germany as reference; the adaptation
to the US case is trivial. The total number of moments varies by country. The specific
number in each case is included in table B.12.
To construct the simulated income profiles over time, we write earnings growth as a
function of the shocks, using equation (B.1):
yt+τ − yt = θt+τ − θt +
τ∑
j=1
ζt+j , (B.4)
for the different horizons τ = 1, 3, 5.
The simulated series of the life-cycle variance profile of log earnings is computed as
follows. We assume a time-invariant distribution of shocks by imposing xt ≡ 0 in equation
(B.3). Notice that this assumes that the variance accumulates linearly over the life cycle.
We then normalize the series so that the variance at age 25 in the simulation is 0. Finally,
we rescale the resulting simulated profile to have the mean of its empirical counterpart.
We simulate these profiles R = 10 times and compute the moments corresponding
to the aforementioned targets. To find θˆ, we next minimize the average scaled distance
between the simulated and empirical moments. A weighting matrix is used to scale the
life-cycle profile. In particular, we weight the variance profile with 0.2 and the remaining
moments with 0.8. For the optimization part, we use a global version of the Nelder-Mead
algorithm with several quasi-random restarts, as described in Guvenen (2011).
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Simulation of Income Profiles
Let cmn denote the empirical moment n (n = 1, · · · , N) that corresponds to cross-sectional
target m, where
m ∈ {p10(∆1yt), p10(∆
3yt), p10(∆
5yt), · · · , var(yage=25), ..., var(yage=60)}.
In each simulation, we draw a vector of random variables
Xr = {ε1, ε2, ..., εT−1, εT , ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζT−1, ζT},
where T denotes the last year available in the data in levels. We simulate these profiles
R = 10 times. In order to accommodate the mean shift of the distribution of earnings
changes over time, we shift the simulated earnings changes such that the mean of the 1
year earnings changes fits the data.7
Optimization
We minimize the scaled deviation F (θ) between each data and simulated moment.
minθF (θ)
′WF (θ),
where F is defined as:
Fn(θ) =
dmn (θ)− c
m
n
|cmn |+ γ
m
dmn (θ) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
dmn (θ,Xr)
Notice that the scaling can be problematic in the case of the P50 and the mean, which
are very close to zero. γm is chosen such that, for those two moments, the denominator
is, on average, equal to the sample average of the P90 moment. The average is calculated
within the same group m. This is,
7For the US, we use the annual waves of the PSID to calculate the 1-year changes mean for the period
1976-1996. For the remaining of the sample, we annualized the biennial changes.
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γm = 1
T−1
[∑T−1
i=1 |c
p90,1
n | −
∑T−1
i=1 |c
m
n |
]
for m ∈ {p50(∆1yt)}
γm = 1
T−3
[∑T−3
i=1 |c
p90,3
n | −
∑T−3
i=1 |c
m
n |
]
for m ∈ {p50(∆3yt)}
γm = 1
T−5
[∑T−5
i=1 |c
p90,5
n | −
∑T−5
i=1 |c
m
n |
]
for m ∈ {p50(∆5yt)}
and γm = 0 otherwise.
Because our goal is to capture as closely as possible the business cycle fluctuations of
idiosyncratic income risk, we impose the mean of the medium-run income changes to be
as in the data. We adjust the weighting matrix such that the cross-sectional moments get
a weight of 80% and the life cycle moments get a weight of 20%.
Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
As noted at the beginning of this section, we estimate income processes for pre-government
household labor income and, separately, for post-government household income. Tables
B.13a and B.13b show the parameter estimates for the three economies under both scenar-
ios. For each country and income measue, figures B.4 to B.9 show the empirical moments
and the simulated moments implied by the estimated paramters.
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Table B.12: Estimated parameter values
Parameter Description Value
US Sweden Germany
p1 Weight of center of ζ distribution 0.9711 0.9628 0.9388
p2 Weight of right tail of ζ distribution 0.0144 0.0186 0.0306
p3 Weight of left tail of ζ distribution 0.0144 0.0186 0.0306
σε St. dev. of transitory income shock 0.2101 0.1048 0.1501
σ1,ζ St. dev. of center of ζ distribution 0.1077 0.0872 0.0785
σ2,ζ St. dev. of right tail of ζ distribution 0.0343 0.0079 0.0016
σ3,ζ St. dev. of left tail of ζ distribution 0.0343 0.0079 0.0016
µ2 Mean of right tail of ζ distribution 0.1380 0.0940 0.0000
µ3 Mean of left tail of ζ distribution -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.4125
φ Aggregate risk transmission parameter 0.5738 0.5968 0.4045
M # moments targeted in estimation 252 297 261
(a) Pre-Government Earnings
Parameter Description Value
US Sweden Germany
p1 Weight of center of ζ distribution 0.9765 0.9434 0.9294
p2 Weight of right tail of ζ distribution 0.0118 0.0283 0.0353
p3 Weight of left tail of ζ distribution 0.0118 0.0283 0.0353
σε St. dev. of transitory income shock 0.1921 0.0869 0.1385
σ1,ζ St. dev. of center of ζ distribution 0.0902 0.0452 0.0523
σ2,ζ St. dev. of right tail of ζ distribution 0.0113 0.0007 0.0000
σ3,ζ St. dev. of left tail of ζ distribution 0.0113 0.0007 0.0000
µ2 Mean of right tail of ζ distribution 0.2313 0.1002 0.0000
µ3 Mean of left tail of ζ distribution -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.1526
φ Aggregate risk transmission parameter 0.3893 0.3231 0.3131
M # moments targeted in estimation 252 297 261
(b) Post-Government Earnings.
Note: Estimated parameters for the different countries and income variables. For details o
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Figure B.4: Pre-Government Income Fit: United States
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Note: Each panel shows the time series of a moment of short-run, medium-run, or long-run income
changes together with the correspoinding moment implied by the estimated income process.
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Figure B.5: Pre-Government Income Fit: Sweden
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Note: See notes to figure B.4.
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Figure B.6: Pre-Government Income Fit: Germany
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Note: See notes to figure B.4.
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Figure B.7: Post-Government Income Fit: United States
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Note: See notes to figure B.4.
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Figure B.8: Post-Government Income Fit: Sweden
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Note: See notes to figure B.4.
152 APPENDIX B. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4
Figure B.9: Post-Government Income Fit: Germany
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Note: See notes to figure B.4.
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B.6 Quantitative Model
Given estimates of the income process, we scale the parameters of the permanent shocks
ζ to feed them into the model - fraction λis insurable and the rest is uninsurable. This
scaling implies that the first three standardized moments of the distribution of insurable
shocks are given as below - for the first three moments of the uninsurable shocks, simply
replace λ with 1− λ.
E [ηt] =
3∑
i=1
piµη,i,t =
3∑
i=1
piλ
1/2µi,t = λ
1/2
3∑
i=1
piµi,t = λ
1/2E [ζt] ≡ λ
1/2µζ,t
var [ηt] =
3∑
i=1
pi
(
σ2η,i + µ
2
η,i,t
)
− (E [ηt])
2 =
3∑
i=1
pi
(
λσ2i + λµ
2
i,t
)
−
(
λ1/2E [ζt]
)2
= λ
(
3∑
i=1
pi
(
σ2i + µ
2
i,t
)
−E [ζt]
2
)
= λvar [ζt]
skew [ηt] =
1
var [ηt]
3/2
3∑
i=1
pi (µη,i,t −E [ηt])
[
3σ2η,i + (µη,i,t − E [ηt])
2]
=
1
λ3/2var [ζt]
3/2
3∑
i=1
pi
(
λ1/2µi,t − λ
1/2E [ζt]
) [
3λσ2i +
(
λ1/2µi,t − λ
1/2E [ζt]
)2]
=
1
λ3/2var [ζt]
3/2
3∑
i=1
piλ
1/2 (µi,t − E [ζt])
[
λ
(
3σ2i + (µi,t −E [ζt])
2)]
=
1
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3/2
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[(
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